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ABSTRACT 
 
Elizabeth Stockton 
 
Troubling Women:  
American Fictions of Marriage and Property, 1848-1867 
 
(Under the direction of Eliza Richards) 
 
This study connects the domestic novel’s period of extraordinary success, from 
approximately 1845 to 1865, to the legal developments of the early nineteenth century. 
During this period, both discourses responded to the volatile antebellum economy by 
endorsing women’s removal from the marketplace. In order to limit speculation and create 
stability, legal rhetoric and literary narratives alike idealized marriage as a status, or 
hierarchical, relationship, even as other relationships were rewritten in contractual terms.  
Within the context of the project, then, fiction takes on a double meaning.  While 
legal discourse circulated “legal fictions”—rhetorical structures that shaped people’s 
discussions of marriage—domestic novels envisioned the range of possibilities for women 
even within the confines of an inferior legal status.  
“Troubling Women” traces the domestic novel’s development in tandem with 
legislative debates and judicial decisions, elucidating why these discourses resisted domestic 
contracts and promoted status and protectionism. It begins with a historical overview, 
followed by an examination of James Fenimore Cooper’s The Pioneers—a prototypical 
domestic plot in which an heiress’s right marriage restores the “natural aristocracy.” 
Focusing on narratives of the 1850s and 1860s by a range of authors—including Nathaniel 
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Hawthorne, Herman Melville, E.D.E.N. Southworth, Caroline Lee Hentz, Frank J. Webb, 
and Harriet Jacobs—the project illustrates how, in the intervening decades of increasing 
market dominance, Cooper’s proposed solution had become untenable. Like Cooper’s novel, 
these texts endorse women’s inferior legal status, but they also illustrate that women’s 
relationship to property had become an unsettled and contested question. The project 
concludes with an exploration of Elizabeth Stoddard’s novels from the 1860s, which 
highlight the profound costs of idealizing women’s legal inferiority, an increasingly 
indefensible construction in the wake of emancipation.  
Grounded in historical detail, this project demonstrates how the domestic novel 
defused the culture’s fear of the market by reimagining women’s relationship to property.  
By detailing domestic novels’ complex engagements with legal discourse, “Troubling 
Women” rejects the persistent claims that these texts either unconsciously reflected or 
actively subverted conservative ideologies; instead it underscores the range of the genre’s 
political commitments. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MARRIAGE, STATUS, AND STABILITY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 
 In 1855, prominent women’s rights activist Lucy Stone married Henry Blackwell, and 
as a part of their marriage ceremony, the two published a protest against contemporary 
marriage law.1  Stone had long been opposed to the institution of marriage and particularly 
the concept of coverture.2  She believed that women should be able to own property, control 
their earnings, make wills, and sue in a court of law—all actions that, if she were ever to 
become a wife, she would no longer legally be able to do.  Over a series of letters, Blackwell 
sought to convince Lucy that the laws of coverture did not need to affect them.  As long as 
they could agree with one another about how their marriage should be structured, he argued, 
“such laws would not exist” (Wheeler 108).  In other words, Blackwell proposed that the two 
establish their own rules for marriage.  Their protest announced their unique arrangement, 
and it also condemned contemporary marriage law for its injustices: 
We believe…that marriage should be an equal and permanent partnership, 
and so recognized by law; that until it is so recognized, married partners 
should provide against the radical injustice of present laws, by every means 
in their power. 
We believe that, where domestic difficulties arise, no appeal should be 
made to legal tribunals under existing laws, but that all difficulties should 
be submitted to the equitable adjustment of arbitrators mutually chosen. 
Thus, reverencing law, we enter our earnest protest against rules and 
customs which are unworthy of the name, since they violate justice, the 
essence of all law. (Blackwell 167-68) 
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In their protest, Stone and Blackwell asserted that because the law does not view marriage 
correctly—as a relationship between two equals—they would not use the court system and 
would instead rely on arbitrators, should any domestic disputes arise between them.   
Yet, as legal scholars have pointed out, Stone and Blackwell’s agreement was not 
legally binding, and it certainly did not grant Lucy equal standing with her husband.  If 
Henry Blackwell ever decided to violate their marriage agreement and bring a domestic 
dispute to the courts, rather than to an arbitrator—if, for example, he sued for exclusive 
custody of their children—a judge would likely have rendered their marriage agreement null 
and void and then ruled in favor of Blackwell.  This is because, according to nineteenth-
century law, the husband and wife shared one legal identity, and so the wife could not enter 
into a contract with her own husband.  In addition, although marriage was referred to as a 
contract, the two parties had no control over its terms, and they could not privately dissolve 
it.  To put it another way: if marriage was a contract, it was a contract like no other.  By 
getting married, then, Stone and Blackwell committed not only to each other; they also bound 
themselves to the dictates of the U.S. legal system, which they had condemned as unjust.   
Stone and Blackwell never did bring a domestic dispute to the courts, but their 
agreement underscores the law’s insistence on limiting women’s legal powers, which seems 
particularly unusual in the context of an historical period that supposedly moved “from status 
to contract.”  This resistance to women’s contractual abilities and legal rights can be 
attributed to the enormous legal and economic changes in early nineteenth-century America.  
As legal practitioners attempted to distinguish U.S. law from its British legacy, legislators, 
judges, and jurists recognized the need to revise and better articulate the structure of 
marriage.  In their attempts to standardize domestic law, they also sought to explain wives’ 
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legal inferiority in a way that would be amenable to American democracy.  They privileged a 
model of the family held together by affective bonds in which everyone has a distinct role, 
rather than a feudalistic model in which a male patriarch is “king” of the household.  
Nevertheless, women’s inferior legal position persisted, particularly in the form of the legal 
fiction of marital unity—the notion that the wife’s legal identity was subsumed under her 
husband’s.  Legal fictions such as marital unity allowed lawmakers to envision ideals and 
possibilities.  Regardless of the extent to which real wives actually asserted their 
independence or sold goods in the marketplace, the law imagined an ideal wife removed 
from market volatility and speculation.  This removal provided a hope for stability amidst 
tremendous change.  Thus, during the early decades of the nineteenth century, women’s 
inferior legal position became imbued with imaginative significance as a source of constancy 
and security.  This project investigates the rhetorical function of the idealized portrayal of 
women in both legal and literary fictions, and it subsequently redefines the domestic novel as 
a genre engaged with—and even enabled by—the imaginative significance of women’s 
inferior legal position. 
 
 Before investigating the role of marriage in nineteenth-century literature, we must 
first examine the way the law defined marriage in the nineteenth century.  Today, historians 
and literary scholars often focus on the unequal legal structure of marriage as a symbol of 
nineteenth-century America’s commitment to a patriarchal society.  In particular, these 
scholars highlight the concept of marital unity—a theory found throughout common law that 
required the wife’s legal identity be merged into her husband’s—as an affront to our modern, 
more egalitarian sensibilities.  In addition, wives could not enter into contracts, could not sue 
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or be sued, and could not hold property in their own names.  In short, they had no legal 
identity under nineteenth-century American common law. 3 However, as recent legal 
scholarship has demonstrated, such a monolithic view underestimates the complexity of 
nineteenth-century American legal theory and practice.4 
 In spite of their disabilities under common law in the early nineteenth century, wives 
were able to hold property in a separate estate by using the equity courts.  Through a 
complicated process of legal changes, which occurred in Britain and were then transferred to 
the American colonies, equity emerged as a separate jurisdiction from common law, and 
courts of equity also became responsible for distributing inheritances and administering wills.  
Equity allowed for antenuptial agreements and, most importantly, the creation of trusts for 
women.  These trusts allowed wives to set aside property and legally disallow their husbands 
access to it.  Though the wives did not technically own the wealth in the trust, an appointed 
trustee would administer it specifically for the woman’s benefit, and she was entitled to all of 
the proceeds from it.  If a husband encountered financial difficulties, he could sell his wife’s 
personal property.  He could not, however, gain access to the wealth in her trust, and neither 
could his creditors.  Through equity, women, especially women with significant property, 
could gain “economic autonomy far beyond the limits of the common law” (Basch 21). 
 With the rise of the commercial economy in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century, equity became increasingly problematic for the U.S. legal system.  First, because of 
the expense involved in using equity courts, equity was only available to the very wealthy.  
As the American middle class developed, more families wanted to protect women’s property 
in a separate estate.  In addition, equity procedures had been designed for the needs of an 
English economic system based in land, not the emerging American industrial economy.5  As 
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a result, an increasing number of legislators demanded a revision of equity in an attempt to 
systematize and democratize American legal practices.  The call for married women’s 
property laws was tied directly to the codification movement.  Between the years of 1815 and 
1820, most states provided for the wife’s ability to create a separate estate via a simple 
antenuptial agreement without the need for a trust. 6  By the mid-1840s most states were 
moving toward abolishing chancery courts and creating a single court system.  It was at this 
point that state legislators generally passed married women’s statutes. 7  Although these new 
laws varied in the capacities they afforded wives, they were all intended to codify equity 
(Rabkin 22).   
As many legal historians have emphasized, this first wave of married women’s 
property reform was not intended to revise the legal structure of marriage.  “These acts, 
usually adopted with little lobbying from women,” writes legal scholar Richard Chused, 
“created a special set of assets available for family use when husbands found themselves in 
trouble with creditors” (1361).  Legislators were motivated to pass the laws primarily 
because of a series of economic panics in the first three decades of the nineteenth century: 
“Severe economic dips like the Panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression encouraged 
legislatures to pass statutes insulating the wife’s property from the husband’s creditors” 
(Basch, “Invisible Women,” 135).  These statutes protected this property by mandating that a 
husband could not sell his wife’s separate estate without the wife’s explicit, notarized 
agreement.8  In other words, they attempted to secure one source of family property from the 
increasing commodification within the American economy.  Often, legislators who supported 
such laws did so as a way to protect vulnerable daughters from potentially irresponsible sons-
in-law.9  The intent of these laws was to make it more difficult to involve a woman’s 
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inherited property in speculative arrangements.  As Alexander notes, “the result, while surely 
not making contracting separate property assets impossible, nevertheless did create 
something of a drag on the assets’ ready marketability” (175).  Married women’s property 
reforms allowed men to enter into market relations more securely, knowing that one aspect of 
family wealth would remain stable and protected.  As Chused concludes: 
If the new model of family finance appearing in the first half of the 
nineteenth century called for men to undertake financial risks for the 
benefit of their families, then setting aside wives’ property simply provided 
another body of exempt assets when the risk taking went sour….Since 
women generally had less property than their husbands, it was logical that 
legislators would see wives’ property as a safe way of adding to the pool of 
assets insulated from attachment. (1402-03) 
The first wave of married women’s property laws did not alter the status foundation of the 
marriage relationship.  Rather, these laws were an attempt to accommodate the changing 
notions of American property.10 
Although the new statutes made equity protections more available to women of 
broader economic background, the decline of equity meant that a husband and wife had less 
power to negotiate the terms of their marriage.  Instead, the common law’s view of marriage 
became more pervasive and more difficult to amend on an individual basis.  As Norma Basch 
argues, “While equity precedents recognized marriage as an individual bargain in which the 
contracting parties set their own financial terms, the common law depicted marriage as a 
monolithic institution in which the state imposed uniform rules for marital property” 
(“Invisible Women,” 135).  These uniform rules for marital property were established by 
state legislators, various court cases, and nineteenth-century American legal treatises.  As 
American jurisprudence distanced itself from British precedent, jurists recognized the need to 
articulate the practices and principles of American law, and over the course of nineteenth-
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century American legal treatises we can trace an increased emphasis on marriage as a status 
relationship. 
Although nineteenth-century jurists, judges, and legislators referred to the marriage as 
a contract, the legal construction of marriage was much more complicated than this term 
implies.11  In the sense that marriage established a relationship between two parties, it 
resembled other contracts.  However, legal theorists of the period believed that marriage was 
more of a relationship of status, rather than a true contractual relationship.  Here, the word 
“status” does not suggest broader concepts such as “state,” “condition,” or “position”—as in 
the phrase “trying to attain a middle-class status.”  In legal terms, status refers to a 
relationship in which each party possesses “relatively fixed rights and obligations” and 
performs “specific interrelated roles” that are codified by the state (Regan 6).  The individual 
parties of a status relationship cannot set the terms of their rights and obligations within the 
relationship; instead, their roles are “subject to a set of publicly imposed expectations largely 
independent of the preferences of the person who holds that status” (Regan 9).   
 The status construction of marriage was inextricably tied to the concept of marital 
unity, a principle derived primarily from William Blackstone’s highly influential 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765).  According to Blackstone, a husband and wife 
share one legal identity.  As he states, once a woman becomes a wife, her legal identity is 
subsumed by that of her husband, “under whose wing, protection, and cover she performs 
everything: and is therefore called in our law…a feme covert” (Blackstone I:442).12  Marital 
unity technically prevented a wife from holding property, suing in her own name, or entering 
into contracts because she did not have a legal identity of her own; theoretically, in the eyes 
of the law she did not exist.13   
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The first extended discussion of marriage in American legal letters was Tapping 
Reeve’s The Law of Baron and Femme (1816).  With his treatise, Reeve primarily sought to 
“Americanize the English common law,” and he presented American law as he believed it 
should be (Grossberg 21).  Reeve, who had been active in Revolutionary politics, was critical 
of wives’ legal disadvantages, often drawing on the liberal rhetoric of late eighteenth-century 
America.  Although Reeve claimed that marriage resembled most other civic contracts, “he 
managed to arrive at equally patriarchal results [as the common law]…by emphasizing the 
principle of male coercion” (Basch, Eyes of the Law, 58).  Reeve rejected the common law’s 
prohibition against wives making wills, but he accepted the view that a husband and wife 
could not enter into a contract with one another.  According to Reeve, the husband always 
had the power to coerce his wife into an agreement, and the common law’s structure simply 
reflected this natural fact.  Because of male coercion, Reeve argued that equity—and the 
protections it afforded married women—was one of the core principles of English law that 
America should retain. 
In contrast to Reeve, New York chancery chancellor James Kent’s Commentaries on 
American Law (1826) and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s Conflict of Laws 
(1833) further supported the fiction of marital unity, and they explicitly emphasized marriage 
as a status relationship rather than a “mere” civil contract.  Their texts, however, did not 
centrally focus on the issue of marriage laws, as did Massachusetts lawyer Joel Bishop’s 
Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce (1852).  Written almost four decades 
after Reeve’s treatise, Bishop’s text was not concerned with how American law ought to be.  
Rather, Bishop presented it as a logical system, which he merely needed to explain.  Bishop 
disagreed with Reeve that marriage primarily resembled other private contracts.  Instead, he 
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focused on the social component of the marriage arrangement.  As legal historian Michael 
Grossberg claims,  “Bishop charged that blurring the differences between marital and other 
pacts made for legal confusion and perpetuated a misreading of law’s basic principles….He 
lamented that true legal principle has been lost by sloppy use of the now ambiguous contract 
label” (Grossberg 22).   
Bishop’s influential legal treatise provided the central paradigm for understanding 
marriage as a status relationship for mid-nineteenth century legal practitioners.14  In Bishop’s 
view, two people’s initial decision to marry did constitute a contract.  After the civil marriage 
ceremony, though, the husband and wife were “no longer governed by contract…but by the 
law” (Bishop 308).  Bishop certainly was not the first to propose this progression of marriage 
from contract to status.  The most notable forerunner for his view was an 1838 Kentucky 
case, Maguire v. Maguire, in which Judge George Robertson argued that marriage was not a 
contract in any conventional understanding of the term.  It was “controlled by the sovereign 
power of the state” and could not “be dissolved by mutual consent only of the contract 
parties” (Maguire v. Maguire 181).  According to this view, the marriage contract was a 
unique arrangement because of its structure. 15  First, once the marriage contract was 
executed, it lost many of the integral qualities of a contract.  One of the parties (the woman) 
lost her civic identity and, hence, the ability to contract any further; the contract itself, 
therefore, foreclosed the possibility of further contract.  This belief that marriage was 
essentially a wife’s final contract continued well past the Civil War until it came under more 
direct attack by women rights activists of the period.16 
While Blackstone described marriage as analogous to a master-servant relationship, 
American jurists distanced themselves from such a formulation because of its feudalistic 
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implications.17  Although the belief that marriage was a status relation persisted and even 
gained momentum in the mid-nineteenth century, the way wives’ inferior status was justified 
did change.  Legal treatises moved away from describing marriage as a relation of master and 
slave.  As legal historian Reva Siegel demonstrates: 
Far less frequently did courts assert that a husband had authority over his 
wife or property rights in her services.  Instead, as courts struggled to 
explain why a married woman…lacked ordinary forms of legal recourse 
against her husband, judges invoked nineteenth-century conceptions of 
domesticity and companionate marriage to justify the relationship of 
husband and wife in new terms. (“Equal Protection,” 1118)   
Thus, wives’ status became justified through the mutual affection between husband and wife.  
Wives purportedly did not need equal civil rights because they were protected by their 
husbands’ affection and because equal rights might endanger the domestic sphere—a sphere 
increasingly conceptualized as antithetical to the competitive and purely contractual 
marketplace.  In a New York case in 1858, Cropsey v. Sweeney, the judge claimed that a 
wife performed services “not as a servant, with a view of pay, but from higher and holier 
motives” (qtd. in Isenberg, 174).18  Even after the next wave of property rights reform in the 
early 1860s, “a wife [still] could not enforce a contract with her husband compensating [her] 
for her work performed in the family sphere because such labor was to be performed 
altruistically, rather than self-interestedly: for love, not pay” (Siegel, “Equal Protection,” 
1118).  The law maintained that a woman’s labor for her family came not from contractual 
motives, but from altruistic ones; her labor did not require any payment because it was its 
own reward.19   
Wives’ continued lack of self-possession flew in the face of traditional 
understandings of the relationship between labor, property, and self-ownership, drawn most 
commonly from John Locke.20  In the Second Treatise Locke asserts that the natural 
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condition of men is “a State of perfect Freedom to…dispose of their Possessions…without 
asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man” (287).  Classical liberalism 
maintained that self-possession was essential for participating in government and attaining 
the full rights of a legal citizen.  To participate actively and without bias in the body politic, a 
man could not be under another man’s sway or duress.  In the early decades after the 
Revolution, self-possession was grounded in property ownership; property in land 
represented a wealth that one could always depend on and that could not be taken away.   
As the law adapted to the changing market economy, jurists and legislators supported 
the commodification of land in order to facilitate commerce.  Charles Sellers notes that a 
central moment in the market revolution occurred when legal practitioners revised 
inheritance laws in order “to make land a freely marketable commodity” (52).  As property 
became more fluid and wage labor became more common, self-possession shifted from land 
ownership to being grounded in a core sense of the self.  In other words, there was a kernel of 
the self that could not be alienated away in labor.  Following this conception of self-
possession, “all of the individual’s labor power is alienable in its transformation into a 
commodity, but the whole of the person is not…. The laborer, by this account, retains an 
essence of self into which market relations simply cannot penetrate” (Coviello 48). 
Following Locke’s theory, ownership occurred as a result of labor; yet married 
women’s labor did not lead to ownership or, more importantly, self-possession.  Instead, 
wives’ household labor was viewed as a natural outgrowth of their affection, and judges and 
jurists repeatedly denied that this labor led directly to complete self-determination or to wage 
compensation.  In addition, the common law adoption of married women’s property laws 
created stability of real property for a family.  As we have seen, men could engage in market 
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speculation with the assurance that an aspect of family wealth was protected from creditors 
and, therefore, the dangers of speculation.  
The status construction of marriage, in tandem with property laws that protected 
wives’ assets from commodification, sheltered wives from the volatility of the commercial 
economy.  The wife—removed from the marketplace—took on the role that land once had: 
she represented a kind of property that could not enter the market and, therefore, could not 
fluctuate in value.  In this way, the structure of marriage in antebellum America helped 
sustain male self-possession.  As Hendrik Hartog notes, the fiction of marital unity “helped 
establish the terms of republican male citizenship” (Hartog 110).  In other words, a wife 
came to signify that kernel of the self that a man retained despite his contractual obligations.   
This project examines the interchange between the legal fiction of marital unity and 
the domestic fiction within the antebellum literary marketplace.  Although legal practitioners 
recognized that marital unity could only truly exist in the language of the law, the fiction of 
marital unity “was so pervasive…that it affected as well as reflected attitudes toward women 
and marriage” (Basch, “Invisible Women,” 133).  Indeed, the law gains power in culture as a 
discourse, and as such, it relies on narrative, fictions, and interpretations, just as literary 
discourse does.  Yet while legal discourse codified protectionism and hierarchy in order to 
limit financial speculation, novels of the period imagined the multifaceted ways that married 
women could provide stability.  Thus, the term “fiction” takes on a double meaning in this 
project: while legal fictions generated rhetorical structures that shaped people’s discussions 
of marriage, literary fictions envisioned a range of possibilities for women even within the 
limitations of status.   
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It is not that the law and literature could hegemonically dictate and control people’s 
private relationships.  Rather, because of their narrative structures, the two discourses could 
create a sense of an ideal marriage that was possible, actuable.  By connecting legal fictions 
with literary fictions, we can understand how both forms of narrative create what Robert 
Cover has termed a nomos—“a normative universe”—of antebellum marriage (95).  As 
Cover explains: 
The codes that relate our normative system to our social constructions of 
reality and to our visions of what the world might be are narrative.  The 
very imposition of a normative force upon a state of affairs, real or 
imagined, is the act of creating narrative.  The various genres of 
narrative...are alike in their being the account of states of affairs affected by 
a normative force field.  To live in a legal world requires that one know not 
only the precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states 
of affairs.  It requires that one integrate not only the “is” and the “ought,” 
but the “is,” the “ought,” and the “what might be.”  Narrative so integrates 
these domains. (102) 
By articulating a certain model of marriage, legal and literary discourses created a standard 
by which antebellum couples could judge their own behaviors.  They established, in other 
words, an ideal husband and an ideal wife with clear roles and responsibilities. 
By examining both legal and literary discourses, this project connects the rise of the 
domestic novel with the status construction of marriage.  It argues that the domestic novel 
centrally takes up the imaginative possibilities of the idealized—yet inferior—wife as a 
source of stability within America’s emerging market culture.  I use the term “domestic 
fiction,” rather than the more popular “sentimentalism,” because of the genre’s attempt to 
find in the home—and women’s position within it—a new site of family affiliation that is as 
stable and secure as land once was.  As the definition of marriage becomes more contractual 
after the Civil War, the fantasy of status is foreclosed, and consequently, the domestic novel 
recedes as a genre.  
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In the next section of this chapter, I will examine James Fenimore Cooper’s 
condemnation of women’s property reforms in The Ways of the Hour (1851) and establish 
The Pioneers (1823) as a foundational domestic plot in which a woman’s right marriage to 
the co-heir of the ancestral land restores the natural aristocracy. In the second chapter, I 
analyze Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables (1851) as an adaptation of 
Cooper’s plot. In Hawthorne’s novel, the increased power of the market prevents the 
possibility of a complete restoration of property, causing the noble family to retreat to a 
middle space between the market and the ancestral land. In contrast, Melville’s Pierre (1852) 
uses similar plot dynamics to insist that no “right marriage” exists, that men persistently fail 
to protect women, and that, because the American aristocracy is based on a hollow notion of 
status, it cannot be restored.  
While the first section of my project treats Cooper’s nostalgic plot in the work of 
canonical male authors, the second section analyzes how other writers—with different 
relationships to the American polity than white, middle-class men—conceived of women’s 
role as a basis for stability. The third chapter highlights how popular women writers also 
expressed fears of male speculation and, similar to Hawthorne and Melville, failed to 
envision women as contracting agents.  Unlike their male counterparts, though, these authors, 
including E.D.E.N. Southworth, Caroline Lee Hentz, and Ann Stephens, examined how the 
law might provide a more reliable form of paternalism than husbands and fathers. In the 
fourth chapter, I explore African American writers’ complex portrayal of marriage and 
property. While texts such as Frank Webb’s The Garies and Their Friends (1857) and Harriet 
Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861) reveal white marriage to be a perversion 
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of the status ideal, they also project some hope that a status-based model of marriage could 
nonetheless secure the black domestic space against racial violence, thus creating an analogy 
between such violence and the fear of speculation. By examining these narratives alongside 
abolitionist rhetoric that portrayed the inviolate home space and the stable wife as the 
rewards of emancipation, I underscore the rhetorical difficulty of retaining status as a 
conceptual anchor while cultural reforms are effecting the transition from property to 
personhood. In the fifth and final chapter, I turn to the novels of Elizabeth Stoddard, written 
in the 1860s, which register disappointment that property reform failed to provide women 
with the self-possession promised by classical liberalism. The project ends with a 
consideration of what has appeared to be a literary-historical paradox: that the very moment 
in which women’s rights advocates, spurred by legislation surrounding slave emancipation, 
focused explicitly on reforming the marriage contract also marked the beginning of the end 
of the literary form—the domestic novel—that had most forcefully presented the centrality of 
women’s marital status to social and economic stability in antebellum U.S. culture. 
 
Marriage and Stability in James Fenimore Cooper’s Ideal America 
In her study of married women’s property reform in nineteenth-century New York, 
legal historian Norma Basch identifies James Fenimore Cooper as the foremost literary 
proponent of the fiction of marital unity.  “Disillusioned with nineteenth-century 
egalitarianism,” Basch claims, “Cooper selected the common law status of wives as the 
perfect paradigm for the naturally hierarchical structure of all human relationships” (Eyes of 
the Law 139).  Pursuing Basch’s insight helps uncover the centrality of marriage in Cooper’s 
fiction.  For Cooper, marriage alone could effectively combat the threats of market volatility 
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and speculation.  Its status construction necessitated that all property be held by the husband 
and, thus, subsumed under one name.  The husband, as the steward of his wife, would also 
become the steward of the land.  Cooper privileged this model of ownership over land 
speculation, which he believed would only perpetuate competition and individuation 
indefinitely, rather than reconcile competing claims to the land.  In Cooper’s view, the 
competing claims to American land—from Native Americans, British loyalists, and 
American pioneers—impeded the kind of union and community necessary for the progress of 
the American nation.  Through marriage, these competing claims could be reconciled.  In this 
section, I demonstrate how women’s inferior legal status enabled Cooper’s ideal America of 
stable land ownership and male community. 
As law and literature scholars have demonstrated, Cooper’s fiction was shaped by the 
legal debates of early nineteenth-century New York.  Two years before the publication of 
The Pioneers, New York politicians held a convention to revise the state constitution.  The 
reformers, led by Martin Van Buren, advocated moving away from British legal practice in 
order to democratize the state’s legal code and to address the needs of the emerging market 
economy.  Defenders of the existing New York constitution, led by the jurist James Kent, 
argued that the principles behind British law encouraged communitarianism.  In short, the 
supporters of the existing constitution, including Cooper, believed in a paternalistic form of 
government and were wary of rapid, egalitarian reform.21   
In The Pioneers, Cooper transfers the debates of the constitutional convention into a 
frontier town in order to highlight what he believed was the most pressing threat to stability: 
land speculation.  Although most of the novel’s action takes place in 1793, the novel opens 
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with an overwhelmingly positive portrait of current-day Templeton, which he depicts as a 
rural paradise: 
Roads diverge in every direction, from the even and graceful bottoms of 
the valleys, to the most rugged and intricate passes of the hills.  Academies, 
and higher edifices of learning, meet the eye of the stranger, at every few 
miles, as he winds his way thorough this uneven territory; and places for 
the worship of God abound with that frequency which characterizes a 
moral and reflecting people. (Pioneers 15) 
This “moral and reflecting people” is mirrored in the landscape, replete with churches and 
schools.  After this initial description of Templeton, Cooper emphasizes how this civilization 
has been carved out of the wilderness: 
The expedients of the pioneers who first broke ground in the settlement of 
this country, are succeeded by the permanent improvements of the yeoman, 
who intends to leave his remains to moulder under the sod which he tills, 
or, perhaps, of the son, who, born in the land, piously wishes to linger 
around the grave of his father.—Only forty years have passed since this 
territory was a wilderness.  (Pioneers 16) 
As Cooper indicates, this development can occur positively and quickly (“only forty years”) 
because of the family ties that imbue the land with deeper significance than mere monetary 
investment.  Through his portrayal of the yeoman son who wants only to remain on the same 
land on which his father is buried, Cooper provides a fictional representation of the theories 
of ownership and natural use that Locke proposes in the Second Treatise.  These rustic men 
work the land.  Through their labor, they come to own it—and, critically for Cooper, to love 
it.   
In this idyllic opening, Cooper foregrounds his purpose: to explain how a frontier 
settlement evolved into an established, sustainable town.  As the beginning chapter shows, 
while the Templeton of the 1820s is calm, refined, and bucolic, Templeton in 1793 was, by 
contrast, plagued by heated debates, bursts of violence, egregious squandering of natural 
resources, and misapplications of the law.  Cooper attributes such difficulties to the presence 
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of land speculators, such as Hiram Doolittle, who view land as merely an investment to be 
sold at a later date.  For Cooper, speculators threaten community because they have no 
attachment to the land, and by commodifying land, they introduce market fluctuation into the 
rural economy.  As Brook Thomas notes, Cooper believes that “increased value, determined 
by something outside of the land itself [and] brought about by speculation is unnatural, 
fictional, and suspect” (Thomas 35).  Speculators exploit and then abandon the land in the 
pursuit of profit.  Their activities cannot create the settled community of schools and 
churches that Cooper envisions at the beginning of the novel. 
Literary critics who have investigated connections between The Pioneers and New 
York legal culture have focused on Cooper’s vision of male community and neglected the 
marriage that underpins it.  They have rightly pointed out the way that the novel explores the 
construction of the social contract in America; in other words, Cooper interrogates what can 
hold men together in a nation that values independence.  As Charles Hansford Adams has 
argued: 
The notion of community is of course crucial for understanding Cooper’s 
vision….Whether nostalgically portraying Natty and Chingachgook in the 
woods, or criticizing the ‘wasty ways’ of the settlements, Cooper is always 
at heart concerned with…an ideal of ‘brotherhood.’  (‘Sisterhood’ is not, of 
course, a concept that much interests Cooper—nor are ‘sisters’ ever invited 
into any of Cooper’s imagined ‘brotherhoods,’ in the woods or the town.)  
(59) 
Adams rightly points to the importance of male community in The Pioneers and throughout 
the Leatherstocking Tales.  Yet he and other scholars overlook women’s essential role in 
Cooper’s ideal vision.  Cooper’s men are able to form meaningful connections that support a 
stable society—rather than one ruled by threats of violence alone—because of the marriage 
contract.  Norma Basch succinctly articulates the connection between the social contract and 
the status-based marriage contract: “the story of the social contract, which is a story of 
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freedom, represses the story of the marriage contract, which is a story of subjection” (Basch, 
“Declarations of Independence,” 35).  According to Basch, the recent trend in feminist 
scholarship has been “devoted to exposing the concealed subordination of women to the 
political fraternity of men” (“Declarations of Independence,” 35).22  Indeed, Cooper’s vision 
of political fraternity is predicated on the subjection of women in the status-based 
construction of marriage.  Through surrendering their claims to property and creating 
affective connections between the home and the land, Cooper’s ideal wife can encourage her 
husband to become rooted in a certain area, which in turn causes him to develop the kind of 
ordered community that Cooper envisions at the beginning of The Pioneers.  The status 
construction of marriage, for Cooper, is the fundamental structuring element for society; it 
represents a unity in which everyone has a place and everyone is cared for. 
 Cooper recognizes that women are essential for the stabilization of property.  The 
story of The Pioneers is the story of how the home space becomes a source of family 
identity—as important, if not more so, than the land.  To create his utopian agrarian 
community, Cooper “need[s] to imagine that the rightful owner of the land [i]s someone who 
resisted the tendency to turn it into a commodity” (Thomas 34).  Therefore, he idealizes that 
part of the homefront for which no price can provide sufficient compensation; Cooper makes 
the home space impossible to commodify.   
The trajectory of Cooper’s plot from wilderness to domestic space becomes evident in 
the initial chapters.  As Judge Temple and his daughter, Elizabeth, enter Templeton, the 
judge pursues and attempts to kill a deer.  After the deer falls from the shots of a gun other 
than Judge Temple’s, the other major male characters emerge—Natty Bumppo and a young 
stranger, Oliver—and insist that they killed the deer and have a right to it.  The three men 
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engage in a debate about natural use and land ownership.  Natty Bumppo appeals to natural 
laws, and Judge Temple privileges civil order.  Although most scholars believe this debate 
establishes the novel’s primary social concerns, if we continue to follow the scene, we can 
recognize the important position that Cooper envisions for women.  During the men’s 
discussion, Oliver reveals that the Judge has accidentally shot him, and the Judge, feeling 
remorseful, asks Oliver to accompany him to his home so that the man’s wounds may be 
dressed properly.  Initially, Oliver rejects the plan, but then Elizabeth emerges from the 
sleigh and gracefully reiterates her father’s request.  At that moment, Oliver extricates 
himself from the judge’s concerned grasp, but his eyes remain fixated on Elizabeth’s face.  
After Elizabeth speaks, Bumppo, who had remained silent when the Judge spoke, concedes 
that it may be best for Oliver to return to the Temple home, and at this moment Oliver finally 
acquiesces.  Cooper carefully constructs the scene to underscore that Elizabeth’s influence, 
rather than the Judge’s reasoned argument, convinces Oliver to leave the woods and enter the 
home space.  Elizabeth not only brings Oliver into the domestic space with the approval of 
Bumppo, Oliver’s surrogate father in the wilderness, but she is also capable of discerning her 
proper mate amidst her numerous suitors in the novel.  This scene, therefore, serves as a 
miniature of the entire novel’s trajectory.  Over time, Oliver will leave the woods and come 
to accept his position as a rural gentleman and the rightful proprietor of the Temple estate.   
 Just as Oliver moves from the wilderness to the domestic space, so does the reader.  
From the scene at the sleigh, Cooper transitions to a lengthy description of the Temple house.  
The building displays Judge Temple’s wealth and authority, but the narrator implies that it 
was built on shaky principles.  As is obvious upon Elizabeth’s approach, this house—
constructed completely by men in the ludicrous “composite order”—is not a home.23  It is 
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incongruous, contains deformities, and has “only the air” of being comfortable (Pioneers 45).  
Through Elizabeth’s presence and her adept household management, the house will become a 
primary site for the novel’s activities.  Importantly, it represents more than an alternative 
sphere of action away from the wilderness; it is the only sustainable sphere of action 
presented in the novel.  Part of Cooper’s vision of progress is the inevitable decline of the 
town’s ramshackle structures and the rude dwellings in the wilderness, including Natty 
Bumppo’s own humble home.  These must be abandoned in favor of the more comfortable 
home spaces created through women’s influence, which allow long-term settlers to take root 
and establish families.24 
 Cooper connects the fictional world of The Pioneers with the legal debates of early 
nineteenth-century New York by highlighting the pivotal moment in which a society decides 
whether the law will become an instrument of speculation or an instrument for meaningful 
community.  Cooper explores the possible uses of the law through the figure of Judge 
Temple.  Early in the novel, Judge Temple agrees with the speculators to use the law against 
Natty Bumppo.  In addition, Cooper casts doubts about the legitimacy of Temple’s claims to 
the Otsego lands.25  As Adams points out, “Although according to the law his ownership is 
indisputable, we are aware from the second chapter that the circumstances of his purchase 
render his claims morally if not legally suspect” (64).  For much of the novel, Cooper 
emphasizes the aspects of Judge Temple that resemble a land speculator: a man who buys 
land to which he has no attachment, makes “improvements,” and finally sells the land for a 
tremendous profit.  Like other speculators, Judge Temple buys his land for a low price at an 
auction—arguably the ultimate site of land’s commodification.  Additionally, he alters the 
landscape in the name of improvement, and Bumppo suggests such changes are merely 
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cosmetic changes and intended only to increase the land’s monetary value.  Finally, Temple 
repeatedly boasts of the enormous increase of the value of his land since he purchased it.   
 Toward the end of the novel, Judge Temple’s commitment to status rather than 
speculation is firmly settled when he finally answers Oliver’s charges about the Effingham 
claim to the land.  As Adams has astutely observed, this scene takes on the aura of a trial in 
the woods, in which Judge Temple steps down from his social position in order to defend 
himself.  As he tells Oliver, “ ‘Thou shalt be thyself the judge,’ ” implying not only that he 
will not rule this court but also that Oliver will inherit the judge’s role in the community 
(Pioneers 439).  He then responds to Oliver’s accusations by demonstrating his commitment 
to the principles of status, rather than contract.  In explaining his relationship with Oliver’s 
father, Temple claims: “ ‘Thy father was my early friend.  He intrusted his fortune to my 
care.  When we separated, he had such confidence in me, that he wished no security, no 
evidence of the trust, even had there been time or convenience for exacting it’ ” (Pioneers 
439).  The elder Effingham saw no need for written evidence of their understanding, insisting 
that his confidence in Marmaduke Temple was sufficient to secure the arrangement.  As 
proof of his fulfillment of this trust, Judge Temple produces his will—an instrument of 
equity rather than of commercial contract—which deeds half of the land to the Effingham 
family.  Temple then reassures Oliver of his inheritance by hinting at Oliver’s impending 
marriage to Elizabeth, which would entitle Oliver to the rest of the estate: “ ‘One half of my 
estates shall be thine as soon as they can be conveyed to thee; and if what my suspicions tell 
me, be true, I suppose the other must follow speedily’ ” (Pioneers 443-44).  Again, Oliver’s 
inheritance is secured through the mechanism of equity, rather than the mechanisms of 
contract.  The judge’s trial, then, is the fantasy of equity’s ascendance and the annihilation of 
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contract.  Throughout the scene, Judge Temple refers exclusively to the instruments of equity 
courts, invoking the language of trusts, wills, and marital property.  This scene, therefore, 
clarifies Temple’s position as a civil official who repudiates contract and embraces the laws 
of status.26  Through the character of Judge Temple, Cooper shows that civil law can be used 
to support the ordered transmission of property, rather than land speculation. 
Yet civil law and ordered property transmission alone cannot create Cooper’s ideal 
community.  For the land to be properly imbued with meaning and affect, women must be 
part of Cooper’s political vision.  And yet Elizabeth is not just an empty vessel for property 
consolidation.  She has earned her claim to the natural aristocracy, which she proves when 
she capably questions her father’s legal judgments.  After her father sentences Bumppo to 
prison, she presents an alternative vision of the law by pointing out its failure to make 
distinctions about character and intention.  As she calmly tells her father, “ ‘I see the 
difficulty of your situation, dear sir…but in appreciating the offence of poor Natty, I cannot 
separate the minister of the law from the man’ ” (Pioneers 382).  Although Judge Temple 
listens carefully to her criticisms, he ultimately dismisses her as too emotional.  Cooper, 
however, does not jettison her critique so easily.  When Elizabeth subsequently visits 
Bumppo in jail, she intends to convince him that he should withstand his sentence.  Soon 
after arriving, however, she hopes that his plan to escape will be successful, which would 
presumably be against her father’s wishes.  Although we might be able to interpret the fire 
that later traps Elizabeth on Mt. Vision as a form of punishment for her complicity with 
Bumppo’s lawless plan, it is Bumppo who eventually rescues her from danger, arguably 
justifying her view that he should not have been imprisoned.  Throughout the novel, 
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Elizabeth sides with Bumppo and Oliver against her father, even while comprehending the 
necessity of the civil order he represents. 
At other points in the novel, Elizabeth defends her father’s principles, but she clearly 
retains her doubts about the appropriateness of civilization’s methods.  These feelings 
become most evident in her conversation with Indian John about the white man’s usurpation 
of Native American lands.  In this scene, Indian John offers an alternative narrative for 
“civilization”:  
“Daughter, since John was young, he has seen the white man from 
Frontinac come down on his white brothers at Albany, and fight!….He has 
seen his English and his American Fathers burying their tomahawks in 
each other’s brains, for this very land.  Did they fear God, and live in 
peace!  He has seen the land pass away from the Fire-eater, and his 
children, and the child of his child, and a new chief set over the country.  
Did they live in peace who did this!  did they fear God!” (Pioneers 401) 
John’s refrain—“Did they live in peace who did this! did they fear God!”—challenges 
Elizabeth’s faith in the values of white, Western European culture.  She attempts to answer 
his criticisms by claiming that he has failed to understand the full context of white men’s 
actions: 
“But you hardly understand the circumstances,” said Elizabeth, more 
embarrassed than she would own, even to herself.  “If you knew our laws 
and customs better, you would judge differently of our acts.  Do not believe 
evil of my father, old Mohegan, for he is just and good.” (Pioneers 401-02) 
Elizabeth immediately associates Indian John’s comments with her father, the representative 
of the law that she claims can justify such horrendous acts of violence, and connects him to 
the violence surrounding property ownership that Indian John has depicted.  Even as she 
defends her father, though, the narrator makes it clear that Elizabeth is also embarrassed by 
her race’s actions.  Most likely, Indian John’s narrative would not be persuasive to Judge 
Temple; at the very least, it would not convince him that white men’s claim to the lands were 
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illegal.  Elizabeth, however, is moved by John’s speech, and John recognizes her compassion 
by calling her daughter throughout the exchange.  In this scene, then, Elizabeth has two 
fathers: the white father whom she imperfectly defends and the Indian father for whom she 
feels sympathy.  Indeed, this kind of sympathy will not generate effective political action to 
re-enfranchise the Indian.  As numerous critics have pointed out, Cooper feels the Indian’s 
removal is an inevitable, albeit regrettable, byproduct of civilization.  However, we can also 
read this scene as Elizabeth’s “education” in the Indian perspective, which is an important 
element of Cooper’s vision for America.  As children of the noble Temple and Effingham 
families, Elizabeth and Oliver unite what Cooper believes are the two greatest political 
civilizations—American and Britain.  As “children” of Indian John and Natty Bumppo, their 
marriage also unites the novel’s greatest representatives of the frontier ethic.   
Elizabeth and Oliver’s marriage unifies, and also erases, alternative claims to the 
Otsego land.  Their union subsumes all of the property disputes, ensuring that their 
attachment to the land will be multi-layered and deep.  At the end of the novel, they are 
ensconced in their house on the land that incorporates all of their family’s connections.  This 
connection to the land allows them to effectively combat commerce, for, as Brook Thomas 
noted:  “…the Federalist ideal of a republic that encouraged commerce posed a threat to 
Cooper’s agrarian ideal.  His imaginary solution to this threat was a narrative that made 
certain that the authority of the guardian class was rooted in the soil” (38).  Elizabeth’s and 
Oliver’s entitlement to the guardian class is secured through their relationships to their 
biological fathers but also due to their fathers in the forest. 
At the end of the novel, Elizabeth and Oliver live together in the Temple house, 
which, as Natty Bumppo remarks, is now “full of laughter” (Pioneers 454).  The final scene 
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opens with Elizabeth, wisely attuned to her husband’s moods, silently obeying his wish to 
walk with him outside.  During their walk, Elizabeth jokes that she will dominate the 
relationship with her will, but both she and Oliver laugh good-naturedly at the prospect.  Her 
free-thinking is not a threat to her husband’s authority, with his unique combination of 
training in the ways of the wilderness and the British aristocracy.  Yet it is Bumppo who 
ultimately gets the last word on their relationship.  As he prepares to leave the Otsego forest, 
he solemnly advises Elizabeth: “ ‘Trust in God, Madam, and your honourable husband, and 
the thoughts for an old man like me can never be long or bitter’ ” (Pioneers 455).  At the 
close of the novel, the representative man of nature, then, reinforces the status construction of 
marriage.  It creates order, and ultimately it will safeguard the land so that it will not be 
completely ruined for the likes of Natty Bumppo.  By using Bumppo to articulate this view, 
Cooper transforms British legal precedence into natural law.  27 
 
From 1823 to 1848, the year when Cooper began composing his last novel, The Ways 
of the Hour, New York state law continued to capitulate to the pressures of the market 
economy.  Such adaptations and reforms represent the downfall of American society for 
Cooper—a downfall he traces through marriage.  British legal practice, in Cooper’s view, is 
properly founded on property, and he is tentative about any legal reform that favors volatile 
markets over stable forms of property.  In The Pioneers, Cooper conceived of marriage as 
supporting property’s stability, but the New York married women’s property law in 1848 
overturned this safeguard.  His final novel, The Ways of the Hour, is an impassioned 
reaction—even a product of revulsion—to the 1848 New York Married Woman’s Property 
Law, which he predicts will destroy marriage and hopelessly corrupt American society.  In 
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Cooper’s view, the law transforms marriage into a contractual relationship, rendering the 
institution of marriage powerless against market volatility and social unrest.  The Ways of 
the Hour underscores the manner in which mid-nineteenth-century America had become 
“more complex and less susceptible to the…resolutions carefully constructed in [Cooper’s] 
fictions” (Adams 147).   
In The Ways of the Hour, all of Cooper’s criticisms of mid-century New York’s 
politics are directed at the character of Mary Monson, whom he portrays simultaneously as a 
victim of the corrupt court system and as an exploiter of the recent married women’s 
property law.  When the novel begins, Mary has been charged with murdering the Goodwins, 
a couple who run a boarding house in Biberry on Long Island.  Mary was sleeping there the 
night the cottage burned down.  Although she escaped, two skeletons, believed to be the 
Goodwins, were found in the cottage’s remnants.  Soon after the fire, a neighbor realizes that 
Mrs. Goodwin’s stocking stuffed with gold is missing, and the town’s suspicion centers on 
Mary, who seems to have an endless supply of money and whose purse contains an unusual 
coin that exactly matches one in Mrs. Goodwin’s collection.  She is then arrested, and the 
novel opens on the day that the intelligent and established New York attorney, Dunscomb, 
agrees to defend her.  Dunscomb, arguably the hero of the novel, is wary of Mary, who 
admits to using an alias, though she refuses to reveal any details of her life.  Despite 
Dunscomb’s legal counsel and the lack of physical evidence, the jury of common (and easily 
manipulated) townspeople convicts Mary of murder.  After her conviction, Mary produces 
the supposedly dead husband, who had been hiding away in a local tavern, and she then 
cross-examines a neighbor who confesses to stealing Mrs. Goodwin’s gold and slipping the 
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unique coin into Mary’s purse.  The neighbor then reveals that a simple accident caused a fire 
in the Goodwin’s cottage, killing Mrs. Goodwin and her servant girl.   
Despite Mary’s vindication in court, her story is a cautionary, rather than happy, tale.  
As Joyce Warren has pointed out, rather than celebrating Mary’s abilities and interests in the 
law, Cooper “condemns her behavior as ‘unfeminine’ and labels her a ‘discredit to her 
sex’…[seemingly undisturbed] that if Mary had behaved as a ‘true woman,’ she would have 
been executed” (232).  Although Mary is acquitted for murder, Dunscomb’s persistent 
distrust for her is validated when she finally reveals her other serious “crime.”  As she 
explains after the trial, the new married woman’s property laws have enabled her to control 
her estate and abandon her obnoxious husband.  Over the course of the novel, however, 
Cooper teaches Mary an important lesson.  Cooper presents her as increasingly insane, 
implying that her distance from her husband’s identity has dislocated her own sense of 
selfhood.  Unable to care for herself, Mary retreats to Dunscomb’s country estate at the end 
of the novel, where she slowly regains much of her sanity by learning her proper place 
relative to her male protectors. 
 Although the novel somewhat follows the plot of a conventional murder mystery, this 
narrative primarily serves as a frame that enables the characters to disparage New York and 
its hopeless politics.  As Barbara Bardes and Suzanne Gossett claim in their compelling 
analysis of the novel, “Throughout The Ways of the Hour Cooper looks with horror toward 
the future of the United States.  Fundamental property rights are threatened, new codes and 
constitutions endanger the law, and the educated gentry is being replaced by a mob 
that…does not constitute a meritocracy” (WOTH 88).  Cooper uses dialogue to heap vitriol 
onto the press for its rumor-mongering and also to condemn the trial-by-jury system, which 
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is associated with bribery, petty manipulation, and incompetence.  Yet the most consistent 
source of Cooper’s scorn is New York’s 1848 married woman’s property law, which the 
male characters dismissively refer to as “the cup and saucer law” and the “Woman-hold-the-
Purse Law.” Dunscomb, a bachelor lawyer with strongly paternalistic beliefs, provides the 
most sustained attacks on the law, as in his bitingly sarcastic remarks to Dr. McBrain, who is 
preparing for his third marriage: 
“…There are runaway wives enough, at this moment, roaming up and 
down the land, setting the laws of God and man at defiance, and jingling 
their purses, when they happen to have money, under their lawful 
husbands’ noses…But this damnable Code will uphold them, in some 
shape or other….One can’t endure her husband because he smokes; another 
finds fault with his not going to church but once a day; another quarrels 
with him for going three times….All these ladies, forgetful as they are of 
their highest earthly duties, forgetful as they are of woman’s very nature, 
are the models of divine virtues, and lay claim to the sympathies of 
mankind.” (WOTH 275) 
As Dunscomb makes clear, the new civil law overturns the natural law that dictates that 
women should be the subordinates of their husbands.  It also purportedly enables women to 
enact revenge on their husbands for petty domestic disputes by taking control of the family 
property.   
Disregarding the fact that men proposed and supported the legislation, Dunscomb 
implies that women demanded such reforms, and he even asserts that the new law eradicates 
all of the wife’s responsibilities while alleviating none of the husband’s: “ ‘There is no mode 
by which an errant wife can be made to perform her duties in boldly experimenting New 
York, though she can claim support and protection from her husband’ ” (WOTH 479).28  
Cooper even insinuates that the law fundamentally destroyed the status component of 
marriage.  As Dr. McBrain remarks: “ ‘This calling marriage a  ‘contract,’ too is what I never 
liked.  It is something far more than a ‘contract,’ in my view of the matter’ ” (WOTH 17-18).  
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Here, Cooper connects married women’s property law with a contractual model of marriage, 
though supporters of the reform were committed to marriage-as-status.  Cooper’s narrator 
and characters continually reiterate that married women’s property laws have corrupted 
marriage, which, given the centrality of the status construction of marriage to Cooper’s ideal 
society, necessarily entails the destabilization of the entire society.   
 Mary is virtually the only character in the book who ever articulates the “reform” 
perspective, but Cooper dismisses her arguments through increased implications that she is 
untrustworthy.  In explaining her views, Mary asserts that “men have not dealt fairly by 
women.  Possessing the power, they have made all the laws, fashioned all the opinions of the 
world, in their own favour” (WOTH 308).  Yet Cooper disarms her critique by presenting her 
as unable to care for herself capably.  Separated from her husband’s civic identity, she lacks 
protection and fixity.  For example, when she is arrested and placed in jail, she expresses 
pleasure at being in her cell.  From her jail cell, Mary Monson confides to one of 
Dunscomb’s apprentices:  
“[F]or the first time in months I do feel myself safe—secure….jails are 
intended for places of security, are they not?….This may appear wonderful 
to you, but I do tell no more than sober truth, in repeating that, for the first 
time in months, I have now a sense of security.  I am what you call in the 
hands of the law, and one there must be safe from everything but what the 
law can do to her.” (WOTH 99-100)   
Mary’s paradoxical comment is a direct result of her decision to separate from her husband.  
Cooper makes clear that, having foolishly foresworn her husband’s protection, Mary cannot 
create a safe space for herself.  She requires protection that she can only really experience in 
imprisonment under the watchful eye of the law.  As the novel continues, her prolonged 
separation from the structure of marriage makes Mary more disturbed and unstable.  In the 
court scene, when she capably defends herself by producing and cross-examining witnesses, 
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her performance seems monstrous.  Cooper presents Mary as a woman so focused on 
mastering the law and controlling her finances that she is unsexed and almost inhuman.  Yet 
Mary is not truly psychotic or deranged.  Rather, Cooper implies as much in order to 
demonstrate the dangerous consequences of the new property law.  As Charles Hansford 
Adams comments, “For Cooper, a woman who would flee the marriage bond is necessarily 
unbalanced, since she is violating the proper order of nature by asserting her own desires 
against her husband’s authority… Her madness is in fact a product of the new laws: with 
such measures as the ‘cup and saucer’ law, the legislature is actively encouraging the sort of 
breakdown Mary experiences” (Adams 143).  Mary’s willingness to act on the privileges 
gained through the married woman’s property law renders her unreliable as a character, 
negating any of her arguments about the injustices of the male legal system.  In essence, 
Cooper creates Mary so that he can silence her. 
 Cooper’s final novel ends with a longing to return to the rural paradise that never 
existed, but that he imagined in The Pioneers.  After Mary’s trial, which was corrupted by the 
town’s ineptness and petty prejudices, Dunscomb abandons New York City and retreats to 
his country estate, Ratteltrap.  Before retiring from legal practice, he arranges a legal 
separation for Mary, which affords her husband a considerable amount of her inherited 
fortune.  She ends the novel residing with Dunscomb at Rattletrap, where one of Dunscomb’s 
pious female relatives converts her to Christianity and where she ultimately becomes 
reconciled to women’s place in the natural order.  The narrator reports that her health is 
improving and that her lucid moments are increasing.  Yet she remains fixated on a single 
ruling passion: divorce.  In Cooper’s view, once Mary sunders the primary bonds of the 
marriage relationship, she cannot ever fully recover her sanity, and her obsession with the 
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legal realm continues to poison her mindset.  As Mary’s condition seems to underscore, the 
contemporary legal order has no coherence.  Thus, The Ways of the Hour ends with a 
nostalgic view of the lost ideal of 1823 when status reigned and contractual relations were 
contained. 
 I situate Cooper as the original “domestic” novelist because of the way he binds the 
American landscape to the American homespace; their functions and their fates are the same 
for him.  Cooper envisions a virtuous woman bestowing all of her property—and all of her 
rights to it—to the control of a righteous husband.  This move protects against the 
speculation of land, and it reunites the land to the rightful owners, the “natural” aristocracy.  
His vision of protection from speculation roughly corresponds with the legal debates from 
1820 through 1840.  By the 1840s, however, the commercial markets and speculation had 
simply become too essential to the American economy to be overcome.  In order to adapt to 
these changes, legislators across the United States passed a series of law that enabled families 
to interact with the credit economy more easily, in part because married women’s property 
could be safely secured from market relations.  Cooper, whose vision for American 
community depends on wives automatically ceding their property to their husbands, can only 
view this legislation as the final blow to his agrarian ideal.   
The other authors in this project also look to women’s relationship with property as a 
way to secure American society against the threat of market speculation.  Unlike Cooper, 
they do not have the luxury to envision an American culture outside of market speculation 
and volatility; instead, their texts must wrestle more directly with these threatening forces.  
Yet all of these texts, including Cooper’s, implicitly recognize the potential dangers of 
domesticity: if women make the wrong marriage choice, a series of tragic consequences can 
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follow for their family and their society, as the cautionary tale of Mary Monson unceasingly 
demonstrates.  
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1
 The Reverend Thomas Wentworth Higginson read the protest at their ceremony, and it was also printed and 
distributed. 
 
2
 See Lucy Stone and Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Friends and Sisters: Letters between Lucy Stone and 
Antoinette Brown Blackwell, 1846-1893, ed. Carol Lasser and Marlene Deahl Merrill.  Urbana-Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 1987. 55-58. 
 
3
 Because the particularities of marriage law varied from state to state, it can be difficult to characterize the 
exact situations of husbands and wives throughout the country.  However, we can establish a general sense of 
how a wife’s legal identity would have affected her sense of self-possession: “What rights a wife had…existed 
as rights possessed by her husband: as rights he lost, he gave, or he abused.  Her place in the world, both 
metaphorically and spatially, was his place in the world; his home was her home wherever she actually lived.  
Citizenship would, from this perspective, have been something close to a contradiction in terms for a married 
woman.” Hartog, Man and Wife, 100.  It is important to note that the legal description, or theory, did not always 
match people’s experiences.  Although a wife’s legal “place” was with her husband, she might—and often 
did—live elsewhere.  This point demonstrates why legal historians refer to marital unity as a “legal fiction.” 
 
4
 The most recent example of this argument might be found in Hendrik Hartog’s Man and Wife in America, 
which examines the very frequent exceptions to marital unity in the nineteenth century.  However, this view can 
arguably be traced at least as far back as Michael Grossberg’s comprehensive Governing the Hearth, which 
traces the evolution of American domestic law throughout the nineteenth century. 
 
5
 For more on the impracticality of equity within the U.S. commercial economy, see Basch, In the Eyes of the 
Law, 38-40 and 113-135; see also Warbasse, 57-87. 
 
6
 These changes illustrate how much legal reform was in the interest of clarifying creditor-debtor relations 
instead of improving women’s rights.  In 1836, New York abolished the use of trusts because of how trusts 
created two-tiered ownership: the trustee and the beneficiary.  Instead of giving women the right to own 
property and thereby consolidating the ownerships, legislators simply abolished formal trusts altogether, 
severely limiting fathers’ abilities to keep property in their daughters’ hands.  For more on New York legal 
reform in the 1830s and the role of fathers in women’s legal reform, see Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters, 74-99.   
 
7
 “Mississippi passed a married women’s statute in 1839, Maine in 1844, and Massachusetts in 1845.  A 
married women’s clause appeared in the Texas Constitution in 1845, and a similar clause was in the proposed 
Wisconsin Constitution of 1847…” (Basch, Eyes of the Law 28).  In addition, married women’s clauses were 
included in the state constitutions of California, Oregon, and Kansas.  For more, see Warbasse, Changing Legal 
Rights of Married Women. 
 
8
 Before the agreement can be notorized, the wife must undergo a separate examination, away from her 
husband, with a government official.  I will discuss these interviews, referred to as privy examinations, in more 
detail in Chapter Three. 
 
9
 For example, Thomas Herttell introduced the first married women’s property legislation in New York in 1837.  
In doing so, he did condemn contemporary marriage laws, arguing that they were based on English models of 
tyranny and were consequently out of step with American Republicanism.  However, he also appealed to fathers 
who wanted to secure family wealth for their daughters.  In the New York State Assembly in 1836, Herttell 
vilified husbands and claimed that new women’s property laws could “ ‘protect the rights and property of 
married women from injury and waste by means of the improvident, prodigal, intemperate and dissolute habits 
and practices of their husbands’ ” As quoted in Rabkin, Fathers to Daughters 86.  Rabkin goes on to claim that: 
“Such an approach was surely calculated to appeal to any father in the legislature” (86). 
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10
 In recognizing the male legislators’ goals in passing married women’s property statutes, I do not intend to 
underestimate the extent to which many women activists supported their passage.  Most notably, attendees at 
the Seneca Falls convention in New York in 1848 heralded the passage of recent New York married women’s 
property laws.  However, as many historians have pointed out, most statutes were passed with little involvement 
from women.  See Chused and Warbasse. 
 
11
 As a lawyer in the late nineteenth century claimed, “the domestic relations law of…New York says that 
marriage shall continue to be a civil contract, the phrase is practically meaningless….[M]arriage is the 
foundation of the family and the origin of domestic relations, which are considered of greatest importance to 
civilization and social progress, it is deemed to be a social institution, a status, and not a civil contract” (qtd in 
Grossberg 23). 
 
12
 Blackstone explicitly referred to this as the system of coverture.  However, in this study, I will not employ 
coverture as a stand-in for the status construction of marriage.  Though coverture might seem like a formal legal 
system, in the United States, where marriage is legislated by the individual states, it is difficult to locate such a 
system.  As this project demonstrates through the evolution of married women’s property laws, determining the 
end of coverture in the U.S. is an almost impossible endeavor.  For example, by the late 1830s, wives could own 
property in their own names in Mississippi, but the status construction of marriage remained firmly intact within 
Mississippi courts.  Regardless of her ability to own property, a wife could not be sued or enter into contracts.  
Instead of using the term coverture, I will refer to the status construction of marriage as a way to understand a 
wife’s position in the eyes of the law. 
 
13
 I use the word “theoretically” here because marital unity was a legal fiction.  In other words, it was a legal 
convention that made adjudicating cases easier, but legal practitioners understood that it did not indicate reality.  
Therefore, as several legal historians have recently emphasized, there were many ways in everyday life that 
husbands and wives sidestepped marital unity.  In particular, see Hartog, Man and Wife in America.  As I will 
demonstrate later in this introduction, though, my interest as a literary scholar is precisely located in the 
rhetorical power of this “fiction.” 
 
14
 For more on Bishop’s influence, see VanBurkleo 69-79. 
 
15
 In part, I am arguing against Cindy Weinstein’s compelling examination of the redefinition of the family in 
antebellum sentimental literature.  While Weinstein charts a rising trend toward contract as the basis for family 
relation, I assert that legal theorists and judges resisted the notion that marriage was purely contractual until 
well after the Civil War.  For example, in 1873, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., revised a new edition of James 
Kent’s Commentaries to define matrimony as a status.  See Grossberg 23.  James Schouler, in his influential 
domestic law treatise, published in 1874, emphatically claimed that marriage was “not on the footing of 
ordinary contracts….” As quoted in Hartog 76.  Grossberg quotes a New York attorney in 1889 who stated that 
since “ ‘marriage is the foundation of the family and the origin of domestic relations, which are considered of 
greatest importance to civilization and social progress, it is deemed to be a social institution, a status, and not a 
civil contract’ ” As quoted in Grossberg 23.  More information about the prevalence of the status view of 
marriage can be found in Grossberg 17-29; Basch, Eyes of the Law 229-231; Hartog 78-103. Although 
Stoddard’s novels do follow many of the same patterns Weinstein notes, her novels also register a distinct 
complaint about women’s status.  See Weinstein 1-12.   
 
16
 The U.S. Supreme Court continued to cite Bishop as well as the Maguire v. Maguire case as late as 1881 in 
the case of Maynard v. Hill, a decades-long inheritance case involving child support, land speculation in 
Western territories, and multiple marriages.  The Maynard case demonstrates the complex nexus of social and 
cultural changes that affected marriage law. 
 
17
 For more on this distancing, see Basch, In the Eyes of the Law 56-7. 
 
18
 Similar arguments were employed in the Pennsylvania case Raybold v. Raybold in 1853 and in the Maine 
case Merrill v. Smith in 1854.  For more on these cases, see Isenberg 263. 
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19
 Sarah Josepha Hale provides an exemplary depiction of this exchange in her domestic manual, The Ladies’ 
New Book of Cookery, published in 1852:  “The table, if wisely ordered, with economy, skill and taste, is the 
central attraction of home; the Lady who presides there, with kindness, carefulness and dignity, receives 
homage from the Master of the House, when he places at her disposal the wealth for which he toils. The 
husband earns, the wife dispenses; are not her duties as important as his?” (iii).  Although men were supposedly 
working equally for their families’ subsistence, in fact, the legal structure of earnings and property rights meant 
that a man could more easily retain earnings and assets in the event of his wife’s death or divorce.   
 
20
 For more on Locke’s philosophy and self-possession, see C.B. Macpherson’s concept of possessive 
individualism, which provides an in-depth examination of Locke’s connection between property and self-
ownership.  Gillian Brown investigates how the domestic space bolstered and supplemented subjective identity 
in light of impinging market forces in Domestic Individualism: Imagining Self in Nineteenth-Century America.   
 
21
 As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Kent, like Cooper, strongly supported the status construction of 
marriage.  He claimed in his Commentaries: “the husband is the best judge of the wants of the family, and the 
means of supplying them,” adding that it is “within his rights to put gentle restraints on her liberty” (2:180, 
181). 
 
22
 Basch attributes this trend to Carole Pateman’s influential The Sexual Contract. 
 
23
 For a comparison between the composite order and nineteenth-century legal theories, see Thomas, pp. 37-8. 
 
24
 Signe Wegener provides an in-depth discussion of the function of Elizabeth Temple’s domesticity. 
 
25
 One reason for the uncertainty surrounding Judge Temple may involve Brook Thomas’s insight that Temple 
might be based on the figure of James Kent.  As Thomas points out but does not develop, Cooper and Kent 
disagreed on the importance of the commercial economy.  Most of Kent’s rulings reflect his advocacy for the 
emerging economy, and Cooper was considerably more anxious about the market, as The Pioneers 
demonstrates.  It is possible to read Judge Temple as Cooper’s optimistic hope for Kent’s eventual attitude 
toward status. 
 
26
 We should not really be surprised at Temple’s allegiance to status because of his early history.  As a young 
man, Temple increased his station in society by marrying Elizabeth’s mother.  He has personally benefited from 
the dictates of coverture, which granted him control of all of his wife’s real and personal property.  Cooper also 
reveals that although Temple had been a successful businessman, he rejected the commercial economy in favor 
of the stability of land settlement.  Thus, Temple’s own narrative traces a rejection of contract in favor of the 
agrarian, almost feudalistic, society he helps construct in Templeton. 
 
27
 Natty’s final words in support of the status arrangement of marriage further support Brook Thomas’s 
assertion that Natty Bumppo and Judge Temple both represent different aspects of Locke’s political theories.  
See Thomas 40-4. 
 
28
 Richard Chused makes the conservative project of the 1848 New York law clear in his examination of 
antebellum married women’s property reforms: “Despite the well-known connection between legislative 
petitioning and lobbying by a few women in the late 1840’s and the passage of a few of the married women’s 
acts, most of the early acts, modest and conservative in tone, were compatible with prior and contemporary 
legislation of the most ordinary sort. Even the New York act of 1848, the best known of all the early statutes, 
was extremely narrow in scope” (1410). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“RESTORING TO YOU YOUR OWN PROPERTY”:  
HAWTHORNE, MELVILLE, AND THE FLIGHT FROM CONTRACT 
 
The ascendance of the commodified conception of property to dominance in the legal thought in the 
first half of the nineteenth century was, to be sure, greeted with optimism and encouragement.  Yet it 
was also greeted, even by those who benefited from it, with a sense of anxiety that the social 
revolution it wrought might spin out of control.  Nostalgia is, after all, a symptom of fear, and the 
antebellum property law reformers may ultimately be described as prisoners of nostalgia.  
–Gregory Alexander, Commodity and Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal 
Thought, 1776-1970, 184 
 
In July of 1852, Herman Melville and his father-in-law, Justice Lemuel Shaw, 
vacationed together near New Bedford and Nantucket.  They were accompanied much of the 
time by Shaw’s friend, Massachusetts Attorney General John H. Clifford.  During the trip, 
Clifford related a peculiar story to Melville and Shaw about a case he had worked on years 
before, involving a woman named Agatha Hatch from Pembroke, Massachusetts.  While a 
teenager, she cared for a shipwrecked sailor, Robertson, whom she soon married.  After 
recuperating, Robertson returned to sailing life, embarking mostly on short, local voyages.  
Two years later, Agatha became pregnant, and Robertson left on a sailing vessel, never to 
return.  For the next seventeen years, Agatha worked to support herself and her daughter 
without hearing from Robertson.  At that time, he made a brief and mysterious overnight visit 
in which he gave his wife and daughter a considerable sum of money.  Approximately a year 
later, on the eve of his daughter’s wedding, he visited again to give her a bridal gift and at 
also to try to convince his family to leave with him for Missouri.  They declined his offer, but 
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he continued to send an annual remittance to his daughter and Agatha for the rest of his life.  
He even wrote to inform Agatha that he would be marrying again, which did not surprise her 
since she suspected (rightfully) that he had already committed bigamy with another woman 
during his initial seventeen-year absence.1   
When Robertson died intestate some years later, the executor of his estate only 
discovered Agatha and her daughter’s existence because the daughter happened to send her 
father a letter, which was consequently delivered to the executor.  The executor was left then 
to determine the proper distribution of the funds, and it was at this point that Clifford, a 
young lawyer, was called in to help collect testimonies from the various parties.  Clifford 
asked Agatha why she had never tried to inform Robertson’s other wives about her existence.  
He noted her response:  
She stated the causes with a simplicity & pathos which carried that 
conviction irresistibly to my mind.  The only good it could have done to 
expose him would have been to drive Robertson away and forever disgrace 
him & it would certainly have made Mrs. Irvin & her children wretched for 
the rest of their days—‘I had no wish’ said the wife ‘to make either of them 
unhappy, notwithstanding all I had suffered on his account’—It was to me 
a most striking instance of long continued & uncomplaining submission to 
wrong and anguish on the part of a wife, which made her in my eyes a 
heroine. (Correspondence 624) 
Clifford apparently believed that Melville was interested in writing Agatha’s story because 
he assured Melville that he had taken extensive notes about the case in his journal.  Melville 
encouraged Clifford to send him as much documentation as he had available, even though he 
claimed in his letters that he did not initially think of developing the material into a literary 
endeavor.  But as negative reviews of Pierre emerged, Melville buried himself in Clifford’s 
journal about the Hatch/Robertson case.  On August 13, 1852, Melville wrote to Hawthorne 
about the story for the first time, explaining how one night on vacation he and a “gentleman 
from New Bedford, a lawyer” were discussing “the great patience, and endurance, and 
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resignedness of the women of the island in submitting so uncomplainingly to the long, long 
absences of their sailor husbands” (Correspondence 232).  In that packet to Hawthorne, 
Melville included Clifford’s source materials, believing that Hawthorne would be the better 
writer for the tale because “this thing lies very much in a vein, with which you are peculiarly 
familiar” (Correspondence 234).   
It is not surprising that Melville thought of Hawthorne when he learned the details of 
Agatha Hatch’s life story.  Both authors had recently completed major novels that 
investigated women’s relationship to male property.  Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven 
Gables (1851) was published first, which inspired—and was shortly followed by—Melville’s 
Pierre (1852).  For both Hawthorne and Melville, Agatha’s story would likely have provided 
an interesting vantage point to consider women’s role in marriage, as well as their 
relationship to male property accumulation and wage labor.2  Agatha’s story was also 
inextricably tied to legal discourse.  The story was introduced to Melville on a trip with a 
prominent lawyer and a famous judge, and it involved the minute and complicated details of 
women’s inheritance in the early decades of nineteenth-century America.  More particularly, 
Agatha’s story focused on the dynamics of inheritance, which reappear throughout 
Hawthorne’s and Melville’s body of work.  The interest in Agatha’s story—from Clifford, 
Melville, and seemingly Hawthorne as well—demonstrates the pervasive concern about 
women’s relationship to property and the resulting implications for the marriage contract.3 
Melville continues his letter to Hawthorne from August 13 by providing his opinions 
on how to construct the story.  He defends the sailor Robertson, (whom he renames 
Robinson), and disagrees with Clifford’s judgment that Robertson should “meet with 
punishment” for having abandoned his first wife (Correspondence 624).  Melville insists that 
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Robertson’s desertion was not premeditated, maintaining that “the whole sin stole upon him 
insensibly—so that it would perhaps have been hard for him to settle upon the exact day 
when he could say to himself, ‘Now I have deserted my wife…’ ” (Correspondence 234).  In 
his speculations on the story, Melville writes to Hawthorne, “It were well, if from her 
knowledge of the deep miseries produced to wives by marrying seafaring men, Agatha 
should have formed a young determination never to marry a sailor; which resolve in her, 
however, is afterwards overborne by the omnipotence of Love” (Correspondence 236).  He 
then envisions Agatha traveling every day for seventeen years to check her mail, hoping for 
some word from her estranged husband.  Clearly, in Melville’s view of the story, Robertson 
is a typical adventure-hungry sailor, and Agatha is his devoted and domestic wife.  Melville 
ends his letter to Hawthorne with an acknowledgment that he might have offended 
Hawthorne by providing too much guidance on the story.  He assures Hawthorne finally, “I 
do not…imagine that you will think that I am so silly as to flatter myself I am giving you 
anything of my own.  I am but restoring to you your own property—which you would 
quickly enough have identified for yourself….” (Correspondence 237).  For Melville, 
evidently, Hawthorne “owned” the rights to this tale about wives, husbands, abandonment, 
and wealth.  His comment to Hawthorne underscores the increasingly uncertain and unstable 
quality of property in the nineteenth century—from credit to speculation to literary 
inspiration.   
In December 1852, Hawthorne and Melville apparently met to discuss the story.  
Although extant correspondence provides scant details on their brief collaboration, 
Hawthorne eventually decided that Melville should write the tale, and some months later 
Melville developed a draft to a story he titled “Isle of the Cross.”4  Perhaps, if the story had 
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survived, modern readers could discern more clearly in Melville’s writing an extended 
concern about women’s status in marriage and women’s relationship to property, as they do 
in Hawthorne’s work.  It is evident from the surviving material, however, that in 1852—in 
the midst of significant married women’s property reform debates and newly enacted 
legislation—Hawthorne and Melville were engaged in investigating these same concerns in 
their literary productions.5   
No two novels demonstrate these concerns better than The House of the Seven Gables 
and Pierre.  Both texts reinterpret Cooper’s nostalgic domestic plot of family property and 
marriage in order to substantively investigate the rapid changes of America’s economic 
system in the mid-nineteenth century.  While Hawthorne, like Cooper, finds hope in status 
relationships, he critiques the concept of a “natural” aristocracy.  Writing almost two decades 
after Cooper, he views the market’s ascendancy as inevitable, though not inescapable.  
Through the plot turns of The House of the Seven Gables, Hawthorne envisions a middle 
space between the market and the aristocratic system, which is secured by women’s inferior 
status.  In contrast, Melville’s Pierre uses similar plot dynamics to insist that no “right 
marriage” exists, that men persistently fail to protect women, and that, because the American 
aristocracy is based on a hollow notion of status, it cannot be restored. 
 
 
“Someone is always at the drowning point”: Market Anxiety and the  
Marriage Contract in The House of the Seven Gables 
 
Critics have long noted the similarities between the plots of The House of the Seven 
Gables and The Pioneers.  In both novels, a young single woman comes to a family estate, 
creates domestic order, and eventually marries a co-claimant of the ancestral land, who 
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conceals his identity for much of the narrative.6  The restoration of ancestral lands in both 
novels, therefore, depends on women’s ability to recognize the “right husband” and their 
willingness to cede property (both their ownership of the land and their ownership of 
themselves) to their virtuous husbands.  Women’s marriage choices reconcile property 
disputes, and in establishing a more stable social order, they help resist the fluctuations 
inherent in the encroaching commercial economy.  Like contemporary legal discourse, both 
novels configure women as a way to provide fixity and materiality despite the instability of 
new forms of wealth, including credit, speculation, and cash.7  Both Cooper’s and 
Hawthorne’s novels envision women’s willingness to cede property—and therefore their 
self-possession—as the last possibility for stability amidst economic volatility and 
immateriality.   
In The House of the Seven Gables, ancestral land is not a viable solution for the 
problems posed by the powerful market economy.  Even though Hawthorne, like Cooper, is 
concerned with the fluctuations and volatility of the new economy, Hawthorne does not seek 
to reinstate Locke’s theories of natural use in order to establish a natural aristocracy.  While 
both authors view marriage as an instrument that secures men’s self-possession, The Pioneers 
endorses the establishment of a natural aristocracy in order to effectively combat the 
increasingly powerful market.  In Cooper’s text, women, like ancestral real estate, are a 
“space,” associated strongly with family identity, that needs to be protected by upper-class 
white males.  Cooper’s women become an essential part of a family’s property and therefore 
contribute to Locke’s theories of self-possession in the same way that land does.  In The 
House of the Seven Gables, Hawthorne borrows many of Cooper’s plot elements, but he 
jettisons land as a requirement for men’s self-possession.  Instead, he envisions women and 
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the status-based marriage contract as the last viable source for men’s fixity.  Although 
Phoebe’s marriage, like Elizabeth Temple’s, does quell the family’s property disputes, the 
Maule/Pyncheon family has no intention of inhabiting or, in Locke’s sense, owning the 
ancestral land at the end of The House of the Seven Gables.  In The Pioneers the 
Temple/Effingham land is poised to become even more valuable because of its owners’ 
stewardship, while the Pyncheons’ eastern land is abandoned and declared valueless at the 
close of Hawthorne’s novel.   
Throughout The House of the Seven Gables, Hawthorne maintains that the “natural 
aristocracy” is not natural at all; it acquires wealth through underhanded means—most 
typically by misusing the law.  These powerful people then transmit their illegitimate wealth 
through inheritance.  From the opening pages of the novel, Hawthorne condemns inherited 
wealth as a curse rather than a benefit to future generations.  Claiming that the moral of his 
tale is that “the wrongdoing of one generation lives into the successive ones,” he expresses 
the hope that his romance will “effectually convince mankind…of the folly of tumbling 
down an avalanche of ill-gotten gold, or real estate, on the heads of the unfortunate 
posterity…” (HOTSG viii).  This focus on inherited real estate establishes the novel’s central 
position on possession: it critiques Locke’s theories of land ownership and endorses the 
status-based model of marriage.  The House of the Seven Gables demonstrates that, although 
land ownership may seem based in natural law, the law is in fact a social construction, which 
men can manipulate in order to overturn others’ legitimate claims.  In other words, although 
land claims might seem irrefutable, particularly when compared to ownership claims on 
fungible currency, land ownership is actually as mystified and unjust as the market system.  
Therefore, Hawthorne rejects land ownership as a basis for self-possession and focuses 
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instead on the structure of the marriage contract as a source of stability.  I will investigate 
Hawthorne’s critiques and solutions by first elucidating his critique of “natural” law and the 
supposedly “natural” aristocracy it establishes.  While the novel seems to endorse the upper 
class’s demise, I will examine how Hawthorne’s focus on women’s relationship to property 
underscores the dangers of abandoning status relationships entirely in favor of the market 
economy. 
 
 
Maule vs. Pyncheon: the Ends of “Natural” Law 
Through the story of the Pyncheons’ manipulation of the law, Hawthorne expresses 
skepticism that Locke’s theories ever operated according to their ideals.  The first significant 
misuse of the law occurs when Colonel Pyncheon, the Puritan patriarch of the family, tries to 
convince the legislature to bequeath to him the real estate for the site of the House of Seven 
Gables.  He attempts to wrest the land from Matthew Maule not through legitimate means but 
by making the law bend to his will.  However, as the narrator explains, “Matthew 
Maule…was stubborn in the defense of what he considered his right; and…he succeeded in 
protecting the acre or two of earth which, with his own toil, he had hewn out of the primeval 
forest, to be his garden ground and homestead” (HOTSG 12-13).  Maule’s attempt to justify 
his ownership claims echo the theory of Locke’s Second Treatise, which asserts that 
ownership occurs when a man mixes his own labor with natural resources.8  Yet Maule’s 
efforts to secure his real estate claims through natural use do not succeed because Colonel 
Pyncheon manipulates the law again—this time by accusing Maule of being a wizard during 
the Salem witchcraft crisis.  As the narrator recognizes, Matthew Maule’s cultivation should 
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have guaranteed his rights to the land, according to classical liberal theory; his claims should 
have been indisputable.  Instead, the law robbed him of his right and executed him for 
witchcraft.  This incident reveals not only the failure of Locke’s natural use theory but also 
demonstrates, according to the narrator, “that the influential classes, and those who take upon 
themselves to be leaders of the people, are fully liable to all the passionate error that has ever 
characterized the maddest mob.  Clergymen, judges, statesmen—the wisest, calmest, holiest 
persons of their day—stood in the inner circle round about the gallows…” (HOTSG 13).  In 
other words, the hierarchical social order, which is based on status notions like a natural 
aristocracy and protection of the weak, is deeply flawed.  The members who are purportedly 
more rational—or in Cooper’s view, those who would be the proper stewards of the land—
are just as likely to become entangled in irrational and unjust pursuits as any other segment 
of society.   
The manipulation of the legal system to acquire and maintain land rights extends 
through each generation of the Pyncheons.  Hepzibah and Clifford’s cousin Jaffrey is referred 
to as a judge, tying him directly to the legal realm, and like his ancestors, he takes advantage 
of legal structures to attain his control of the family estate.9  As a young man, Judge Jaffrey 
Pyncheon destroys the version of his uncle’s will that names Clifford the rightful heir of the 
Pyncheon estate in order to legitimize the earlier version of the will that deeds the property to 
himself.  He then arranges the scene of his uncle’s death so that it Clifford is ultimately 
accused of murder, consequently resulting in Clifford’s incarceration and Hepzibah’s 
eventual descent into labor.  Throughout the novel, those characters who are most closely 
associated with the law in the text use the legal system to unfairly gain property and 
perpetuate their advantage. 
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In addition to the Pyncheons’ actions in the legal realm, the narrative itself repeatedly 
draws on legal rhetoric in order to underscore that the law is a social construction that is 
unable to judge fairly.  The court of law cannot uncover and evaluate truth as consistently as 
the romance can.  Reminding the reader that the feud between the Pyncheons and the Maules 
is local legend, rather than documented fact, the narrator warns, “It would be bold, therefore, 
and possibly unjust, to venture a decisive opinion as to its merits; although it appears to have 
been at least a matter of doubt whether Colonel Pyncheon’s claim were not unduly stretched, 
in order to make it cover the small metes and bounds of Matthew Maule” (HOTSG 13, 
emphasis mine).  The “evidence” against Colonel Pyncheon may not be sufficient for a court 
of law, but it is essential to understanding the trajectory of property in the text.  Turning 
conventional reasoning on its head, Hawthorne asserts that the law, rather than the romance, 
is a tool that can be manipulated to achieve one’s purposes, while the romance provides 
greater access to truth.10  Additionally, it is only within the space of the romance, rather than 
the courtroom, that Clifford’s innocence can be established.  The narrator begins the 
explanation of Judge Pyncheon’s involvement in Uncle Jaffrey’s death cautiously: “Now it is 
averred—but whether on authority available in a court of justice, we do not pretend to have 
investigated—that the young man was tempted by the devil, one night, to search his uncle’s 
private drawers….” (HOTSG 271).  Yet again, the romance can provide and evaluate 
evidence that is not admissible in the court of law.  The law puts faith in appearances, which 
can easily deceive people, just as Judge Pyncheon’s appearance of innocence has fooled the 
town of Salem.  Going by appearances, it is Clifford who seems guilty; his innocence can 
only be discovered from a mesmeric seer “who…put[s] everybody’s natural vision to the 
blush” (HOTSG 270).  Although evidence from a mesmeric seer is not admissible in court, it 
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alone can reveal the truth of Uncle Jaffrey’s death.  Thus, it is only by reading the romance, 
which is open to alternative forms of evidence and new ways of seeing, that the conniving 
tactics of the Pyncheon family—and natural aristocracy more generally—can be discerned.   
 
 
Market Ascendancy: Losing Ground at the House of the Seven Gables 
Given the repeated insinuations that the upper class has become powerful only by 
controlling and manipulating the law, The House of the Seven Gables builds a case that the 
so-called “natural aristocracy” deserves to fall into decline.  The market economy, with its 
equalizing tendencies, is overtaking the status-based system that has falsely elevated a certain 
group of devious men.  Indeed, when the narrative opens, the Pyncheon family and its house 
are in a significant state of disrepair.  The town is encroaching further and further upon the 
house, which is gradually succumbing to the pressures; as the narrator describes the changes: 
“The street having been widened about forty years ago, the front gable was now precisely on 
a line with it….Behind the house there appeared to be a garden, which undoubtedly had once 
been extensive, but was now infringed upon by other enclosures, or shut in by habitations 
and outbuildings that stood on another street” (HOTSG 30-31).  The street acts as a site of 
commerce and exchange that has overtaken the space of the feudalistic House of the Seven 
Gables.  Likewise, the garden, which represents an earlier economic period by symbolizing 
either domestic production or aristocratic leisure, is becoming rapidly overgrown.  Although 
the house still remains separated from the commercial economy, its borders are being eroded 
by the external pressures of the market.  This shift in space indicates a changing social 
landscape in which the Pyncheon’s stronghold is quite literally losing ground. 
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The Pyncheon family is also endangered because it has refused to relinquish its 
aristocratic attachments and adapt to changing conditions.  Over the years, the family’s land 
claims have purportedly “resulted in nothing more solid than to cherish, from generation to 
generation, an absurd delusion of family importance….In the better specimens of the breed, 
this peculiarity threw an ideal grace over the hard material of human life….In the baser sort, 
its effect was to increase the liability to sluggishness and dependence….” (HOTSG 23).  The 
luxury of wealth and power has transformed the Pyncheon family into unrealistic, lazy, and 
unresourceful people.  Hepzibah, the last great champion of the family, even claims that the 
Pyncheons’ uselessness is an essential part of the family’s identity, and she takes pride in the 
family’s “native inapplicability, so to speak…to any useful purpose” (HOTSG 73).  All signs 
point to the family’s imminent deterioration, and their aristocratic leanings seem outdated 
and even ridiculous relative to the increasingly commercial society. 
While the House of the Seven Gables itself has served as an aristocratic stronghold, 
the Pyncheon family has made one concession to the commercial economy: a shop window, 
initiated by Hepzibah’s great-great grandfather and promptly locked after his death.  The 
great-great grandfather opens the shop to solve his family’s economic difficulties; as the 
narrator explains, “instead of seeking office from the king or the royal governor, or urging 
his hereditary claim to Eastern lands, he bethought himself of no better avenue to wealth than 
by cutting a shop door through the side of his ancestral residence” (HOTSG 32).  In other 
words, rather than depend on aristocratic entitlement, this Pyncheon family member 
embraces the new way to wealth, the commercial market.  His skill as a merchant, combined 
with his love of cash, casts doubt on his Pyncheon blood:  
...there was something pitifully small in this old Pyncheon’s mode of 
setting about his commercial operations; it was whispered that, with his 
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own hands, all beruffled as they were, he used to give change for a shilling, 
and would turn a halfpenny twice over, to make sure it was a good one.  
Beyond all question, he had the blood of a petty huckster in his veins… 
(HOTSG 32)   
The shopkeeper cannot be a “true” Pyncheon because of his ease in accepting the market.  He 
is seen instead as a huckster or confidence man, and he and his shop window are considered a 
disgrace by subsequent generations of the Pyncheon family. 
 Therefore, when Hepzibah is forced to reopen the cent shop in order to save her 
generation of the Pyncheon family from financial danger, she does so with trepidation 
because she does not believe that she can engage with the cash economy without degrading 
her family’s stature.  Unlike her great-great grandfather, she does not turn to the cent shop 
because she refuses to draw upon her aristocratic heritage.  While he shunned help from 
noblemen, Hepzibah continues to hope that her aristocratic heritage will somehow save her.  
She imagines that a long-lost uncle, living a luxurious life in Britain or India, will attempt to 
bring her back to his home so that she will never have to work again.  In her dream, she must 
decline his generous offer, presumably because of her responsibility to Clifford.  She then 
imagines that a branch of the Pyncheon family has settled in Virginia, another aristocratic 
stronghold in Hepzibah’s view, and dreams that one of those male relatives will send her an 
annual remittance of one thousand dollars.  Perhaps her greatest hope, though, is that the 
Pyncheons will finally be able to claim their land in the East and “instead of keeping a cent 
shop, Hepzibah would build a palace, and look down from its highest tower on hill, dale, 
forest, field, and town, as her own share of the ancestral territory” (HOTSG 63).  Thus, 
unlike her great-great grandfather, Hepzibah hopes that she will be saved from market labor, 
and all of her dreams involve the restoration of a quasi-feudalistic order that will include her 
among its ranks. 
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 The narrative, however, implies that there will be no going back in time—nor should 
there be.  Just as the town is irrevocably encroaching on the house’s land, the progress of 
change cannot be reversed.  Hawthorne’s novel, unlike The Pioneers, rejects nostalgia in 
favor of an optimism toward the new order.  This optimism is usually articulated by 
Holgrave, who first appears in the novel immediately before Hepzibah reopens the cent shop.  
Hepzibah confides to Holgrave that she would rather be dead than laboring, and she exclaims 
remorsefully that now that she has opened the cent shop she can no longer be considered a 
“lady” (HOTSG 43).  In response, Holgrave claims that opening the cent shop will enable her 
to discover that the people outside of the House of the Seven Gables are not monsters and 
specters, as she seems to fear.  In addition, Holgrave tells Hepzibah that the opening of the 
cent shop will mark “ ‘one of the fortunate days of your life’ ” (HOTSG 43).   
“It ends an epoch and begins one.  Hitherto, the lifeblood has been 
gradually chilling in your veins as you sat aloof, within your circle of 
gentility, while the rest of the world was fighting out its 
battle….Henceforth, you will at least have the sense of healthy and natural 
effort for a purpose, and of lending your strength…to the united struggle of 
mankind.  This is success.” (HOTSG 43) 
This passage demonstrates vividly the two contrasting economies of Hawthorne’s narrative.  
Holgrave explicitly critiques Hepzibah’s faith in status, focusing on her dying “blood” and 
her declining “gentility.”  The aristocratic elements of Hepzibah’s character are unhealthy 
and dysfunctional, according to Holgrave; they have removed Hepzibah from humanity and 
prevented her from achieving a sense of purpose.  These shortcomings, in Holgrave’s view, 
are inextricably tied to Hepzibah’s attachment to a status-based order, and her entrance into 
the realm of contract and exchange will rejuvenate her.  Holgrave apparently believes that 
women should increase family wealth not through status-based arrangements—like 
marriage—but through active participation in economic exchange.   
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Holgrave’s predictions, while advocating exchange and fluidity, do not accurately 
foretell Hepzibah’s experience with the cent shop.  Because of her strong attachment to the 
Pyncheon ancestry, she is unable to adapt to the market.  When her first customer—a young 
boy named Ned Higgins—enters the cent shop, she refuses payment from him because “her 
old gentility was contumaciously squeamish at sight of the copper coin, and besides, it 
seemed such pitiful meanness to take the child’s pocket money in exchange for a bit of stale 
ginger bread” (HOTSG 50).  On principle, Hepzibah resists anonymous sales in which all 
items have a non-negotiable price that must be paid.  She exhibits not only a disdain for 
money but also an inability to accept the terms of exchange.11  In other words, Hepzibah 
rejects the notion of contract on principle; “she operates in terms of noblesse oblige instead 
of the reciprocity of a market economy” (Goddu 121).  Despite her objections to market 
exchange, Hepzibah quickly learns that she cannot survive on the dictates of status in a 
market economy.  When the young boy returns for another gingerbread, Hepzibah realizes 
that she must charge him or she will have to provide him continually with free goods.  Thus, 
with the opening of the cent shop, Hepzibah discovers not the joy of labor, but the 
greediness, dirt, and pettiness of the commercial economy.  She is completely overwhelmed 
by her interactions with others and the unfamiliar world of market exchange.  Interestingly, 
while Holgrave’s predictions do not accurately foretell Hepzibah’s experience with the cent 
shop, they also do not describe Holgrave’s own fate.  At the end of the novel, Holgrave does 
not unite himself with mankind, as he encourages Hepzibah to do when she opens the shop.  
Instead, after marrying Phoebe, he retreats from society to the Pyncheon’s country seat.  If 
the novel tracks Hepzibah’s separation from her aristocratic roots, then it also charts 
Holgrave’s turn away from his enthusiastic embrace of the market economy.  
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The Woman Question in The House of the Seven Gables:  
Narrative Perspective and Materiality 
 
Much of the plot of The House of the Seven Gables prepares the reader for a rejection 
of Cooper’s nostalgic plot, which envisioned a redemption of ancestral land through the 
establishment of a natural aristocracy.  In Hawthorne’s novel, the aristocracy is portrayed as 
outdated, useless, and often evil.  The narrative seems to advocate their removal in favor of a 
more egalitarian and modern way of living.  Yet by telling much of the story from 
Hepzibah’s perspective, Hawthorne continually undercuts his dismissals of the aristocracy, as 
well as Holgrave’s relentlessly positive depictions of the market.  Even though Hepzibah is 
often made to seem slightly ridiculous, the narrative perspective replicates her point of view 
more consistently than any other character’s.  She is arguably the most sympathetic character 
in the novel, and indeed contemporary reviewers of the novel clearly saw her in this way.12  
Additionally, the only character who receives the narrator’s open admiration is Phoebe, who 
is configured as a sort of domestic savior.  The novel’s sympathy with and focus on women 
foregrounds its central preoccupation: what will replace the status-based order?  How will 
women and other “weaker” creatures be protected in a market economy?  Although 
Hawthorne does not endorse a natural aristocracy, like Cooper does, he too is deeply 
concerned with the ascendancy of the market system—and particularly the consequences for 
women’s position.   
Even though Holgrave asserts that the market provides democratic opportunities, the 
narrator implies that the market relations are random and dehumanizing—perhaps not as 
manipulatible as the law, but certainly no more just.  The narrator establishes this concern 
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early in the novel, with the warning: “In this republican country, amid the fluctuating waves 
of our social life, somebody is always at the drowning point” (HOTSG 39).  Although the 
market contains a leveling power that can provide increased opportunity for the lower 
classes, it necessarily (and randomly) places some citizens at the brink of destruction.13  By 
examining Hawthorne’s critiques of the market economy, we can situate the novel—and 
domestic novels more generally—within the broader category of what Mary Templin has 
termed panic fiction.  Templin defies the genre as narratives written in the wake of 
antebellum economic crises and consequently driven by fears of speculation and credit.14  
Templin focuses on women’s fiction from the 1830s when defining panic fiction, but 
Hawthorne’s tale responds to similar social and economic forces—and, like other domestic 
fiction, does so by examining those forces’ effects on women’s lives. 15 
The most evident symbols of the harshness of the market economy in the novel are 
the Italian organ grinder and his monkey companion, who wander the streets of the town.  
The monkey, in particular, symbolizes the condition of the laboring classes in the market 
economy.  He produces nothing, not even the ephemeral, melodious notes of the organ 
grinder.  His relentless and repetitive actions that demand money from viewers serve as a 
stark distillation of labor in the market system.  He works exclusively and greedily for cash, 
for which he has a rapacious desire, regardless of how much he has accumulated.  Indeed, 
“you could desire no better image of the Mammon of copper coin, symbolizing the grossest 
form of the love of money” (HOTSG 146).16  Critics have recently provided compelling 
insight into the monkey’s racial coding, highlighting Hawthorne’s association between 
“blackness” and the market economy.17  Yet it is also important to note that the monkey is 
not the sole inhabitant of this depraved world; instead he is an embodiment of the 
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repulsiveness of the market economy: “Doubtless, more than one New Englander…passed 
by, and threw a look at the monkey, and went on, without imagining how nearly his own 
moral condition was here exemplified” (HOTSG 146).  The monkey represents an entire 
society driven only by this desire for cash, a desire the narrator claims is spreading 
throughout New England.  Although much of the novel presents greed as a sort of timeless 
motivation, extending across the generations of the aristocratic Pyncheon family, the monkey 
and his rapaciousness for money are distinctively new—an insatiable desire, aired openly in 
public, for what is materially worthless.18   
As many critics have noted, Hawthorne’s solution for this depravoity is domestic 
renewal, as embodied by Phoebe Pyncheon.  When Phoebe arrives at the House of the Seven 
Gables, she is “widely in contrast” with the unkempt surroundings of “gigantic 
weeds…heavy projection[s]…and the timeworn framework of the door” (HOTSG 66).  
Phoebe effortlessly provides a variety of domestic services, including tending chickens, 
making corn bread, and brewing ginger beer.  Many of her skills are associated with an 
agrarian economy in which the home was a site of production rather than consumption.  Yet 
she is not simply a nostalgic icon, who represents an earlier period of women’s productive 
capacity that could protect the family from the encroaching market. 19  Although Phoebe is a 
sort of domestic angel seemingly unfazed by the dirt and somberness of the house, she also 
displays business acumen, running the cent shop with ease and adroitness.  In her first 
conversation with Hepzibah, Phoebe informs her cousin that she has not come to receive 
protection or comfort from her relatives: “ ‘I mean to earn my bread.  You know I have not 
been brought up a Pyncheon’ ” (HOTSG 66).  She goes on to assure Hepzibah: “ ‘I am as 
nice a little saleswoman as I am a housewife’ ” (HOTSG 69).  As such, Phoebe’s skills 
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include an inherited ability to sell goods—“a knack,” which she asserts comes “ ‘with one’s 
mother’s blood’ ” (HOTSG 69).  Unlike Hepzibah, Phoebe does not see herself as destined 
for aristocracy, and she is not concerned with “falling” into labor and betraying her ancestors.   
Phoebe can handle cash, but she can also create a home space—even out of the airy, 
immateriality favored by the market economy.  When the House of the Seven Gables is 
emptied after Judge Pyncheon’s death, the organ grinder and monkey return, lingering at the 
quiet house hoping to see a sign of Phoebe.  As the narrator explains:  
These wanderers are readily responsible to any natural kindness—be it no 
more than a smile, or a word itself not understood, but only a warmth in 
it—which befalls them on the roadside of life.  They remember these 
things, because they are the little enchantments which, for the instant—for 
the space that reflects a landscape in a soap bubble —build up a home 
about them. (HOTSG 255, my emphasis)   
Phoebe’s gift for practical arrangement can create a home “in a soap bubble” for the 
transients who have been ignored and disadvantaged by the market economy.  Her ability to 
create a solid home out of the air (within a “soap bubble”) also stabilizes and secures the 
“homeless” Holgrave and, by extension, the Pyncheon family property (HOTSG 157).  
Phoebe’s role is, as Joel Pfister claims, “to prevent the psychological universe of men from 
tumbling ‘headlong into chaos’ ” (HOTSG 148-49). 
The “chaos” that men are in danger of falling into is an economy with no substance, 
with no source of material value.  The novel’s male characters repeatedly ignore the dangers 
of cash, credit, and speculation; rather, they see the market economy as replete with 
opportunity and capable of radical social transformations.  Even Judge Jaffrey Pyncheon, the 
most powerful member of the Pyncheon family, sheds his aristocratic attachments in favor of 
speculation, aligning himself more with “the grossest form of the love of money” than the 
Pyncehons’ inapplicabililty that Hepzibah values.20  As the narrator claims, Jaffrey’s wealth 
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derives mostly from “railroad, bank, and insurance shares [in addition to] U.S. stock” 
(HOTSG 211).  His wealth does not come from precious material goods, but from pieces of 
paper of varying values.  But it is Holgrave, a Maule, who most vociferously champions 
market relations.  Holgrave appears to be a consummate Jacksonian youth: he is a 
journeyman who rails against the inherited wealth of the upper classes, as when he exclaims 
to Phoebe:  
“A dead man, if he happen to have made a will, disposes of wealth no 
longer his own; or if he die intestate, it is distributed in accordance with the 
notions of men much longer dead than he.  A dead man sits on all our 
judgment seats; and living judges do not but search out and repeat his 
decisions…Whatever we seek to do, of our own free motion, a dead man’s 
icy hand obstructs us.” (HOTSG 162) 
In Holgrave’s view, inheritance impedes free will and thwarts living men’s development.  He 
advocates instead for a world repeatedly made anew—through the dynamics of what he 
believes is an equalizing market.   
The male characters are, therefore, in danger of becoming like the new forms of 
wealth they admire: ephemeral, without basis or substance.  The novel’s male characters are 
consistently associated with abstractions and immateriality, indicating that their embrace of 
cash and credit threatens their physical existence.  Their fading presence reflects how, within 
the increasingly powerful credit economy, “personhood bec[omes] dangerously alienable, 
potentially appropriable by market relations” (Shamir 747).  Holgrave’s main employment is 
the art of the daguerreotype.  While the result of daguerreotypy may be tangible, the 
production process involves a mysterious engagement with the unseeable and unknowable, of 
which Hepzibah and Phoebe are particularly suspicious.  Even the men with whom Holgrave 
associates are eccentric reformers who have “no taste for solid food” (HOTSG 152).  
Clifford, like Holgrave, also asserts that old domestic structures should be torn down in favor 
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of less substantive models.  As he states during the excitement of his railroad journey, “ ‘…it 
is my firm belief and hope that these terms of roof and hearthstone, which have so long been 
held to embody something sacred, are soon to pass out of men’s daily use, and be forgotten’ 
” (HOTSG 229).  Clifford is consistently depicted as detached from the physical.  Unlike 
Hepzibah, whose age is represented by the wrinkles on her face, Clifford’s age is presented 
as a progressive lack of physicality—as a withering away; he is ghost-like in his old age.  
The separation of men from the corporeal corresponds with the new forms of immaterial 
wealth that attract them.  As self-possession becomes separated from material property in the 
antebellum period, the men of The House of the Seven Gables are in danger of fading 
away.21 
In contradistinction, the women in the novel perceive the dangers of substance-less 
wealth.  They consistently reject rapid change and express anxiety about volatility and 
abstraction.  For example, when Holgrave attempts to convince Hepzibah that the aristocratic 
titles that once “ ‘conferred privileges’ ” now “ ‘imply…restriction!,’ ” Hepzibah shuns his 
theories: “ ‘These are new notions…. I shall never understand them; neither do I wish it’ ” 
(HOTSG 46).  Even though Phoebe does not share Hepzibah’s aristocratic upbringing, she 
too views Holgrave’s theories with doubt.  Holgrave suggests to her his plan for property 
reform: 22  
“If each generation were allowed and expected to build its own houses, that 
single change, comparatively unimportant in itself, would imply almost 
every reform which society is now suffering for.  I doubt whether even our 
public edifices—our capitols, state house, courthouses, city hall, and 
churches—ought to be built of such permanent materials as stone or brick.  
It were better that they should crumble to ruin once in twenty years, or 
thereabouts, as a hint to the people to examine into and reform the 
institutions which they symbolize.” (HOTSG 163) 
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Phoebe is made nervous by Holgrave’s seemingly insatiable desire for change.  She responds 
to his solution with dismay; she claims that it makes her “ ‘dizzy to think of such a shifting 
world,’ ” echoing the narrator’s warnings that the increasingly powerful market economy 
means that “somebody is always at the drowning point” (HOTSG 163, 39).  Throughout the 
novel, the women—rather than the men—are the characters who solve problems through 
practical action, and they are repeatedly connected to the material world of labor, production, 
and stability.  
It is through Phoebe’s domestic influence that Holgrave realizes that his theories of 
renewal, which are based on destruction, are misguided.  He discovers instead that the 
generational renewal he seeks can come from marriage to the right woman.  Yet Phoebe’s 
preference for fixity causes her at first to decline Holgrave’s marriage proposal.  She tells 
him, “ ‘You will lead me out of my own quiet path.  You will make me strive to follow you 
where it is pathless.  I cannot do so.  It is not my nature.  I shall sink down and perish!’ ”  
(HOTSG 267).  Phoebe refuses to depart from her path and subsequently drift into 
Holgrave’s world of uncertainty.  Holgrave responds by assuring Phoebe that her influence 
has caused him to perceive a new desire within himself: “to set out trees, to make fences—
perhaps, even, in due time, to build a house for another generation—in a word, to conform 
myself to laws, and the peaceful practice of society.  Your poise will be more powerful than 
any oscillating tendency of mine’ ” (HOTSG 267).  Thus Phoebe enables Holgrave, the once 
radical property reformer, to claim and cultivate land, and in so doing, she offsets his 
oscillating tendencies—tendencies that clearly associate him with market volatility.  As 
Gillian Brown claims, “Phoebe’s salutary and salvific role signals the emergence of domestic 
womanhood as an antidote to the economic upheavals of nineteenth-century American 
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society which transport the Pyncheons from wealth to poverty and thence to new wealth” 
(HOTSG 108).   
While critics such as Brown have discussed Phoebe’s domestic skills at length, I 
would like to emphasize how she restores stability through the marriage contract rather than 
through a simply nostalgic return to property cultivation, as Cooper advocates, or through 
some version of a separate spheres ideology.  As the narrator indicates, Phoebe’s “exclusive 
patrimony” is “the gift of practical arrangement,” which enables her to “bring out the hidden 
capabilities” in her environment; in particular this gift allows her “to give a look of comfort 
and habitableness to any place” she calls home by enlivening items that seem to have “an old 
maid’s heart” (HOTSG 64).  Thus, the narrator implies, Phoebe’s restorative powers are 
directly connected to her position as an available, unmarried woman.  In other words, 
because Phoebe can marry, she alone can rehabilitate the decaying Pyncheon family.   
Consistently, domestic novels of the mid-nineteenth century assert that women’s 
marriage choice is critically important for family identity and survival.  When Phoebe 
marries Holgrave, she surrenders to him her stake in the family property, as Massachusetts 
state law required in 1851.23  The marriage act, thus, reconciles the competing disputes 
surrounding the family land, and the Pyncheons are finally able to uncover the lost claim to 
the elusive eastern lands.  These resolutions all depend on Phoebe’s marriage choice.  
Because Phoebe does not know Holgrave is a Maule when she agrees to marry him, her 
ability to choose the “right mate” depends more on her innate goodness, on her ability to 
discern who would be a suitable husband.  Phoebe’s goodness serves a doubly positive 
function: it rehabilitates Holgrave as well as the Pyncheon family.  For Hawthorne and for 
Cooper, the ability to withstand the instability of the market economy depends on women 
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marrying the “right man,” who will properly enact a status relationship by protecting and 
caring for his wife.  Phoebe’s relationship to family property underscores the need for 
women to marry wisely; if they do not, that property is in danger of depletion.  This danger 
of wealth depletion, due to men’s speculation, also captivated legislators and spurred the first 
wave of married women’s property reform. 
Regardless of the property reforms, it was not legislators’ intention for wives to put 
their property in market circulation.  As Alexander Gregory comments about legal theorists’ 
attitude about women’s property entering the market: “Market-alienability of women’s 
property, by creating the potential of reducing the wife’s dependency on her husband, 
represented too great a threat to maintaining the delicate equilibrium between stability and 
change” (HOTSG 181).  Phoebe herself represents this delicate equilibrium.  While a single 
woman, she is able to labor effectively in the market system and the private space.  Once 
married, she is willing to give up her position in order to bolster her husband’s sense of self-
possession.  The marriage contract, therefore, requires that Phoebe relinquish her portion of 
the family estate, and in submerging her legal identity into her husband’s, the marriage 
contract also requires that she surrender property in her self.  Thus, if land ownership can no 
longer provide Holgrave with adequate stability against market forces, his “ownership” of 
Phoebe can.  This point is made explicitly when Holgrave reveals his identity by referring to 
the mechanics of coverture.  He asks Phoebe, “ ‘[H]ow will it please you to assume the name 
of Maule?’ ” (HOTSG 275).  Phoebe, then, sacrifices two kinds of ownership—ownership in 
property and ownership in her self—in order to bolster Holgrave’s own self-possession 
against increasingly powerful market forces.  The nineteenth-century conception of the 
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marriage “contract” erased women’s self-possession and transferred it to their husbands, 
leaving the men able to interact in the market economy while preserving their fixity.   
We can, perhaps, gain a clearer understanding of how women bolster status through 
Holgrave’s story about Alice Pyncheon.  The entire story is imbued with an emphasis on 
status, and, in particular, status-based relationships pervade the Pyncheon household.  Early 
in the story, the blacksmith Matthew Maule is summoned to the House of the Seven Gables 
by the Pyncheon’s black servant, Scipio.  During their conversation, Maule mentions to 
Scipio that he looks forward to seeing Alice Pyncheon, to which Scipio responds with 
offense: “ ‘The low carpenter man! He no business so much as to look at her a great way 
off!’ ” (HOTSG 167).  In a novel in which blackness is consistently a marker of a low class 
position, it is not surprising that Hawthorne uses a black servant to articulate the rules of 
stratification.24  Clearly, Scipio abides by the dictates of status relationships, and he 
repeatedly disapproves of Maule’s indifference to such rules, like when Maule insists on 
approaching the House of the Seven Gables through the front, rather than the servants’, 
entrance.  Holgrave describes the house as surrounded by the hustle and bustle of home 
economics, accomplished without cash exchange.  The cook is standing outside the house 
“bargaining for some turkeys and poultry,” which implies negotiation rather than the 
anonymous sale of items with established value, like the knick knacks sold for an exact price 
at Hepzibah’s shop (HOTSG 168).  The house’s affiliation with status is also indicated by the 
neatly dressed maid and the “shining sable face of a slave” easily visible from outside the 
house (HOTSG 168).  The focus on status extends to the head of the household, Genoveyse 
Pyncheon, who is described as having spent a good teal of time in Europe, a symbol for 
aristocracy throughout Hawthorne’s fiction, and who is now married to a wealthy, landed 
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British woman.  When the narrative begins, Genoveyse is hoping to purchase an English 
Earldom in order to secure his status as a true aristocrat.  It is not surprising, then, that the 
narrator remarks that the house “seemed fit to be the residence of a patriarch” (HOTSG 168).   
 Through Genoveyse’s and Matthew’s interactions, Hawthorne implies that men view 
single women as the way to expand family wealth.  In order to earn the money to purchase an 
Earldom, Genoveyse needs the claim to the Pyncheon’s eastern lands, and he believes Maule 
knows the location of the lost deed.  Maule agrees to help on the condition that Genoveyse 
restore the Maule’s ancestral land (on which now sits the House of the Seven Gables).  
Genoveyse, believing that land in England will suit him better, gladly accepts, briefly 
imagining himself as Lord Pyncheon or the Earl of Waldo, further emphasizing Genoveyse’s 
association with status and aristocracy (HOTSG 176).  The initial terms of their agreement, 
however, are quickly put aside, and instead Maule demands to speak with Alice Pyncheon 
before he will reveal the deed’s location, claiming “that the only chance of acquiring the 
requisite knowledge [is] through the clear, crystal medium of a pure and virgin intelligence” 
(HOTSG 177).  After a moment of hesitation, Genoveyse capitulates to the new arrangement, 
justifying his decision as a concern for Alice’s future.  He assures himself that acquiring the 
claim to the eastern lands will allow him to secure Alice’s aristocratic position and to 
enhance the prestige of the family: 
And was it not for her sake far more than for his own that he desired [the 
plan’s] success?  That lost parchment once restored, the beautiful Alice 
Pyncheon, with the rich dowry which he could then bestow, might wed an 
English duke or a German reigning prince, instead of some New England 
clergyman or lawyer!  At the thought, the ambitious father almost 
consented, in his heart, that, if the devil’s power were needed to the 
accomplishment of this great object, Maule might evoke him.  (HOTSG 
181) 
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Genoveyse allows a blacksmith-wizard to speak with his daughter because he hopes to save 
her from a potential descent into middle-class American life.  The eastern lands could ensure 
that Alice would marry a European nobleman rather than a respectable, but laboring, New 
England middle-class man.  Like his male ancestors, Genoveyse intends to use underhanded 
means (even “the devil’s power,” if necessary) to increase the family’s wealth.  Both men 
view women as a source for expanding wealth and improving class position. 
 Maule’s power undermines the protection that status relationships supposedly afford 
women.  Alice, a “haughty” Pyncheon like her father, accepts Maule’s terms because she 
believes that her superior status provides her with her own power, “combined of beauty, 
high, unsullied purity, and the preservative force of womanhood—that could make her sphere 
impenetrable” (HOTSG 180).  Alice’s gender, therefore, provides her with an inviolate 
privacy that can withstand Maule’s invasive powers.  Even Maule invokes the Pyncheon’s 
belief in status when he assures them that Alice “ ‘will no doubt feel herself quite safe in her 
father’s presence, and under his all-sufficient protection’ ” (HOTSG 179, my emphasis).  
These claims reflect the theory behind status relationships—that white men can and will 
protect those who depend upon them.  Yet, the Pyncheons’ faith in status does not protect 
Alice from Maule’s intrusion; her father even turns away from the proceedings until after 
Maule’s power “had laid its grasp upon her maiden soul…and her spirit passed from beneath 
her own control, and bowed itself to Maule” (HOTSG 185).  Although Alice was supposedly 
protected by her race, her class, and her father’s stature, Maule’s invasive power reveals this 
protection to be useless.   
Before the experiment, the worst fate Genoveyse could imagine for his daughter was 
that she might descend into middle-class American life.  But after Alice succumbs to Maule’s 
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power, she falls to an even lower position than she would have occupied as the wife of a 
laborer; she becomes Maule’s slave, the lowest status position possible.  The mesmeric 
encounter between Maule and Alice, which was entered into with the hopes of expanding 
family wealth, results in the inversion of their own status relationships.  In this way, 
mesmerism itself replicates the dynamics of a status relationship.  It is not a dialogue 
between mesmerist and subject, but a one-way path of control, predicated on hierarchy rather 
than exchange.  Although mesmerism is often associated with sexual control, the narrator 
makes it clear that Maule does not mesmerize Alice in order to turn her into his sexual 
victim.  Soon after their encounter, Maule marries another woman, as if to underscore that his 
interest in Alice is not sexual, but social.  Indeed, Maule does not seek to “crown [Alice’s] 
sorrows with the grave of tragedy, but to wreak a low ungenerous scorn upon her” (HOTSG 
185).  As the language of this passage indicates, Maule wants to inflict a “low” punishment 
on Alice and the Pyncheon family; he aims to dismantle the social order that has falsely 
elevated the Pyncheons and marginalized the Maules.  Instead of taking Genoveyse’s land, 
Maule takes his daughter, thereby robbing Genoveyse of the ability to expand the family 
estate.   
By telling Phoebe the story of Alice, Holgrave re-enacts the mesmeric encounter 
between Maules and Pyncheons in which the Maules sought to undermine the status order.  
Once Holgrave finishes the story, he recognizes in Phoebe “an incipient stage of that curious 
psychological condition, which as he had himself told Phoebe, he possessed more than an 
ordinary faculty of producing.  A veil was beginning to be muffled about her, in which she 
could behold only him, and live only in his thoughts and emotions” (HOTSG 187).  Unlike 
Matthew Maule, though, Holgrave apparently resists penetrating Phoebe’s consciousness 
 65 
because he possess a “rare and high quality of reverence for another’s individuality” 
(HOTSG 187).  Still, in the story of Alice, there is an indication of Holgrave’s connection 
and continuity with his Maule ancestors.  The parallel between Alice’s and Phoebe’s 
situation infuses Phoebe’s own story with an ambiguous quality: specifically, does Holgrave 
convince Phoebe to marry him by employing better skill and more restraint than his ancestor 
Matthew Maule, who abused his power to such an extent that he killed Alice?  Regardless of 
the answer, Holgrave’s methods reveal a perpetuated view of women as an embodiment of 
family wealth and property. 
Although Alice’s story (Holgrave’s tale) and Phoebe’s story (Hawthorne’s novel) 
possess disturbing parallels, Alice’s story has an antithetical end to the novel The House of 
the Seven Gables.  There are no positive outcomes from her union with the Maule family.  
The deed to the eastern lands is not located, and by being rendered unable to marry, Alice 
cannot increase family lands through marriage, as a daughter in a status-based system could 
do.25  Phoebe, on the other hand, is united to Holgrave through choice rather than coercion, 
and Holgrave does reveal to her the location of the deed.  Yet Matthew Maule’s prophecy—
that the Pyncheons would not receive the deed until the eastern lands became worthless—is 
also fulfilled, which Holgrave acknowledges after he has exposed the deed: “ ‘This is the 
very parchment the attempt to recover which cost the beautiful Alice Pyncheon her happiness 
and life….It is what the Pyncheons sought in vain, while it was valuable; and now that they 
find the treasure, it has long been worthless’ ” (HOTSG 275).   
Despite her goodness and her ability to provide balance, Phoebe is unable to redeem 
the House of the Seven Gables or the Pyncheons’ ancestral lands.  Phoebe does not save the 
family by transforming the house into a separate sphere—a peaceful, protected space from 
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the market economy.  Instead, the new family abandons the House of the Seven Gables and 
removes to Judge Pyncheon’s country seat.  Even though the disputes surrounding the 
family’s land have been settled, the family property does not serve as a stronghold against the 
volatility of the marketplace as it does at the end of The Pioneers.  Instead, Hawthorne’s 
novel implies that the market has simply become too powerful for the House of the Seven 
Gables to resist it effectively; as we have seen, the market has been slowly encroaching upon 
the dilapidated house.  Rather than adapt to these changes, the house seems to combat the 
new forces with little success.  Again, it is slowly losing ground to the market, which results 
in the house’s compartmentalization and division.  Each space in the house, it seems, can 
only contain one form of economic activity or labor.  Throughout the novel, the narrator 
emphasizes the house’s many divisions, partitions, and locked sections.  It has been ruptured 
by the commercial world through the shop door, but this addition is just another division in 
the house.  Alternatively, the Pyncheon’s country seat is presented as a flexible and fluid 
space.  As the new head of the family, Holgrave, who had once claimed that each generation 
should build its own house, embraces the country seat’s adaptability.  For his new home, he 
hopes that “ ‘every generation of the family might…alter the interior, to suit its own taste and 
convenience’ ” (HOTSG 274).  Holgrave’s statement positions interior decorating itself as a 
middle ground act, situated between complete destruction, as he had once advocated, and the 
stultification of the home space, as had existed at the House of the Seven Gables. 
Despite the middle-ground quality of the Pyncheon’s country seat, the novel 
concludes with a distinct reminder that patriarchy is the best form of protection for society’s 
weakest members.  Hawthorne, however, re-establishes the status order by returning to the 
character of Uncle Venner at the conclusion of the novel.  Uncle Venner is a peculiar elderly 
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man who performs odd jobs along Pyncheon Street.  He is the only male character in the 
novel who is aligned with older economic structures, and as such, he is very suspicious of the 
new market economy.  When Hepzibah opens her cent shop, he gives her advice on how to 
manage her business.  He relates his “golden maxims,” such as “Give no credit!…Never take 
paper money!  Look well to your change!”  (HOTSG 63).  Throughout the novel, Uncle 
Venner talks repeatedly of retiring to his farm—a fantastical space of productive labor and 
respite from the market economy.  Yet rather than return to an idealized agrarian past, Uncle 
Venner accompanies the Pyncheon’s to their country seat.  As Phoebe insists, “You must 
never talk any more about your farm!  You shall never go there, as long as you live!  There is 
a cottage in our new garden—the prettiest little yellowish-brown cottage you ever saw; and 
the sweetest looking place, for it looks just as if it were made of gingerbread—and we are 
going to fit it up and furnish it, on purpose for you.  And you shall do nothing but what you 
choose” (HOTSG 275-76).  Phoebe reconfigures the Pyncheons’ role in society as that of 
providing protection rather than practicing exploitation or manipulation.  Instead of being 
abandoned to his fantasies, Uncle Venner is supplied with a cottage in a garden—another 
middle ground space between the market he has been a part of and the farm he continually 
dreams of. 
The novel’s conclusion solidifies Holgrave’s position as the patriarch of a family.  
Yet he is established not by land ownership, but through the status components of the 
marriage contract.  Phoebe’s willingness to follow Holgrave’s guidance and let him “own 
her”—her willingness to embody the status relationship—provides fixity against the dangers 
of speculation.  Although the final moments of the novel often confound readers, it allows 
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Hawthorne to incorporate Cooper’s nostalgia plot while also recognizing the power—and the 
benefits—of market forces.   
 
 
Status, Property, and Annihilation in Pierre 
Hawthorne’s fiction of the market and the homespace ends in comedy—with a 
marriage—but it is in many ways a surprising ending.  For much of The House of the Seven 
Gables, Hawthorne appears to be presenting a tale in which the outdated, aristocratic 
generation will be supplanted by the younger couple, who will happily join the market 
revolution occurring around them.  Yet in the last quarter of Hawthorne’s novel, he changes 
course.  Rather than depicting the inevitable decline of the aristocratic order, he portrays both 
generations living together peacefully in a middle ground country estate, safe from 
encroaching market forces.  Holgrave—the one-time market advocate who told Hepzibah 
that opening the cent shop would mark the best day of her life, who suggested that family 
estates should be routinely burnt to the ground—ultimately embraces the remnants of the 
older order, including an ancestral homespace that will be passed from one generation to the 
next.  Although The House of the Seven Gables ends with marriage, it does not end the way 
most readers anticipate.   
 In contrast, Melville’s fiction of the market and the homespace, Pierre, ends in 
devastating tragedy.  By its close, all of the major characters are dead, and most are killed in 
disturbing outbursts of violence.  Unlike Hawthorne, Melville finds no hope for a middle 
space between the dangerous market economy and the rural aristocratic estate.  When Pierre 
decides to abandon the deeply patriarchal Saddle Meadows, he almost immediately removes 
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to the harsh urban environment of New York City, where everything is in danger of turning 
into cash. 
 These novels’ fundamental differences can be attributed to the male characters’ 
perception of status.  The function of status, as Cooper’s novels underscore, is to consolidate 
wealth and to ensure orderly property transmission.  Over the course of The House of the 
Seven Gables, Holgrave—almost as if by magic—comes to understand and accept this. By 
marrying the right woman, he reconciles competing claims to the land, and in turn he himself 
is reconciled to the usefulness of status.  Pierre, on the other hand, misunderstands the 
function of the status relationship.  He sees within it only the ideals of protection, fixity, and 
legitimization, and he ignores its realities—the perpetuation of land claims through 
exploitation and manipulation of the law.  To highlight the gap between the status ideal  and 
the reality of status, Melville twists the earlier reconciliation plots of Hawthorne and Cooper.  
Rather than presenting a female inheritor who must make the right marriage choice, as 
Cooper and Hawthorne do, Melville offers a female un-inheritor and the puzzle of how to 
redeem her.  Pierre attempts to do so by employing the ideals of status, and in the process he 
destroys himself and everyone he has vowed to love and protect.   
In a recent examination of Pierre, Cindy Weinstein compellingly argues that the novel 
is propelled by the tensions between status and contract in antebellum America.  Weinstein 
interprets Pierre’s action as an attempt “to divest himself of his parents” and, indeed, of 
family altogether (161).  As she claims, “All of the children in the novel seek to embrace an 
ideal of contract only to find that biology, indeed incest, awaits them” (160).26  Although I 
agree with Weinstein that the uneasy interplay between contract and status is central to 
Melville’s purpose in Pierre, I disagree with her point that Pierre hopes to contract a new 
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family—a family of choice—in an attempt to destroy his consanguineous attachments.  
Pierre begins the novel believing he lives in a world exclusively dictated by status.27  But 
once Isabel enters his life, Pierre realizes that his attachments to his mother and to the 
Glendinning estate are mere functions of the law, rather than the idealized, affective ties of 
status.  In other words, the trajectory of the novel traces Pierre’s resistance to the “fall” into 
contract.  He escapes Saddle Meadows in order to reject contract, and in the city he attempts 
to construct a new world consisting only of the bulwarks of status relationships: 
consanguinity, protection, and irrefutable connection. 
 As Melville makes clear throughout the narrative, status is an aristocratic system 
rooted in ruthless violence and legal manipulation.  Pierre, ignorant of this fact, hopes to 
adapt status to the context of democracy and domesticity, and he fails miserably.  Yet 
Melville does not make clear exactly what the reader should make of Pierre and his pursuits.  
Is he a tragic hero or a naïve buffoon?  Is status a valuable system that should be preserved, 
or is it a pernicious legal construct that justifies oppression?  Does status make sense of 
human relationships or hopelessly confuse them?  Rather than offer answers to these 
questions, the narrative voice in Pierre continually reorients the reader in order to underscore 
the complexity—and perhaps futility—of the questions at hand.  This narrative ambiguity 
mirrors Pierre’s own struggles with textuality and interpretation.  Through Pierre’s resistance 
to contract Melville explores the instability of written language. 
The narrative traces Pierre’s fall from the status ideal and his desperate and ill-fated 
attempts to reconfigure status in the city.  When the novel opens, Pierre’s mother, Mary, 
expects that Pierre will marry a virtuous woman and carry on the tradition of his noble 
Glendinning forebears.  Pierre’s betrothed, Lucy Tartan, is just such a woman.  She is sweet, 
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docile, and blue-eyed, and she adores Pierre as much as his mother does.  However, Pierre’s 
idyllic world is disrupted when he meets the dark-haired Isabel, who claims that she is 
Pierre’s half sister—an illegitimate child of Pierre’s father.  The revelation disrupts Pierre’s 
notions of family, honor, and nobility—in other words, his notions of status.  He decides that 
he must “legitimize” Isabel, to whom he is peculiarly attracted, and does so by pretending to 
marry her and moving to the city.  After Pierre’s supposed marriage, Mary Glendinning 
disowns him and transfers the Glendinning family estate to Pierre’s cousin and rival, Glen, 
before she becomes insane and dies.  This incident only marks the beginning of the downfall 
of the Glendinning family.  In a confrontation at the end of the novel, Pierre kills Glen and is 
then arrested.  When Lucy and Isabel visit him in jail, Lucy dies of grief, and then Pierre and 
Isabel drink poison.  The novel ends with Isabel draped over Pierre’s body, proclaiming “ 
‘All is over, and ye knew him not’ ” (Pierre 362).  The novel ends, then, with the destruction 
of the entire Glendinning line and with no one left to become the steward for the family 
property.  Rather than restoring the family and its status ideals, Pierre destroys it. 
 
 
Land, Inheritance, and Stability: The Legends of Saddle Meadows 
The novel opens with a consideration of the American family, property ownership, 
and stability.  As in The House of the Seven Gables, Pierre’s narrator expresses anxiety about 
security and fixity among tremendous change: “With no chartered aristocracy, and no law of 
entail, how can any family in America imposingly perpetuate itself…In our cities families 
rise and burst like bubbles in a vat” (Pierre 9).  The narrator asks how families can maintain 
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their wealth and stature over time, and then quickly dispels that worry by claiming that 
America’s instability might also be the source of its rejuvenation: 
For indeed the democratic element operates as a subtile acid among us; 
forever producing new things by corroding the old….Herein by apt analogy 
we behold the marked anomalousness of America; whose character abroad, 
we need not be surprised, is misconceived, when we consider how 
strangely she contradicts all prior notions of human things; and how 
wonderfully to her, Death itself becomes transmuted into Life.  So that 
political institutions, which in other lands above all things intensely 
artificial, with America seem to possess the divine virtue of a natural law; 
for the most mighty of nature’s laws is this, that out of Death she brings 
life. (9-emphasis added) 
In this quotation, the narrator asserts that America’s exceptionalism can be found in its 
ability to transform death into life.  This belief mirrors the optimism within The House of the 
Seven Gables: an old order is destroyed in order to give rise to a new family.  Through the 
death of one family and the abandonment of its ancestral dwelling, a new family is born; the 
romance of property becomes the romance of rebirth.  Yet the “most mighty of nature’s 
laws,” as Melville describes it, will fail completely in the plot of Pierre.  Unlike The House 
of the Seven Gables, Pierre ends in death for all of the major and even many of the minor 
characters.  The valuable Glendinning property is left with no one to manage it; no new 
family is poised to revive the land.   
The Glendinning family establishes its claims to ownership in the same way that the 
Temple and Pyncheon families do: the land is secured by racial violence and perpetuated 
through marriage and inheritance.  In Pierre, the Glendinning family acquired its land first by 
defeating the Indians and, then, during the Revolution, by combating the “repeated combined 
assaults of Indians, Tories, and Regulars” (Pierre 6).  Rather than obscure or justify the 
violence as in The Pioneers or The House of the Seven Gables, Melville emphasizes the 
American aristocracy’s dependence on violence and oppression for its ascendancy.  He 
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“repeatedly alludes to the centuries-long struggle for possession of the American land.  
Melville examines how this kind of history is obscured and how the landscape is 
transformed” (Otter 177).   
America’s great families, according to the narrator, will match England’s nobility, 
because of their violence, marriage choices, and mastery of the law.  In order to prove that 
America’s “large estates” and “long pedigrees” will rival England’s, the narrator points to:  
…the old and oriental-like English planter families of Virginia and the 
South; the Randolphs, for example, one of whose ancestors, in King James’ 
time, married Pocahontas the Indian Princess, and in whose blood therefore 
an underived aboriginal royalty was flowing over two hundred years ago; 
consider those most ancient and magnificent Dutch Manors at the 
North…whose haughty rent-deeds are held by their thousand farmer 
tenants, so long as grass grows and water runs; which hints of a surprising 
eternity for a deed, and seems to make lawyer’s ink unobliterable as the 
sea. (Pierre 10-11) 
This quotation highlights how native claims to the land are covered over by the act of 
marriage and the system of coverture, which, as we have seen, unite competing landholders 
and ensure transmission of wealth across generations.28  The narrator immediately follows 
this description with a reference to the Dutch landowners in the North who gain property by 
using the law to create “haughty rent-deeds” that increase the wealth of their estates.  By 
comparing the two kinds of aristocratic families—the European settlers united with Indian 
royalty in Virginia and the Dutch landowners in the North—Melville creates an analogy 
between using the exploitation of women in marriage and the exploitation of a “thousand 
farmer tenants.”  Lurking just beneath both descriptions is the specter of violence that was 
used by wealthy white settlers to subdue Native Americans and to subdue unruly farmer 
tenants.  By harnessing the power of the law, however, these families appear entitled to their 
wealth and privilege. 
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The Glendinning family explains its own ascent through the myths of status rather 
than through disturbing tales of legal manipulation and violence.  These stories depict 
Pierre’s male relatives as brave and virile, rather than violent and oppressive.  Pierre’s great-
grandfather is widely considered a hero; his military activity secured the land of Saddle 
Meadows for the Glendinning family.  However, Saddle Meadows received its name because 
it marked the spot where Pierre’s great-grandfather fell from his horse in battle and died, 
while his men charged on to victory.  In other words, the land is named as much for the site 
of the patriarch’s failure as it is for his victory, an irony that the Glendinnings seem all too 
capable of ignoring. 
While the legends surrounding the Glendinning ancestors seem to embody the ideals 
of status, the narrator continually undermines these legends by returning to moments of 
violence and exploitation.  For example, Pierre’s grandfather, for whom Pierre was named, 
appears unusually able to be merciless on the battlefield and yet tender at home:   
…in the night-scuffle in the wilderness before the Revolutionary War, he 
had annihilated two Indian savages by making reciprocal bludgeons of 
their heads.  And all this was done by the mildest hearted, and most blue-
eyed gentleman in the world, who, according to the patriarchal fashion of 
those days, was a gentle, white-haired worshiper of all the household gods; 
the gentlest husband, and the gentlest father; the kindest of masters to his 
slaves…. in fine, a pure, cheerful, childlike, blue-eyed, divine old man; in 
whose meek, majestic soul, the lion and the lamb embraced…. (Pierre 30) 
Pierre’s grandfather, then, is presented as an ideal mixture of violence and kindness; he can 
seemingly draw on the different parts of his personality depending on his particular sphere of 
action.  The grandfather’s image as a domestically docile military hero is disturbed, however, 
when the narrator discusses the treatment of the slaves at Saddle Meadows:  “[But] woe 
to…his stable slaves, if grand old Pierre found one horse unblanketed, or one weed among 
the hay that filled their rack.  Not that he ever had…any of them flogged—a thing unknown 
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in that patriarchal time and country—but he would refuse to say his wonted pleasant word to 
them….” (Pierre 30).  This passage begins with a stern and serious warning to the slaves lest 
they make even the tiniest mistake on the Glendinning property, and is quickly followed by 
the improbable assertion that these slaves were never beaten during the grandfather’s 
lifetime.  The description of the grandfather seems designed to emphasize the impossible, 
contradictory qualities that the grandfather has, and it undermines the portrayal of the 
grandfather as a gentle master.  The passage about the slaves is particularly pointed because 
of how it implicates Pierre’s grandfather’s domestic behavior.  The master-slave relationship 
was a status relationship that was built on the same principle as the relationship between 
husband and wife.29  Status relationships were based on the premise that the white man, as 
the most rational and strongest being, should guide and protect those who are weaker.  In 
revealing Pierre’s grandfather’s short temper toward his slaves, the narrator implicates the 
grandfather’s attitude toward his family.  Thus, the narrator’s depiction suggests that the 
family’s noble vision of the grandfather as both a military hero and gentle household master 
is distorted, inaccurate, and even impossible.  Just as the legal discourse of the period 
presented an idealized description of status relationships, the Glendinning family legends 
perpetuate an ideal view of status, in which a man, infamous for his violence on the 
battlefield, can channel his anger into mere verbal admonishments at home. 
 
 
The Fantasies of Status 
Raised in a home saturated with the inherited signs of military might, Pierre cherishes 
the hope of finding his own opportunity to become the male protector.  His grandfather’s 
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military prowess seems literally to fill the house.  The family has hung military banners that 
Pierre’s grandfather captured on the battlefield, and Pierre essentially plays dress up with his 
grandfather’s military accoutrements.  The patriarchal environment of Saddle Meadows 
sparks “ten thousand mailed thoughts of heroicness…in Pierre’s soul, [and] he glared round 
for some insulted cause to defend” (Pierre 14).  Isabel’s sudden appearance in Pierre’s life 
provides him with the opportunity to live out these status-based fantasies, particularly his 
long-held wish to have a sister to defend: “ ‘Oh, had my father but had a daughter!…some 
one whom I might love, and protect, and fight for….It must be a glorious thing to engage in a 
mortal quarrel on a sweet sister’s behalf!’ ” (Pierre 7).  Therefore, Pierre, desperate to act out 
the ideals of status, is long ready to believe Isabel’s story.   
From the moment he receives Isabel’s letter, Pierre believes that he can serve as her 
much-needed protector.  He realizes that in opening it, he will commit himself to her 
redemption, but will also forever distance himself from his mother.  The letter in essence 
divides him against himself: 
One [half] bade him finish the selfish destruction of the note; for in some 
dark way the reading of it would irretrievably entangle his fate.  The other 
bade him dismiss all misgivings; not because there was no possible ground 
for them, but because to dismiss them was the manlier part, never mind 
what might betide.  This good angel seemed mildly to say—Read, Pierre, 
though by reading thou may’st entangle thyself, yet may’st thou thereby 
disentangle others.  Read, and feel that best blessedness which, with the 
sense of all duties discharged holds happiness indifferent.  The bad angel 
insinuatingly breathed—Read it not, dearest Pierre; but destroy it, and be 
happy. (Pierre 63) 
The power of text is evident in this moment.  Pierre understands that in simply reading the 
letter he will be bound to its narrative and to fulfilling his status obligations to this woman, 
whatever they may turn out to be.  Even this early in the novel, Pierre also recognizes the 
ambiguity of his position: to act according to the good angel’s wishes will provide him with 
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the “best blessedness” of being unhappy.  Indeed, reading the letter produces instant change 
in Pierre.  He immediately remembers a long-suppressed memory: his father’s mysterious 
cries for a daughter on his deathbed.  Thus, instead of questioning Isabel’s narrative, he 
quickly integrates it into his family’s history.  He believes that he can instinctually divine the 
letter’s truthfulness:  “ ‘I feel that nothing but Truth can move me so.  This letter is not a 
forgery.  Oh! Isabel, thou art my sister; and I will love thee, and protect thee, ay, and own 
thee through all’ ” (Pierre 66).  Here, then, Pierre’s mission is articulated.  His reaction to the 
letter is to articulate the tenets of the status relationship: love, protection, and ownership.  In 
Isabel, Pierre recognizes his status fantasy.30 
 The problem with status, according to Melville, is that while it purports to create 
distinct relationships and responsibilities, it always produces a confusion that easily leads to 
misplaced lust and even incest.  Pierre’s misplaced lust for Isabel is established early in the 
novel, when the narrator asserts that a sister is a precursor to a wife: “For surely a gentle 
sister is the second best gift to a man; and it is first in point of occurrence; for the wife comes 
after.  He who is sisterless, is as a bachelor before his time.  For much that goes to make up 
the deliciousness of a wife, already lies in the sister” (Pierre 7).  Pierre, raised in a world 
permeated by relationality, has nowhere and yet everywhere to channel his sexual desire.  
Throughout the novel, Pierre is plagued by confused relationships with women.  Lucy is his 
betrothed but also his sister.  He calls his mother his sister, but he also imitates a marriage 
relationship with her.  As Michael Rogin points out, “By playing at brother and sister, Pierre 
and his mother are imitating the ideal form of marriage.  The resulting confusions of brother 
with husband, husband with son, and mother with sister and wife make sex a threat to all the 
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pairings” (164).  Thus, Pierre’s decision to pretend to marry his sister makes sense in the 
context of the confused relations of status: 
[P]ossibly the latent germ of Pierre’s proposed extraordinary mode of 
executing his proposed extraordinary resolve—namely, the nominal 
conversion of a sister into a wife—might have been found in the previous 
conversational conversion of a mother into a sister; for hereby he had 
habituated his voice and manner to a certain fictitiousness in one of the 
closest domestic relations of life…this outward habituation to the above-
named fictitiousness had insensibly disposed his mind to it as it were. 
(Pierre 176-77) 
The slippage in the relationship with his mother foretells a slippage in other domestic 
relations.  For example, Pierre consistently configures Isabel as a child, even though he 
knows she is older than he is.  To him, she is a “child of everlasting sameness” (Pierre 140).  
Isabel also agrees that, with Pierre, she “must always continue to be a child” (Pierre 148).  
Pierre then fulfills every domestic male role for Isabel simultaneously: brother, “husband,” 
and even father.   
 
 
To Create the World Anew: The Search for Status in the City 
Pierre’s decision to marry Isabel in the hopes of fulfilling the status ideal awakens 
Pierre to the contractualism that underpins his life at Saddle Meadows.  Before meeting 
Isabel, Pierre apparently thinks nothing of the fact that his father’s will does not mention 
him.  His mother controls the family property, even though the twenty-one year old Pierre is 
entitled legally to own much of the property in his own name.  Pierre is unconcerned with his 
legal ownership at the beginning of the novel because he sees his paternity literally inscribed 
onto the landscape:  “…the beautiful country around Pierre appealed to very proud 
memories….[I]n Pierre’s eyes, all its hills and swales seemed as sanctified through their very 
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long uninterrupted possession by his race” (Pierre 8).  For Pierre his inheritance is irrefutable, 
and the legal mechanics are irrelevant and incidental.  What Pierre ignores and the narrator 
emphasizes is that the Glendinning claim to Saddle Meadows is secured by law; Saddle 
Meadows is in fact saturated with lawyer’s ink, “as unobliteratable as the sea”  (Pierre 22).  
In other words, Pierre idealizes status by ignoring the inextricable relationship between 
written law and property ownership.   
Once Pierre announces his “marriage” to Isabel, Mary’s contractual, rather than 
status-based, relationship to Pierre is clear and unmistakable.  She promptly disinherits him, 
severing her ties with him as if they were as easy to renegotiate as the terms of a contract.  
Pierre, however, refuses to take his mother to court because he hopes to protect the family 
reputation; he still seems immersed in a status-based understanding of the world: 
And though Pierre was not so familiar with the science of the law, as to be 
quite certain that the law, if appealed to concerning the provisions of his 
father’s will, would decree concerning any possible claims of the son to 
share with the mother in the property of the sire; yet he prospectively felt 
an invincible repugnance to dragging his dead father’s hand and seal into 
open Court, and fighting over them with a base mercenary motive, and 
with his own mother as the protagonist. (Pierre 180) 
Pierre simply cannot bear to transform his mother into a “protagonist,” a contracting agent 
acting on her own behalf.  Even after she has rejected him and denied his lineage, Pierre 
clings to a status-based view of their relationship. 
 After deciding to “marry” the unpropertied Isabel, Pierre awakens to the power of the 
law; in many ways, this decision marks Pierre’s fall into the world of contract, which he 
reacts to by desperately trying to create a new world of status.  Indeed, once Pierre becomes 
the domestic hero, he seems unable to stop.  Initially, he intends to leave Saddle Meadows 
with Isabel alone, but he soon agrees to take the rejected fallen woman, Delly Ulver, with 
them.  Later in the novel, Pierre allows Lucy Tartan to join them, living under his protection.  
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Pierre, then, hopes to form a status enclave within the epicenter of the contractual economy: 
New York City.  Thus, Pierre’s attempts to embody the status ideal—marrying his sister, and 
striving for protectionism within the city—seem doomed to failure from the start.  However, 
he relentlessly rejects the pervasiveness of contract, which becomes increasingly associated 
with any textual remnant in the novel. 
Pierre’s plan—that Isabel will pretend to be his wife—is never written out as an 
agreement; it is only suggested through a whisper in her ear, to which the reader has no 
access.  As opposed to a contract, their arrangement involves no terms, negotiations, or 
stipulations, and because the marriage is not real, there is of course no ceremony to sanctify it 
by law.  In other words, Pierre and Isabel’s relationship is based solely on a belief in 
consanguinity and status.  Appropriately, Isabel and Pierre experience their connection to one 
another immediately and viscerally.  When Isabel first sees Pierre, she screams in such a 
terrible way that the shriek of recognition haunts Pierre: 
…[her] face somehow mystically appealing to his own private and 
individual affections; and by a silent and tyrannic call, challenging him in 
his deepest moral being, and summoning Truth, Love, Pity, Conscience, to 
the stand.  Apex of all wonders! Thought Pierre; this indeed almost unmans 
me with its wonderfulness.  Escape the face he could not.  (Pierre 49) 
These instinctive signals of intimacy cannot be comprehended or used as proof in a court of 
law.  They do not exist in the writing of a contract.  Yet the signal of connection is so strong 
that Pierre believes he cannot doubt its veracity.  Pierre and Isabel’s relationship, therefore, 
seems to represent a kind of ultimate consanguinity and familial connection. 
Isabel and Pierre’s relationship is repeatedly configured around images of blood and a 
profound feeling of irrevocable connectedness.  They seem irresistibly attracted to one 
another, connected by an unspoken bond: 
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Often, in after-times with her, did he recall this first magnetic night, and 
would seem to see that she then had bound him to her by an extraordinary 
atmospheric spell—both physical and spiritual—which henceforth it had 
become impossible for him to break, but whose full potency he never 
recognized till long after he had become habituated to its sway. (Pierre 
151) 
Here, Isabel appears to mesmerize Pierre, making him not a contracting agent but a victim.  
In his portrayal of their attraction, Melville recasts the mesmeric relationship from 
Hawthorne’s The House of the Seven Gables in which Matthew Maule invades and controls 
Alice Pyncheon’s consciousness.  In The House of the Seven Gables, Alice is controlled by 
the powerful male forces around her, and she acquiesces to her father’s demands and then 
becomes enslaved to Maule’s magnetic powers.  In Melville’s text, the mesmeric attraction 
seems reversed, with Pierre subjected to the power of the women around him—first his 
relationship with his mother and then with Isabel.  Again, Pierre understands his relationship 
with Isabel as unavoidable, inevitable, and non-negotiable; it is almost the perfect antithesis 
of contract. 
Unlike Pierre, Isabel inhabits a world completely devoid of relationality.  While 
Pierre is born into an over-domesticated patriarchal stronghold, Isabel is born into a haunted 
ruin devoid of affection.31  She tells Pierre that she had no understanding of relational words 
like mother and father during her childhood.  Her story begins with the statement, “ ‘I never 
knew a mortal mother.  The farthest stretch of my life’s memory can not recall one single 
feature of such a face’ ” (Pierre 114).  Isabel’s story consists of a string of un-domestic 
details: from an absent mother to a decaying home space.  As she tells Pierre, “ ‘My first dim 
life-thoughts cluster round an old, half-ruinous house in some region, for which I now have 
no chart to seek it out.  If such a spot did ever really exist, that too seems to have been 
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withdrawn from all the remainder of the earth’ ” (Pierre 114).  Isabel’s connection to family 
is broken, crumbling, and rotting—the real, but hidden, state of Saddle Meadows.   
While Pierre’s inherited mementoes do not need writing to connect him to them, 
Isabel’s family mementoes are covered in writing that is mysterious and indecipherable.  The 
one artifact she has from her father is an embroidered handkerchief he leaves behind after a 
brief visit.  Because Isabel cannot yet read, she cannot decipher the writing—or the identity 
of her father.  She instead stores the handkerchief until she will be able to read and decode it 
for herself: “ ‘I folded it in such a manner, that the name was invisibly buried in the heart of 
it, and it was like opening a book and turning over many blank leaves before I came to the 
mysterious writing, which I knew should be one day read by me, without direct help from 
any one’ ”  (Pierre 146).  Just as she believes that one inscrutable object represents her father, 
she believes another mysterious object—a guitar—seems to represent her mother.  Like the 
handkerchief, it is inscribed with un-interpretable writing: this time Isabel’s own name is 
delicately etched in gilded letters within the guitar.  When Pierre expresses skepticism about 
the significance of the name in the guitar, Isabel responds:  “ ‘The secret name in the guitar 
thrills me, thrills me, whirls me, whirls me; so secret, wholly hidden, yet constantly carried 
about in it; unseen, unsuspected, always vibrating to the hidden heart-strings….I have no 
slightest proof—but the guitar was hers, I know, I feel it was’ ” (Pierre 149).  The initials on 
a handkerchief and the faint etching in a guitar convince Isabel that she is a Glendinning.  
She insists to Pierre that her heart resembles these items, that it too consists of writing that 
foretells her connection to Pierre.  Like the writing on the objects that connect her to her 
parents, the “writing” that connects her to Pierre cannot be seen and read: “ ‘Oh, my dear 
brother—Pierre! Pierre!—could’st thou take out my heart, and look at it in thy hand, then 
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thou would’st find it all over written, this way and that, and crossed again, and yet again, 
with continual lines of longings, that found no end but in suddenly calling thee’ ” (Pierre 
158). 
Isabel is raised in—and continues to perpetuate—an environment devoid of text, of 
writing, and of signification.  Instead, she inhabits a world of instinct, feeling, and a 
responsiveness to blood relationships that makes contract irrelevant.  She represents the ideal 
opportunity for creating a world that needs no contracts.  Pierre, therefore, joins with Isabel 
in the hopes of perpetuating his utopian, status-based view of relationships.  Unfortunately, 
he chooses the city as the site for his retreat—another foolhardy move by a character who 
believes that pretending to marry his sister will allow him to legitimize her while 
simultaneously protecting his family’s reputation.  
 
 
Wages, Labor, and Annihilation in the Urban Space 
After fleeing the world of contract at the heart of Saddle Meadows, Pierre finds that 
he can no longer transform text into commodity, as he had done so successfully as an author 
at Saddle Meadows.  As he prepares to depart for the city, Pierre’s hopes for financial 
success “were based upon his presumed literary capabilities” (Pierre 260).  At that time, 
wages made Pierre feel “confident, that if need should come, he would not be forced to turn 
resurrectionist, and dig up his grandfather’s Indian-chief grave for the ancestral sword and 
shield, ignominiously to pawn them for a living!  He could live on himself” (Pierre 261).  
After breaking with his mother, he delighted in burning his inherited tokens as a means of 
rebirth and self-determination; we find here, though, that Pierre would rather destroy such 
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tokens than commodify them and convert them into cash.  Pierre encounters similar difficulty 
with commodification when he finally attempts to “live on himself.”  The problem of 
alienated labor, of losing oneself in wage-earning work, pervaded nineteenth-century 
American culture.  Pierre recognizes that writing requires that he “send his soul off to labor,” 
but just as with his inherited tokens, he fails to convert his alienated soul into cash (Pierre 
261).  Although he spends seemingly innumerable, grueling hours writing, he never finishes 
his great book; in fact, once he leaves Saddle Meadows, he never again sells anything that he 
writes.  Instead, Pierre pours his blood and soul into “a larger and…infinitely better book” 
that is written “for [his] private shelf” alone (Pierre 304).  He refuses to circulate through 
exchange the “soul” that is contained in his book.  In Pierre’s relationship to cash and wage 
labor, we see a resistance, rather than acceptance, of contract economy.  Pierre, like other 
men in the nineteenth century, fears the instability of the market economy and searches for 
stability—a stability that he hopes to find in his status-based relationship with women.   
Soon after arriving, Lucy insists that she should contribute to the upkeep of the 
household, and so she decides to paint and sell portraits of interested patrons at the Apostles.  
Pierre immediately positions himself as Lucy’s business intermediary.  He dictates the terms 
of her engagement, and he discourages her from accepting credit, commanding that she 
should only accept cash upfront.  She clearly has not engaged in monetary transactions 
before because Pierre admonishes her: “ ‘don’t start so at that [word] cash’ ” (Pierre 332).  It 
is important to note that Lucy’s activity fits in with prevailing views of acceptable woman’s 
work, and she plans not to keep this money for herself, but to turn it over to Pierre for 
management. 
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When Isabel hears of Lucy’s plans, she recognizes that she has not contributed money 
to the household and informs Pierre that she, too, will earn money.  “ ‘Pierre, some way I 
must work for thee!  See, I will sell this hair; have these teeth pulled out; but some way I will 
earn money for thee!’ ” (Pierre 333).  Isabel, like Pierre, interprets earning wages as 
converting her body into cash.  When she suggests that she can teach the other members of 
the Apostles the guitar, Pierre objects: “ ‘[T]hou art the mistress of the natural sweetness of 
the guitar, not of its invented regulated artifices; and these are all that the silly pupil will pay 
for learning.  And what thou hast can not be taught’ ” (Pierre 334).  According to Pierre, 
Isabel’s skills cannot be alienated away from her and transformed into earnings, no more 
than her hair or teeth can be.  The characters’ conception of wages indicates a deep 
uneasiness with the terms of contract.  The only route they see for accumulating cash is to 
convert material goods or the body into money, a dangerous activity that requires a male 
intermediary.  Despite their efforts to convert themselves into cash, there is a continual sense 
that Pierre’s den of protected women cannot survive. 
Melville does provide an oft-overlooked foil for Pierre’s urban experience through 
the figure of Charlie Millthorpe, who succeeds in his attempts to combine paternalism and 
contractualism.  Like Pierre, Charlie grew up in Saddle Meadows, and he shares a sense of 
Pierre’s aristocratic privilege.  Even though Charlie’s father was tenant farmer rather than a 
member of the landed class, he can “loosely and unostentatiously” trace his ancestors back to 
an English knight (Pierre 275).  Regardless of his purportedly noble origins, Charlie is 
marked by labor: “The delicate profile of his face, bespoke the loftiest aristocracy; his 
knobbed and bony hands resembled a beggar’s” (Pierre 275).32  When his father dies, he sells 
all of his family’s possession: their animals, their tools, indeed “almost every movable thing 
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on the premises” becomes “convert[ed]…into cash” in order to fund his impending move to 
the city (Pierre 279).  Like Pierre, Charlie is the only male in his family, and he too attempts 
to become a beneficent patriarch in the city.  He promises his mother and three sisters that he 
will be a “second father and a careful provider” (Pierre 279).  If the Glendinning family’s 
faith in aristocratic lineage seems significant in the narrator’s view, Charlie’s faith in it is 
made to seem ridiculous.  Charlie’s belief in his nobility appears foolish, particularly because 
it convinces him to reject physical labor and abandon the land that his family rents.  Charlie’s 
decisions, like Pierre’s, portend disaster.  He sells all of his family’s belongings because his 
distant relation, a British knight, convinces him that he is entitled to a better life.  Like Pierre, 
Charlie paradoxically attempts to reinstate his patriarchal position within the vagaries of 
urban space and wage labor.   
And yet in almost every way that Pierre fails, Charlie succeeds.  Working as a 
copyist, Charlie occupies “a small dusty law-office on the third floor of the older building of 
the Apostles; assuming to be doing a very large, and hourly increasing business among 
empty pigeon-holes…his mother and sisters dwelling in a chamber overhead” (Pierre 280).  
Within one building, he has a separate space for his work and a separate space for his 
domestic life.  He supports himself through his employment, but as he says, “ ‘I can not 
waste my oil over bonds and mortgages’ ” (Pierre 281).  So, after work, he devotes himself to 
philosophical discussions and metaphysical endeavors.  His entire existence is 
compartmentalized—paid employment versus philosophical engagement, work versus 
domesticity.  Charlie’s success, though, may be because he refuses to engage in the one 
activity that Pierre seems unable to resist: marriage.  As he tells Pierre, “ ‘The great men are 
all bachelors, you know.  Their family is the universe’ ” (Pierre 281).  Even though Charlie 
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serves as the protector for his sisters and mothers, he never confuses them with his wife.  Just 
as he is able to compartmentalize his labor from his soul, his job from his home life, Charlie 
is able to distinguish between his sister and his wife. 
Unlike Charlie, Pierre—with his deep aristocratic attachments—cannot convert his 
family heirlooms into cash.  He seems hemmed in by the family possessions, unable to 
escape his attachment to them.  His status, as supposed heir to the Glendinning land and 
character, is in fact his destiny, whereas Charlie, who has no real status, has no real destiny.  
Melville attributes much of Charlie’s success to “Fate,” a powerful, inexplicable, and 
unbeatable force in the novel:  
But some mysterious latent good-will of Fate toward him, had not only 
thus far kept Charles from the poor house, but had really advanced his 
fortune in a degree….it is often to be observed of the shallower men, that 
they are the very last to despond.  It is the glory of the bladder that nothing 
can sink it; it is the reproach of a box of treasure, that once overboard it 
must down. (Pierre 279) 
Melville’s prediction for America uses the same drowning imagery as Hawthorne’s depiction 
of survival in the market economy—that someone is always at the drowning point.  In 
Melville’s view, that person is always the most substantial and significant person, while the 
shallowest will always float above.  Thus, the market is not hopelessly random and 
indifferent.  Rather, it destroys the most profound men. 
At the close of the novel, Pierre’s attempts to flee the world of contract and erect a 
status-based enclave clearly have failed.  Though he had hoped to protect and defend Isabel, 
Lucy, and Delly as a heroic man should, he succeeds only in killing his cousin, an act which 
accomplishes little but to seal the destruction of the Glendinning family.  Pierre never attains 
the position of his forefathers.  He does commit violence, but he always remains marked with 
a gentleness that prevents him from enacting the role of the ideal protector and patriarch.  
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When Pierre is found dead in his jail cell, his friend Charlie responds, “ ‘Hand scorched with 
murderer’s powder, yet how woman-soft!’ ” (Pierre 362).  In his efforts to fulfill the role of 
the ideal man, his body has remained ambiguous, neither wholly male nor wholly female.  
Ironically, it is Isabel (with her masculine hands) who performs the final act of the novel, 
supplying the poison for Pierre’s suicide and speaking the last word on his fate.  As she dies, 
her body collapses on top of Pierre, and her hair covers him completely.  The novel ends, 
then, with an image that subverts the status relationship: the “married” woman’s identity 
covers over the man’s.  Melville insists repeatedly throughout the novel that status is 
deceptive and certainly not a source for stability or fixity.  Indeed, there is ambiguity within 
gender, ambiguity within the law, ambiguity within domestic relations and domestic power.  
Pierre—and ultimately all of the Glendinnings—are destroyed because their faith in status 
has no place in a commercial world of contracts and commodities.  Melville borrows from 
Cooper’s and Hawthorne’s plots in order to condemn their hope in women’s status and the 
restoration of a natural aristocracy as pure nostalgia.  Pierre finds no retreat, no new site for 
his family to flourish. 
 
 Both Hawthorne’s and Melville’s narratives of the market and the homespace are 
ultimately rendered incoherent.  During much of The House of the Seven Gables Hawthorne 
seems to reject Cooper by portraying a hope that the market will eradicate both inequality 
and aristocracy from the American landscape.  Yet, Hawthorne cannot escape his anxiety 
about the fluctuation and volatility of the market economy.  At the end of the novel, he seems 
unable to abandon his characters to the vagaries of the market, so in the final chapters he 
transfers them to a productive homespace safely protected from commercial activities.  In 
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Pierre, Melville rejects both Cooper’s and Hawthorne’s attempts to find stability through 
status and property reconciliation.  Through Pierre’s futile mission to fulfill the status ideal, 
Melville demonstrates that status is merely a deceit that obscures legal manipulation and 
violence.  Yet after status and aristocracy are annihilated at the end of his novel, Melville can 
only imagine “shallow” men like Charlie Millthorpe in the remnants.  Even as he portrays 
Pierre as naively foolish, he certainly provides no viable alternatives for American 
masculinity.  Just as Melville is unable to portray Pierre as a fully realized hero, he is unable 
to envision a woman as a self-possessed legal agent.  Like Pierre, they die without the ideals 
of status to sustain them. 
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and the beginning of the Civil War, unquestionably a period of unprecedented growth and change, is often seen 
as one in which unbounded optimism (save for glitches caused by the Panics of 1837 and 1843) and a blind 
faith in progress and economic development were universally shared.  Kent’s treatment of property suggests 
that this was not the case.  Fear and enthusiasm were simultaneously present in his discussions of legal changes 
such as statutory revision of property law and growth of corporate franchises as a form of entrepreneurial 
property.  Kent’s experience was no aberration; a sense of regret and fear as reactions to economic growth and 
prosperity was widespread throughout American society” (132). 
 
14
 For more on panic fiction, see Mary Templin, “Panic Fiction: Women’s Responses to Antebellum Economic 
Crisis.”  Legacy 21.1: 1-16.  I am expanding Templin’s purview beyond fiction written by women in the 1830s, 
and I argue, instead, that domestic novels consistently focused on the dangers of speculation and that they 
expressed this concern in the same way as the narratives within Templin’s narrower definition: by examining 
women’s relationship to family property.  As Chused has demonstrated, the changes in married women’s 
property rights were a direct response to the economic panics of the late 1830s: “When distressed economic 
times appeared after 1839, the moment was right for legislatures to codify a portion of the equitable separate 
estate tradition by insulating wives' property from their spouses' creditors. The acts, usually adopted with little 
lobbying from women, created a special set of assets available for family use when husbands found themselves 
in trouble with creditors”  (Chused 1361).  This project situates domestic fiction within the period’s legal 
reforms, illustrating how both were centrally concerned with women’s relationship to property and women’s 
status in marriage as a way to provide stability amidst economic fluctuation. 
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15
 It is just as likely that Hawthorne would become part of this dialogue, particularly because the vicissitudes of 
his mother’s economic condition dictated his childhood.  Much of the decisions about Hawthorne’s childhood 
were made by his uncle, Robert Manning, whom biographers and the Manning family associated strongly with 
rising commercial order.  For more on Hawthorne’s relationship with Robert Manning, see Pfister. 
 
16
 My point in this discussion is not to claim that Hawthorne’s novel accurately reflects the changes within the 
antebellum economy.  Instead, I seek to emphasize Hawthorne’s perception of a threat within the market 
economy, an economy that he believes is driven by love of cash rather than stable wealth and solidity.   
 
17
 For more on racial coding in The House of the Seven Gables, see Paul Gilmore, The Genuine Article, 125-
150 and David Anthony, “Class, Culture, and the Trouble.”  
 
18
 For an overview of critical interpretations on the progression (and blurring) of temporality in The House of 
the Seven Gables, see Lloyd Pratt, “Dialect Writing.” 
 
19
 For more on women’s role in a productive domestic economy, see Mary Beth Norton, “The Evolution of 
White Women’s Experience in Early America.”  
 
20
 For more on Judge Jaffrey Pyncheon’s alignment with speculative economies, see T. Walter Herbert, Dearest 
Beloved, 97-98.   
 
21
 This sense of men’s immateriality might be traced to Hawthorne’s feelings about himself as a writer in the 
increasingly commercial economy.  As Arnold Weinstein claims in his analysis of “Wakefield”: “Hawthorne 
was obsessed with the notion of his own insubstantiality, his ghostliness, his secret identity as nobody.”  Arnold 
Weinstein, Nobody’s Home, 19. 
 
22
 Brook Thomas finds in Holgrave’s concerns a striking similarity with Justice Taney’s property law decisions: 
“…Holgrave’s opinions on reform have similarities with Taney’s decision in the Charles River Bridge case.  
Just as Holgrave proposes that each generation should be able to restructure society to serve its present interests, 
so Taney ruled that considerations of public interests at the present time were more important than maintaining 
the conditions under which a corporation was originally chartered” (69).  Throughout the novel, Hawthorne 
reflects contemporary legal concerns, which frequently dealt with issues of private property. 
 
23
 For more on Massachusetts’s married women’s property laws, see Warbassee, The Legal Rights of Married 
Women.  Phoebe could have retained her stake in the family property if she had inherited the family property in 
a separate trust, an equity exception to common law practices.  However, there is no indication in the text that 
her inheritance was passed on in this manner. 
 
24
 See David Anthony, “Class, Culture, and the Trouble with White Skin in Hawthorne’s The House of the 
Seven Gables.”  
25
 Based on Alice’s position as an object of a sort of gift exchange in order to increase family wealth, Goddu 
astutely draws a comparison between Hawthorne’s novel and Gayle Rubin’s essay, “Traffic in Women.” 
 
26
 Weinstein prefers the use of the term “sentimentalism” to describe the works she examines.  In order to 
remain consistent in this analysis, I have preserved the term “domestic.”  As I have argued elsewhere, the term 
domestic better applies to the genre of novel that this study investigates. 
 
27
 Wyn Kelley also believes that Pierre represents a rejection of status and patriarchal relations: “Either to 
escape from or to protest against the patriarchal institution of marriage, Pierre tries to renovate the middle-class 
household, to achieve a fraternal communion like the one that nurtured Ishmael in Moby Dick. In this sense, 
Melville’s novel shares the antipatriarchal spirit of much domestic fiction by women writers of the 1850s” (92).  
I argue that if Pierre tries to create a new household, it is not a middle class or a fraternal space; rather it is an 
attempt to update and transform the patriarchal context of Saddle Meadows into the urban landscape of New 
York City. 
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28
 The Dutch manors to which Melville refers are an allusion to the tenant uprisings in New York, in which 
Melville’s mother’s ancestors, the Van Rensselaers, were “most centrally involved” (Otter 70).  These conflicts 
also gesture toward the divide between status and contract throughout the country.  As Brook Thomas observes, 
“In contrast to the South’s slave economy based on totalized social relations, the North had a wage economy 
based on a legal contract between employer and employee” (146).  Thus, early in the novel, Melville indicates 
the deceitfulness of contract. 
 
29
 For more on how the law used similar theoretical structures to justify status in marriage and in slavery, see the 
introduction of Timothy D. Morris, Southern Slavery.   
 
30
 While many critics claim that Pierre’s sense of duty to Isabel resembles chivalry, that word’s feudal 
connotations make Pierre seem ahistorical and overtly Romantic.  But Melville is careful to underscore the 
particularly American qualities of Pierre and the Glendinning family.  Pierre’s upbringing has been steeped in 
nineteenth-century America’s formulations of status, and Melville highlights the persistence of status fantasies 
in nineteenth-century America.  These formulations had been refocused around concepts like protection, which 
were largely seen as consistent or at least co-habitable with American democracy.  Isabel, who “has been 
disinherited from the protection of the legal system,” has been left abandoned, therefore, with no protection.  In 
other words, Isabel exists in a status relationship with no one, and it is this void that Pierre is determined to fill 
(Thomas 145). 
 
31
 Recently, critics have discussed Isabel’s probable mixed-race status.  See Oshima, “Isabel as a Native 
American Ghost.” 
 
32
 Charlie’s “hereditary beauty and youthful bloom…and something of natural refinement as contrasted with the 
unrelieved rudeness…of his neighbors” caused Pierre to feel sympathy with and tenderness for Charlie (276).  
Even Pierre’s “severely critical” mother, who was “always fastidiously cautious as to the companions of 
Pierre,” approved of his friendship with Charlie (Pierre 276).  This mixing of nobility and labor can be seen in 
Isabel when Pierre first spends time with her.  When Pierre first visits Isabel, the two clasp hands: “All his being 
is now condensed in that one sensation of the clasping hand.  He feels it as very small and smooth, but strangely 
hard.  Then he knew that by the lonely labor of her hands, his own father’s daughter had earned her living in the 
same world, where he himself, her own brother, had so idly dwelled” (Pierre 113).  Here, Pierre fixates on 
Isabel’s hand and how it marks her as a laborer and how his own hands mark him as an idler.  While he feels the 
fraternal connection with Isabel, he is made aware of their unequal positions and experiences. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAKING A NAME: LEGAL FICTIONS AND WOMEN’S  
POPULAR NOVELS OF THE 1850S 
 
In masculine novels of property reconciliation, the plots hinge on women’s ability to 
choose the right husbands in order to quell land disputes: Elizabeth Temple must recognize 
the nobility of rugged Oliver Effingham, Phoebe Pyncheon must recognize Holgrave Maule’s 
hidden goodness.  Similarly, women novelists of the antebellum period also stressed the 
importance of choosing the right mate, but in doing so, they emphasized women’s 
vulnerability in the status relationship.  A foolish marriage, they warned, could destroy a 
woman’s happiness—and, even more frequently, her wealth.  Yet these novels were not 
simply cautionary tales, intended to educate young women on how to choose their husbands 
wisely.  Nor were they an indictment of the women who made poor marriage choices.  
Instead, they articulated the need for the law to protect women when a husband violated the 
status arrangement.  In this way, these novels presented the law as a new form of 
paternalism, a safeguard for when male protection proved insufficient, incapable, or inept. 
This chapter examines the way wives—people without distinct legal identities—
interacted with and interpreted masculine legal writing.  It begins by examining a U.S. 
Supreme Court case, Drury v. Foster, in which the Court decided that a wife could not be 
held accountable for understanding a legal document.  As this case shows, nineteenth-century 
judges struggled to determine the extent to which the law could intrude on marital unity, in 
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which a husband was supposed to be able to rule and protect his wife as he sees fit.  The 
women novelists in this chapter view this struggle as symptomatic of the law’s insistence that 
marital unity will provide women with sufficient legal representation.  They argue instead 
that the law has an obligation to enter the domestic space and protect women when their male 
relations fail to do so.  I begin with E.D.E.N. Southworth’s The Lost Heiress (serialized 
1853; published 1854), which thoroughly criticizes the law for failing to address women’s 
legal concerns, but in the novel Southworth cannot envision a way for women to “write 
back” to legal discourse.  In contrast, both Caroline Lee Hentz’s Ernest Linwood (1856) and 
Ann Stephens’s The Heiress of Greenhurst (serialized 1854; published 1857) incorporate 
fictionalized women’s diaries into the narrative and then configure such personal writing as 
an alternative, matrilineal inheritance, which can spur legal agency.  I end the chapter with 
E.D.E.N. Southworth’s Ishmael; or, From the Depths (serialized 1863-64; published 1876) .  
Written over ten years after The Lost Heiress, Ishmael demonstrates Southworth’s belief in 
the novel as a form that can allow the public—rather than male-dominated courts—to 
investigate and understand women’s experiences.   
 I chose these novels not only because they so explicitly represent the dangers of 
women’s relationship to contemporary domestic law, but also because their sensational 
elements have often caused them to be critically dismissed as lacking in political or cultural 
engagement.  E.D.E.N. Southworth, Caroline Lee Hentz, and Ann Stephens are known for 
writing primarily shallow, sensationalistic novels, and they all unabashedly hoped to produce 
novels that would be successful in the literary marketplace.1  Their success was, in short, 
essential to their family’s incomes; Hentz and Southworth in particular could not depend on 
their husbands for any substantial support by the time they were writing in earnest.2  Many 
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critics today dismiss these authors’ political and cultural critiques because the novels were 
produced so rapidly and so explicitly for popular consumption.  With one possible 
exception—Hentz’s The Planter’s Northern Bride—these authors did not write particularly 
polemical novels.  Because their novels refrain from the overt moralizing of other novels of 
the period—such as Maria Cummins’s The Lamplighter (1850) or Susan Warner’s The 
Wide, Wide World (1854)—they have often been considered separate from the “canon” of 
antebellum women writers.  For example, Nina Baym has argued that because these novels 
“were set in a clear fantasy world” that their “undomestic women could not serve as models” 
(Woman’s Fiction 181).3  I argue instead that these texts speak to women’s legal standing 
and use fantastical settings and events to underscore the compelling need women had for 
additional protection from male relatives.4 
 
 
Becoming a Blank Sheet: Women in Nineteenth-Century Legal Discourse 
In January 1865, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Drury v. Foster, a 
somewhat unusual case in that it did not deal with the thorny legal issues resulting from the 
Civil War.  Instead, the case involved recent married women’s property law reforms.  
Thomas Foster of Minnesota was an eager and ambitious man, who unfortunately lacked 
capital for his business ideas.  In his search to raise capital for his most recent venture, Foster 
hoped to use his wife’s land, which she held in her own name as a separate estate, as 
collateral for a loan.  Mrs. Foster was, as her lawyer later described, “fearful that the 
speculation her husband was getting into would not come out right” (Drury v. Foster 69 U.S. 
24, 31).5  According to Minnesota state law, Mrs. Foster could not convey her lands to her 
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husband until she underwent a privy examination—an interview conducted by a public 
official outside of the husband’s presence.  Such an interview was intended to ensure that 
husband did not coerce his wife into surrendering her property rights.6  In keeping with the 
law, Thomas Foster hired a notary public to draw up a mortgage, perform the privy 
examination, witness Mrs. Foster’s signature to the document, and then adhere the official 
seal that would confirm her voluntary compliance.  Though the privy examination might 
seem like a straightforward protectionist measure, it often could create difficulty in practice, 
as the Foster case demonstrates.  Mrs. Foster later claimed—and the notary public 
confirmed—that she had expressed to the official some reservations about her husband’s 
business dealings.  In addition, when signing the document, she was under the impression 
that her husband wanted to raise several hundred dollars—rather than the $12,785 for which 
she was actually pledging.  As the notary public admitted, Mr. Foster had instructed him to 
leave blank the amount of the mortgage and the name of the lender, Gardner P. Drury.  
Therefore, Mrs. Foster signed a legal document not knowing its true stipulations, which were 
deliberately obscured by the men who were supposed to be protecting her interests. 
Foster’s business venture did eventually fail, and the couple defaulted on their loan.  
Shortly thereafter, Drury attempted to foreclose on Mrs. Foster’s property.  She refused to 
surrender her land, and Drury sued Mr. Foster.  The Fosters claimed that Mrs. Foster’s 
mortgage was not valid because her privy examination was faulty.  The notary public ignored 
her concerns about the business deals, and he presented her with a document that lacked the 
key terms of the agreement.  She did not, they claimed, willingly consent to the mortgage, 
and it was therefore unenforceable.  The Minnesota state courts ruled in favor of the Fosters, 
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but Drury, perhaps believing that the creditor-friendly U.S. Supreme Court would be more 
sympathetic to his plea, appealed to the highest court in the nation.7   
On December 23, 1864, notable Washington, D.C. attorney J.M. Carlisle presented 
Mrs. Foster’s situation to the U.S. Supreme Court justices in a sympathetic light, focusing 
almost exclusively on the need for the law to protect women involved in commercial 
transactions.  He argued that the privy examination “is the protection with which the law 
hedges the gentle nature of a woman—her crowning grace and glory—from the dangers, and 
perhaps the ruin, which, without the law's protection, it is certain in many cases to bring upon 
her” (Drury v Foster, 69 U.S. 24).  Carlisle emphasizes women’s unique nature, but more 
specifically, he underscores the need for the law to protect women from commercial or 
speculative transactions that could “ruin” them.  The issue is not just that women are 
different; it is not even that women fail to understand business dealings.  Instead, Carlisle 
argues that a wife is naturally vulnerable to her husband.  She cannot resist him even when 
she knows he is wrong.  As Carlisle claims: “[This] case is an affecting illustration of the 
extent to which a woman becomes, in marriage, ‘subdued to the very quality of her lord.’ Her 
woman’s fears had foreseen what her husband’s intelligence never suspected; but like a 
woman, lovely and confiding, she yielded everything to him” (Drury v. Foster 24, 31).  Here, 
Carlisle asserts that Mrs. Foster could see, almost intuitively, that her husband’s venture was 
likely to fail; in fact, she knew it better than he did.  Of course, Carlisle needed to 
demonstrate Mrs. Foster’s misgivings in order to support his claim that she had expressed 
doubts to the notary public.  Still, his statements reveal the complex set of beliefs that 
constructed women’s social and legal position in the mid-nineteenth century.  It is not that 
women are incapable of understanding business.  Rather, men are naturally attracted to 
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speculation, and it is not in women’s power or inclination to defy their husbands.  Carlisle 
claims, however, that the truly guilty party was not Mr. Foster, but the notary public, whom 
he called “the great offender in the case” (Drury v. Foster 24, 31).  In other words, Mrs. 
Foster’s predicament represented a double failure of protection: first, her husband failed to 
protect her and then the law neglected its obligations to her. 
The plaintiff’s representation, led by Robert Peckham, argued that the blanks had 
been left in the mortgage so that Drury and Foster could freely negotiate the terms of the 
loan.  The lawyers insisted that Mrs. Foster’s status as a feme covert was irrelevant because 
she was separately examined, as required by the law.  As Peckham argued 
“What an ordinary person may do without examination, a feme covert may 
do when separately examined. If an ordinary person, without examination, 
may execute a deed with blanks, a feme covert may execute a similar deed, 
provided she be separately examined, know fully what she does, and it be 
plain that it was such a deed she wished and meant to execute.” (Drury v. 
Foster 24, 28) 
According to the plaintiff, because the separate or privy examination ensures that a wife has 
not been coerced, the law must see her as “an ordinary person.”  
Although the 1865 Supreme Court typically ruled in favor of facilitating commerce, 
the defense tapped into widespread concern over women’s vulnerability to male speculation.  
As Stacy Lorraine Brauckman and Michael A. Ross claim in their analysis of cases involving 
privy examination laws, “jurists found themselves in an uncomfortable position, as they had 
to choose between traditional ‘protections’ of women, on the one hand, and the needs of the 
business community on the other” (59).  Even after most states in the U.S. had passed some 
form of married women’s property laws, many judges, lawyers, and legislators continued to 
worry about husbands’ attempts to acquire their wives’ property for speculation or other 
unstable commercial activities.8  The continued use of privy examinations “reflect[ed] the 
 99 
view that when wives entered the world of business and commerce they still needed special 
care and protection” (Braukman and Ross 61).  Women were still associated with stable 
value property, such as real estate, and their involvement in market transactions often 
generated anxiety.  As the persistence of privy examination statutes made clear, even decades 
after women’s separate property rights were established, many Americans believed that 
husbands had the ability to ruin women by exposing them to the vagaries of the marketplace; 
therefore, the law needed to serve as an additional shield for these vulnerable women. 
The Court unanimously ruled in favor of the Fosters.  Justice Nelson’s opinion begins 
by citing Minnesota’s privy examination statute, which he claims “exist[s]…by common law 
for [the wife’s] protection, in consideration of her dependent condition, and to guard her 
against undue influence and restraint” (Drury v. Foster 24, 33).  Nelson invokes language of 
dependence, highlighting the status construction of marriage, and he configures recent 
common law reforms as serving as “protection” and a “guard” for the weaker party.  In other 
words, when a husband violates the status arrangement of marriage and uses undue influence 
against his wife, it becomes the law’s responsibility to protect her when her natural protector 
does not.  Justice Nelson’s opinion then focuses on the nature of the document Mrs. Foster 
signed.  He claims that it could not be considered a mortgage, but was rather a “blank piece 
of paper” (Drury v. Foster 24, 33).  For Nelson, Mr. Foster’s suspicious practices carry 
dangerous implications:  
If the mortgage Mrs. Foster signed were held valid, Nelson worried, then 
unscrupulous husbands across the land would ask notaries to create blank 
documents for unsuspecting wives to sign.  Nelson envisioned countless 
married women so commercially naïve and deferential that they would sign 
anything—even a blank sheet—and leave every detail to their husbands. 
(Braukman and Moss 68)   
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Justice Nelson’s opinion ends with the recognition that the Court’s ruling places an increased 
burden on lenders and creditors, who likely continue to suffer some monetary losses because 
of actions like Mr. Foster’s.  Yet, Nelson claims, such losses are not nearly as damaging to 
society as the sacrifice of “the rights of a class who are dependent enough in the business 
affairs of life, even when all the privileges with which the law surrounds them are left 
unimpaired” (Drury v. Foster 24, 35). 
The Drury v. Foster case highlights the legal realm’s difficulty in determining the 
law’s reach into the domestic space: if a wife has no true legal identity, how and when can 
the courts determine that her husband is not protecting her properly?  As we have seen, 
married women’s additional property rights did not change the legal view that marriage was a 
status relationship—a hierarchical arrangement between a more powerful agent and 
dependent subject who were bound together by mutual affection.  This status relationship 
depended on the legal fiction of marital unity, which bestowed a distinct kind of privacy onto 
the domestic sphere, as legal scholar Hendrik Hartog explains:  
“Unity” identified a private household, a bounded sphere, within which 
husband and wife would work out their collective life and their 
relationship.…This private sphere was private both in the sense that it was 
not, ordinarily, subject to public regulation and in the sense that it was 
private property.  It “belonged” to the husband.  And for a wife, being 
married meant being subject to a husband within his private domain. (108) 
Marital unity, therefore, substantiated marital privacy, and jurists and lawyers were wary 
about intruding into that space.  However, when the status ideal was not upheld, the courts 
were often left to grapple with the proper legal response.  Such difficulties often emerged in 
cases involving property disputes and lending activities, as the Drury case indicates.9   
 The rhetoric of Carlisle’s argument as well as Justice Nelson’s opinion in the Drury 
case embody the new role envisioned for the common law in the U.S. by the 1860s—the 
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protector of dependent women.  Certainly, the notion that women needed protection was 
nothing new; however, the belief that the courts could intrude upon the private sphere and 
adjudicate family matters gained credence in the antebellum era.  Beginning in the 1840s, as 
Michael Grossberg claims, authority shifted from the male head of the household to the male 
jurist, making “judges a new kind of patriarch” (121).  This transfer of power was supposed 
to stop the abuses of errant men.  However, “as the powerful image of the patriarchal judge 
reminds us,” Brook Thomas asserts, “it was a double-edged reform.  It did not challenge 
patriarchal rule; it merely relocated it.  In doing so, it inscribed the dominant patriarchal 
beliefs more deeply into the law” (171).  This intrusion into marital privacy was not a 
rejection of women’s dependence, or of paternalism more generally.  Rather the new role for 
the courts was a recognition that violating the status arrangement had important public 
consequences, not least of which involved property disputes and commercial dealings. 
Clearly, women needed legal oversight in order to decipher and interpret legal 
writing—a central point in the Drury case.  As a woman, Mrs. Foster was judged incapable 
of understanding the danger that the blanks on her deed represented.  In her hands, as Justice 
Nelson claimed, the document was no mortgage at all; it was no different than a blank sheet 
of paper.  His decision implied that were she a man, she might have been held to a different 
standard of interpretation.  The issue of women’s ability to interpret and respond to legal 
discourse became a critical focus of women’s literature of the period. 
 
 
A Ghastly, Legal Murder: The Failure of the Law in The Lost Heiress 
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 From the beginning of her novel The Lost Heiress, Southworth focuses on the 
imperfection of the American justice system.  The novel opens on the night before innocent 
Willy O’Leary will be executed for a murder he did not commit, and his wife and mother are 
traveling to the state capitol to plead his case with the governor, Daniel Hunter.  Hunter, who 
adheres strictly to the letter of the law, refuses to pardon O’Leary because the evidence does 
not warrant overturning the jury’s decision.  According to Daniel Hunter, sympathy cannot 
compel legal judgment.  He responds to Nora and Ellen by explaining: “ ‘Yes, the time may 
come when moral suasion will govern the world, but the world must be prepared for it first—
a generation from infancy up must be educated in its spirit….At present the law must reign’ ” 
(LH 55).  As he makes clear, these women are asking him to judge based on moral feelings, 
not legal evidence.  All of the women in the novel, including his wife, plead with him to 
reconsider, but he steadfastly refuses.  Thus, Southworth establishes the mechanics of the law 
as indifferent to women’s moral intuition, and therefore, Daniel Hunter’s application of the 
law is flawed and incomplete.  As Ellen laments toward the end of the novel, after Willie’s 
innocence is finally established: “ ‘We [the women of the novel] always knew Willie’s 
innocence, sir, and we always hoped it would be found out.  He was a martyr, sir—his death 
was a ghastly legal murder’ ” (LH 269).  The law, due to its inability to incorporate 
sentiment, can sanction murder on its own terms, and its power can ruin women’s lives, 
rather than protect them. 
 Daniel Hunter’s insistence on the merciless and sentiment-blind application of the 
law sets all of the novel’s plot lines in motion.  As a result of Willy’s wrongful execution, 
Nora, Willy’s mother, is compelled to vengeance and steals the Hunters’ baby daughter, 
bringing the child home to the unsuspecting Ellen to raise with her own two children.  Ellen, 
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Willy’s widow, is left to provide for herself and her family, and their poor living condition 
makes them susceptible to the plague.  After the plague strikes the region, Ellen’s family is 
placed in a hospital to die.  Daniel and Augusta Hunter volunteer at this very hospital, where 
they see Ellen’s daughter, Honoria, who is unafflicted.  Believing Ellen has died from the 
plague, they decide to adopt Honoria.  However, Ellen and the rest of her family do recover, 
so Augusta Hunter must ask Ellen if she can continue to raise the child and includes the 
stipulation that Honoria should never learn that Ellen is her real mother.  Ellen regrets that 
the Hunters met her blood daughter, Honoria, rather than her adopted daughter, Maud (who, 
unbeknownst to any of the characters except Nora O’Leary, is the Hunters’ real daughter).  
Ellen accepts the Hunters’ arrangement, though, for the advantages it will give Honoria.  
After several more intricate plot twists, Ellen dies, and the crazed mother-in-law, Nora, 
finally reveals that she had stolen Maud Hunter.  Some time after the reunion between the 
Hunters and their natural daughter, Maud, Daniel and Augusta Hunter die on the same day.  
Daniel Hunter’s will leaves all of his property to his wife, Augusta, but since she died 
intestate, all of their land goes to their natural daughter, rather than Honoria.   
Throughout the novel’s very involved plot, Southworth remains focused on the law’s 
effects on family life and women’s experiences, in particular.  Southworth’s novel shows a 
skepticism about adoption, a developing legal practice, and asserts that a person’s nature 
cannot be changed by a legal process.  When the Hunters adopt Honoria, Augusta Hunter 
emphasizes the complete legality of the arrangement.  As she tells Ellen O’Leary:   
“[Daniel Hunter] will legally—understand me—legally adopt her, give her 
his name, and every advantage of his wealth, station, and social 
connection….You perceive, Ellen, that his wish is to draw the child as 
closely as possible to ourselves—to make her as exclusively our own as if 
she had been born ours.  And I think he would be glad if he could deceive 
himself and every one else into the notion that she is ours.” (LH 209)   
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Southworth, however, asserts that legal decrees cannot successfully deceive anyone; 
Honoria, of working-class heritage, was not born to be a Hunter.  While living with the 
Hunters, she enjoys a life of luxury, which quickly becomes dissipation.  She demeans her 
blood mother, Ellen (though she does not know Ellen’s real relation to her), and is generally 
a disgrace to the family.  In other words, her “legal” adoption utterly fails to transform her 
into a Hunter.  Instead, she experiences the worst of both class conditions.  She is vain and 
snobbish as a result of the influences of high society and also, Southworth implies, because 
of her inferior blood.   
Maud, raised in the American countryside but carrying aristocratic blood, represents 
the best possibilities for the adoption process.  Because of her upbringing and her ignorance 
of her true identity, she has no concept of inherited privilege.  Maud’s birth mother, Augusta 
Hunter, was an orphan from an aristocratic European family and had to learn to shun her title 
upon coming to America.  Maud does not have to undergo such painful, humbling 
experiences.  Instead, her exposure to American rural life grounds her nobility.  She feels 
fortunate when she discovers her parentage, and she continues to live the life of a humble, 
hard-working woman even after she again resides with the Hunters.  Most importantly, she 
continues to love the hotheaded, lowly born, and staunchly democratic Falconer O’Leary, her 
adoptive brother and future husband.  Her marriage to Falconer, Southworth reveals, lifts the 
long curse that has hung over Howlet Hall and its residents.  Maud’s mixed-class experience, 
similar to Phoebe Pyncheon’s, enables her to bring about a rebirth of America’s “natural 
aristocracy.”10   
Maud’s aristocratic background helps provide stability within the troubled economic 
conditions that surround the novel’s plot, and her marriage serves as a model for a proper 
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status-based relationship.  The night before their marriage, Maud presents Falconer with a 
deed to all of her inherited possessions.  As we might expect, her separate estate consists 
entirely of property and real estate rather than cash or investments.  During the scene, 
Southworth describes the legal documentation in careful detail:  “It was a deed of 
conveyance of Howlet Hall, and the whole of her landed estate, to Falconer O’Leary—
regularly and legally drawn up, signed, witnessed, and sealed” (LH 499).  Maud arranges to 
express her womanly sentiments through masculine legal writing.  Southworth’s description 
underscores Maud’s need for a legal intermediary.  On its own, Maude’s writing has little 
power until it is translated into official legal language.  Within Falconer’s and Maud’s 
subsequent conversations of the marriage gift, Southworth reveals her vision of the ideal 
status relationship.  Initially, Falconer objects to Maud’s gift.   
“And you—the richest heiress in the state—have thus conveyed to me the 
whole of your property, and left yourself penniless!” 
“What of that?  Are not our interests one?” she whispered, shyly—fondly. 
“Yes! Blessed be Heaven!  They are one; but being one—why did you not 
keep the estate in your own right; it would have been the same thing, since 
our interests are inseparable?  Answer, love! Why?” 
“Oh!” said Maud, hiding her blushing face in his bosom, and speaking in 
the soft low tones of shy devotion, “you do not know a woman’s fond 
doting heart.  She does so delight to depend upon her husband; to owe all 
things to his love; to receive everything from his hand!  That is the way 
with her; God has made her so!” 
This was a new revelation to Falconer…. “Blessed be God for woman!” he 
ejaculated.  Then disengaging himself from her shy embrace, he tore the 
deed in fragments and threw it on the floor…. 
“It was the idea of my taking this patrimony away from you, that kindled 
my scorn! Dear love! Sweet Maud! It was beautiful—it was lovely in you 
to offer it, but it would have been loathly in me to take it!” (LH 499-500) 
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Falconer rejects Maud’s gift on the grounds of marital unity, claiming that their “interests are 
inseparable.”  Maud explains her intention by appealing to nature: God has made women in 
such a way that they delight in their dependence.  This exchange embodies the hope of many 
domestic novels: that women are willing to offer up their possessions, and the best men will 
protect them without requiring absolute control over them.  Maud had hoped to express her 
unity with Falconer’s interests through authorized, legal writing.  But as Falconer points out, 
such documents are unnecessary when love is strong and true.  Thus, the law remains unable 
to fully take into account the heart and intuition.  Falconer, whose father was killed because 
Maud’s father insisted on adhering to the letter of the law, understands the law’s weaknesses 
better than anyone.11  He destroys the deed and permits affection to structure their 
relationship instead.  Southworth’s novel ends not with the plan for reform, but instead a 
removal from legal concerns.  Over her literary career, Southworth will maintain her interest 
in the law’s affect on domestic life, and in later novels, such as Ishmael, she will project her 
own view of legal reform. 
 
 
The Covering of One’s Name: Legal Writing and Women in Ernest Linwood 
While Southworth fails to envision any role for women’s writing within the legal 
realm in The Lost Heiress, Caroline Lee Hentz’s Ernest Linwood asserts that women’s 
personal writing can contain truths that the law cannot encompass.  Throughout Ernest 
Linwood, Hentz presents literary ability as almost the exclusive domain of women, handed 
down from one generation to the next as a matrilineal inheritance.  Mary Kelley notes this 
theme in many domestic novels of the mid-nineteenth century, but as she claims, Ernest 
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Linwood “stands almost as a parable of the literary domestics’ attempts to know themselves 
by looking to those who went before” (37).  As Hentz’s novel shows, literary production 
provides women with a sense of lineage and belonging at a time when the law had prohibited 
married women the control of their own property. 
The novel opens with a scene that sets the stage for Hentz’s exploration of the 
function of women’s writing.  Gabriella’s schoolteacher has just harshly criticized 
Gabriella’s poetry, and she reacts by telling her mother, “ ‘I will never write any more,’ ” but 
her mother urges her to continue (EL 18).  As Mary Kelley’s quote suggests, though, Rosalie 
supplies Gabriella with her poetic nature as a kind of alternative, property-less form of 
inheritance.  Rosalie tells her daughter, “ ‘I was called the little bookworm, the prodigy, the 
dream-girl, a name you have inherited, my darling Gabriella….’ ” (EL 167).  Yet, unlike 
Gabriella, Rosalie never wrote or recited for the public.  Instead, her most notable piece of 
writing is a private manuscript, which she leaves for Gabriella and which Gabriella herself 
calls  “ a hallowed legacy to the orphan, who had no other inheritance”  (EL 143).   
Here, Hentz highlights the importance of women’s private writing to providing a 
sense of identity and belonging for a young woman.  In reading her mother’s diary, Gabriella 
learns the identity of her father, Henry St. James.  During her life, Rosalie had refused to tell 
Gabriella anything about him.  The manuscript also details the truth about Rosalie’s 
abandonment.  She describes St. James’s departure on an extended business trip, and during 
that time, a strange Frenchwoman visits Rosalie and claims that she, too, is married to Henry 
St. James.  Believing her husband a bigamist, Rosalie leaves with Gabriella in secret and in 
disgrace.  She moved to a new town, resumed use of her maiden name, and also gave that 
name to Gabriella.  Rosalie’s manuscript ends by pleading with Gabriella to forgive her 
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father.  Gabriella directly transcribes her mother’s manuscript into her own story.  Until that 
transcription, the true story behind Rosalie’s abandonment and Gabriella’s lineage had been 
hidden.  Thus, as an author, Gabriella strives to legitimize Rosalie by making her innocence 
public.  In this way, Gabriella’s own text marks a transition for women’s writing—from her 
mother’s privately circulating text to her own public narrative directed to anonymous readers.  
Hentz’s layered presentation of women’s writing—a diary contained within an autobiography 
that is itself a novel—creates a genealogy of women’s writing, the end point of which is the 
domestic novel. 
Throughout the novel, Hentz asserts that while women’s writing corrects society’s 
unjust conclusions, male writing obscures and hides the past.  After Gabriella reads the 
manuscript, she returns to Mrs. Linwood, who served as Rosalie’s confidant of sorts, and 
asks in doubt: “ ‘Will a mother’s virtue cancel the record of a father’s guilt?’ ” (EL 200).  
The answer to this question can be found in the structure of coverture.  As Mrs. Linwood 
reminds Gabriella throughout the novel: “ ‘If there is anything in this world to be prized next 
to a blameless conscience, it is an unspotted name.  Well is it for you, that your own is 
covered with one, which from generation to generation has been pure and honorable’ ” (EL 
335).  In particular, the dynamics of coverture effectively erase Gabriella’s troubled past.  
When they marry, Ernest assures Gabriella that she does not need to worry about her father’s 
identity because the Linwood name will “lift up” and even “absorb” and “annihilate” her own 
name, thereby relieving her of the damage of “bad blood” (EL 202).12  Thus, men’s identities 
literally write over women’s, changing women’s names and covering their troubled histories.  
Marrying Ernest allows Gabriella to take on the Linwood name, which promises to purify 
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her.  It also distances her from her mother, and Gabriella struggles to balance her gratitude 
toward the Linwoods with the desire to maintain a connection with her mother’s story. 
Thus, the only time Gabriella violates the dictates of coverture is when she attempts 
to help her father, whom her mother asked her to forgive.  At one of their secret meetings, 
Gabriella’s supposed father—in fact, her father’s evil twin—begs for her financial help, 
claiming he has no one else to depend on but her.  He begs her to sell some of her jewels for 
cash that he can use.  In asking for her help, he mocks the structure of coverture and 
Gabriella’s powerlessness by inquiring: “ ‘Girl!  Have you no power over the wealth that 
must be rusting in your coffers?  Are you not trusted with the key to your household 
treasures?’ ” (EL 277).  Gabriella’s absconding with her jewels from her husband’s home 
was a violation of the laws of coverture because her personal property technically belonged 
to her husband.  Gabriella disrupts the laws of coverture when she “steals” personal property 
from her husband in order to give it to the man she believes is her father.  Gabriella feels 
justified in this act, claiming that if her husband were not so enraged by jealousy, she could 
have discussed the predicament with him.  Instead, because his protection has failed her, she 
must act on her own and defy the laws of coverture, if only briefly.  
As when Gabriella must hide her actions from her husband, Hentz continually 
investigates moments in which the status relationship does not operate according to its ideals, 
and interpretation becomes necessary for judgment.  Just as Hentz distinguishes men’s and 
women’s writing, she also sees important differences in reading and interpretive practices.  
The confusion over Henry St. James’s possible bigamy is ultimately due to Gabriella’s and 
Richard’s mothers reading the Frenchwoman’s marriage certificate inaccurately.  Because 
the two brothers have similar names, the women wrongfully believe that they are married to 
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the same man.  Yet women seem uniquely capable of reading beyond legally inscribed 
identities.  When Gabriella comes face to face with her real father—rather than his evil 
twin—she reveals to the reader: “He was my father, the beloved of my angelic mother, and 
he had never wronged her, never….Without a word of explanation I believed this, for it was 
written as if in sunbeams on his noble brow” (EL 430).  And, in fact, she was always 
physically repulsed by her “fake father” and never felt affection for him.  Women’s ability to 
read beyond the legal realm becomes especially critical in a novel obsessed with the need to 
prove one’s legitimacy—a novel in which one suitor leaves his beloved for months in order 
to gather legal documentation to substantiate his lineage.13  The law’s insistence on written 
documentation creates more problems than it solves, and women’s intuition and personal 
writing provide an essential function for recognizing and unifying families. 
Throughout the course of the novel, Hentz implies that Gabriella, as a woman, 
appears better situated to withstand poor lineage than a man would be.  She understands truth 
beyond legal institutions and, in addition, she has the benefit of having her name covered by 
her husband’s.  Yet, Gabriella is relieved to discover that her true father is an innocent man:   
No one who has not felt as I did, the shame and anguish of believing 
myself the daughter of a convicted criminal, can understand the intense, the 
almost worshipping reverence with which I regarded my late-found parent.  
To feel pride instead of humiliation, and love instead of abhorrence, …how 
sublime and holy the gratitude! (EL 456) 
Her grateful response leaves the reader with a troubling question: what about Richard, 
Gabriella’s lifelong friend, who really is the son of a criminal (Henry St. James’s evil twin 
brother)?  This juxtaposition—the good female character with the good father versus the 
good male character with the evil father—constitutes Hentz’s most disturbing statement 
about women’s agency.  As Gabriella tells the reader, Richard “knows, though the world 
does not, that his father fills a convict’s grave, and this remembrance chastens his 
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pride…[Yet], he is rapidly making himself a name …in the high places of society.  Men of 
talent take him by the hand and welcome him as a younger brother to their ranks…” (EL 
465).  Richard can go into “the high places of society” and make his own name, but 
Gabriella’s capacity for action is more limited.  Gabriella’s narrative can help demonstrate 
her worthiness, but, ultimately, Hentz believes her heroine better off with a secure lineage.  It 
is for men to overcome the troubles of inheritance.  Just as Richard must overcome his 
father’s criminality, Ernest must battle the jealousy that he inherited from his father.  
Gabriella, however, has less power to overcome her inheritance.14  She is virtuous like her 
father, and she is poetical just like her mother.  It is unclear if she could actively combat 
either influence, as the men can and must. 
If Gabriella cannot really overcome her inheritance, then how powerful is women’s 
writing?  Can it really legitimize those who have been rejected by the law?  Gabriella herself 
is at turns proud of and then frustrated by her role of author, which is made most evident in 
one of her direct addresses to the reader: 
Book!—am I writing a book?  No, indeed!  This is only a record of my 
heart’s life, pages written at random and carelessly thrown aside….I may 
myself commit them to flames.  I am tempted to do so at this moment.  I 
once thought it a glorious thing to be an author,—to touch the electric wire 
of sentiment, and know that thousands would thrill at the shock,—to speak, 
and believe that unborn millions would hear the music of those echoing 
words,…I once had such visions as these, but they are passed. 
To touch the electric wire, and feel the bolt scathing one’s own brain,—to 
speak, to hear the dreary echo of one’s voice return through the desert 
waste.  Is not such too often the doom of those who have looked to fame as 
their heritage, believing genius their dower?  Heaven save me from such a 
destiny.  Better the daily task, the measured duty, the chained-down spirit, 
the girdled heart. (EL 69) 
In this passage, Gabriella denigrates the power of women’s writing.  She is not really writing 
a book, she says, but instead only a record of her heart.  In other words, she claims to be 
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writing a text similar to her mother’s.  She mocks her long-held belief that her writing will 
affect anonymous readers, and realizes now that her voice merely echoes back at her.  
Gabriella’s misgivings supplement many critics’ view that Ernest Linwood is an 
autobiographical novel, mirroring Hentz’s own experience with her jealous husband.  
Perhaps Gabriella’s frustration is a feeling that Hentz herself shared; this could explain why 
she subtitled the novel “The Inner Life of the Author.”15  However, I find this unlikely, 
especially considering that Hentz had just recently published her most affecting and effective 
novel—The Planter’s Northern Bride.  There seems little reason to believe that Hentz felt 
that her novels fell on deaf ears.   
Instead, I find Gabriella’s lament disingenuous.  It comes in the first quarter of a 
lengthy novel and asks for a “chained-down spirit” and “girdled heart” for a woman who acts 
with emotion—albeit judicious emotion—throughout the rest of the novel.  This outburst 
instead represents a moment of depression and futility; it provides a sense of the struggle of 
writing a text that serves as an alternative to the dominant discourse.  Such texts run the risk 
of never being read or absorbed—of never making a change.  Gabriella, as well as Hentz, 
continues to write her book, and she self-consciously guides her anonymous readers through 
her life’s story, all the while redeeming her mother’s legacy.  At the end of the novel, she 
becomes the ultimate author:  she produces her own “Rosalie”—a new “text” to revise her 
mother’s fate.  Hentz ultimately asserts that women’s writing—both professional and 
personal—can create change, even though she supports women’s limited sphere of action.  
Through Rosalie’s diary and Gabriella’s book, Rosalie is exonerated.  Hentz’s own fiction, 
Ernest Linwood, articulates women’s need for legal protection in the event that male 
protectors take the form of jealous husbands or absent fathers. 
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Inheriting Land, Inheriting Gypsy in The Heiress of Greenhurst 
Ann Stephens’s The Heiress of Greenhurst is another story of a woman’s private 
manuscript that explains the injustices she suffered at the hands of her husband, and which 
subsequently is passed onto the woman’s daughter and then is transformed into a public text.  
Unlike Southworth or Hentz, Stephens presents a heroine who learns the law in order to 
reclaim her rightful place.  Stephens’s novel is unusual because it does not argue for 
women’s increased protection but for women’s increased agency—both in the public realm 
and the literary market. 
The Heiress of Greenhurst begins with the story of a gypsy, Aurora, who is betrothed 
to Chaleco, her tribe’s leader.  She is then wooed by an Englishman, Lord Clare.  Aurora has 
been disgraced in the eyes of the tribe, and her grandmother, Papita, arranges for she and 
Lord Clare to elope to England.  Papita elicits an oath from Aurora, demanding that Aurora 
return to her tribe for execution if Lord Clare betrays her.  Once in England, Lord Clare 
establishes Aurora in a separate cottage on his estate, Greenhurst, and they soon have a 
daughter named Zana.  Aurora and Zana live happily together for several years.  However, 
Lord Clare longs for a “civilized” mate and begins to court his former lover.  When Aurora 
discovers this, she returns to Granada to be stoned to death in fulfillment of her oath to her 
grandmother.  Before she dies, Auruora instructs her former gypsy lover, Chaleco, to take her 
daughter back to England.  Papita, Chaleco, and Zana travel to England, where Papita 
poisons Lord Clare’s soon-to-be wife.  Zana soon suffers complete amnesia and awakens at 
the door of Greenhurst, which Lord Clare has deserted out of despair.  The servants secret 
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Zana away to the same cottage where she and her mother had once lived.  Eventually, the 
memoriless Zana meets Chaleco, who tells her of her true past.  Soon after, Lord Clare—now 
dying from despair and remorse—returns to Greenhurst.  Zana reveals herself to him but 
refuses to forgive him, and he dies before he can sign a new will that would give his property 
to her.  Lord Clare’s evil sister, Lady Catherine, declares the new will void and arranges to 
move into Greenhurst with her son, George, who has in time fallen in love with Zana.  
Property-less and family-less, Zana decides to go back to the gypsies with Chaleco, but on 
the way, she and Chaleco discover a Bible in which Lord Clare has written Aurora’s and 
Zana’s names in the Clare family tree.  Therefore, at the end of the novel, Zana inherits her 
father’s property and also marries George, consequently forcing Lady Catherine to recognize 
her and her mother’s legitimacy. 
Like Ernest Linwood, The Heiress of Greenhurst opens with a statement of a 
mother’s influence, but Stephens’s assertion is more powerful than Hentz’s.  As the first 
person narrator, Zana addresses her readers directly and proudly: “It is my mother’s story 
that I am about to write—the story of her wrongs, her sufferings, and the effects of those 
wrongs….Her history ran like a destiny through my own.  My life is but a prolongation of 
hers.  ….” (HG 1).  Not just Zana’s writing, but her entire life, is bound up in the injustices 
her mother suffered.  Over the course of the novel, the more she learns of her mother’s 
history, the more enraged she becomes and more in touch with her gypsy inheritance.  When 
she discovers that her father has returned to Greenhurst, she tells the reader, “now came other 
feelings, such as I had never known or dreamed of before.  …Instead of that tender, holy 
thirst for knowledge that might give my father peace, a fierce curiosity took possession of my 
soul.  I felt not like a child, but an avenger.  …” (HG 294).  Clearly, Zana envisions a much 
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wider sphere of action and redemption for herself than did Gabriella in Ernest Linwood.  
While Gabriella hoped to have her father’s bad reputation covered over and forgotten, Zana 
hopes to expose her father’s wrongdoing to the world. 
Before confronting her father, she reads her mother’s private manuscript.  Unlike 
Gabriella, Zana does not transcribe her mother’s words directly into her own text; she 
focuses instead on the actions that her mother’s words cause.  She describes the physical text 
as “blackened with the written misery of my mother” and Zana takes up each page “one by 
one, reverently, and holding my breath” (HG 319).  At the end of the manuscript, Zana finds 
“a stern command,” written by her great-grandmother Papita, “to avenge my mother's death 
[and] return to my own tribe for ever. The words were strong with bitter hate, that seemed to 
burn into the paper on which they were written” (HG 321).  Prior to reading the manuscript, 
Zana was uneasy about her gypsy blood, but her mother’s tale of suffering reconciles her to 
her heritage.  After reading it, she puts her great-grandmother’s fiery red earrings in her ears, 
and she leaves for her father’s house, dressed as a gypsy.  She brings her mother’s diary with 
her to prove her patrimony to Lord Clare, and she insists on reading directly from the book to 
him.  As she had expected, the words weaken the already failing man.  When Zana finally 
explains to him how her mother died, the words kill him instantly.  With some regret and 
some pride, she has avenged her mother’s death, not through action, but through words. 
As in The Lost Heiress and Ernest Linwood, The Heiress of Greenhurst divides 
women’s writing from the institutionalized male writing of the legal system.  When Lord 
Clare agrees to elope with Aurora, he explains to Papita:  “ ‘Aurora will never be received as 
my wife—have no claim on my property… and in all things her position must depend on my 
will, my sense of honor’ ” (HG 106).  However, Papita sees little validity in the law anyway, 
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claiming:  “ ‘…nothing but death, can separate you from this child.  You have sworn it 
before my god…. Your laws—all the laws of this nation of yours are but shadows against the 
stern will of a woman whom nature has made strong, and treason has left desperate’ ” (HG 
107).  This distinction is not between “primitive” gypsies and the “civilized” English legal 
culture.  Papita insists that neither country’s laws could trump the will of a woman. The law 
here is a separate space; sympathy and feeling have their own systems of justice.  Papita, as 
well as the novel, separate the legal world from another realm of honor, emotion, and 
women.   
As in the other novels discussed in this chapter, The Heiress of Greenhurst associates 
male writing with legal power and presents women’s writing as a site for truth and 
redemption.  Chaleco, who is obsessed with getting revenge for Aurora’s mistreatment, has 
become convinced that Zana’s claim to the Clare estate is essential.  When he attempts to 
persuade Zana to make her claim on the Greenhurst estate, he instructs her to use her 
womanly emotions against Lord Clare: “ ‘You know surely how to work on the repentance of 
a dying man.  Go to him, Zana; this estate and others are his—no claim, no drawback—
nothing that the English call an entail on it.  One dash of his hand, and it is yours’ ” (HG 
235).  Chaleco clearly understands the connection between male writing and legitimacy; as 
he claims, one dash of Lord Clare’s hand could change everything.  Women’s writing—
particularly Aurora’s journal—seems unable to affect change.  However, Zana’s own writing, 
which is in fact The Heiress of Greenhurst itself, redeems her mother’s reputation and 
legitimizes her own claim to the Clare estate.   
Zana combines the power of both male and female writing.  While she uses her own 
authorial power to rehabilitate her mother’s honor, she also educates herself about property 
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law in order to bring to bear the power of legal writing to legitimize her.  Through this 
process, the once naïve Zana becomes intimately familiar with inheritance law and the 
connection between writing and possession.  Eventually, she finds written, legal evidence of 
her lineage in a family Bible, which represents quite literally “the word.”  At that point, 
codification, as well as life writing, gives her power.  When she finally confronts her evil 
aunt, Lady Catherine, she warns, “ ‘evidence of Lord Clare’s residence with my mother, 
which constitutes a legal marriage, is in our possession; the best counsel consider me… the 
inheritor of his estates.  Indeed, the record of my birth, in his own handwriting,… is by the 
laws proof of a marriage in itself” (HG 407).   
Zana seems an anomaly for the mid-nineteenth century because she inherits and 
controls her father’s land while retaining a firm sense of her connection to her mother, 
including her mother’s gypsy heritage.  In the most radical interpretation of the novel, Zana 
represents a matriarchal overtaking of paternal spaces.  Though The Heiress of Greenhurst 
might occasionally seem to idealize matriarchal inheritance—Zana’s life is merely a 
prolongation of her mother’s—the novel ultimately reinforces the power of the law, which is 
represented as more reliable than male relatives and even God’s goodness.  Zana’s marriage 
to George in the conclusion of the novel reconciles property disputes and supports the status-
based construction of marriage (even though the exact ownership of the property remains 
unclear).  In redressing women’s wrongs, then, Zana—like other female characters we have 
examined—creates stability at an ancestral home space on an ancestral estate. 
Baym may be right that the fantastical story of Zana—a gypsy child living on an 
ancestral estate in England—may not be a “model” for mid-nineteenth-century American 
women readers.  Yet, the suffering that Zana and her mother experience—and Zana’s use of 
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writing as a form of redress—were familiar tropes in antebellum American women’s writing.  
The first-person narratives of both Ernest Linwood and The Heiress of Greenhurt expose the 
law’s limitations in recognizing proper marriage relationships.  As these novels show, the 
heroines’ mothers were innocent, and they themselves were legitimate.  In this way, these 
novels privilege the act of self-creation.  Telling one’s own story makes that story available 
to a different judge, the judgment of the public reader.  
 
 
Ishmael: The Lawyer-Hero of Married Women’s Property Reform 
 Perhaps the most explicit and impassioned depiction of women’s need for additional 
legal protection comes in Southworth’s Ishmael: In the Depths.  In this novel, Southworth 
incorporates all of the injustices of the three earlier novels: the law’s indifference to 
sentiment, the problem of legitimacy, and the dangers of women’s exposure to market 
relations.  By setting her novel several decades before the Civil War, Southworth uses her 
novel to reimagine the history of married women’s property reform.  Ishmael, then, is a truly 
alternative form of legal fiction.  Through the legal career of her central character, Ishmael, 
she glorifies these new laws, and she expresses renewed confidence that the law can properly 
serve as an additional protector for women. 
 Like Ernest Linwood and The Heiress of Greenhurst, Ishmael follows a character of 
uncertain parenthood.  Unlike these novels—and unlike Southworth’s other novels—this 
central character is a man.  His working class mother, Nora Worth, had entered into a secret 
marriage with the local wealthy landowner, Herman Brudenell.  At the time, Nora’s sister, 
Hannah, and the area minister were the only two who knew of the marriage.  Just as 
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Brudenell was planning to tell his mother of the marriage, a woman named Countess 
Hurstmonceux arrived at the Brudenell estate.  It is soon revealed that she too had entered 
into a private marriage with Brudenell.  Their marriage had been kept a secret because the 
Countess’s father did not want her to marry an untitled American.  Soon after their wedding 
ceremony, though, Brudenell discovered that he could never love Countess Hurstmonceux, 
and he left her in England, vowing never to return.  Later, he read a newspaper account 
(which ultimately turned out to be untrue) of her death in a railway accident, and therefore 
assumed he was free to marry Nora, the woman who would become Ishmael’s mother.  
When Nora discovers Brudenell’s previous marriage, she is devastated, and she dies soon 
after giving birth to Ishmael.  Before her death, she insists that her sister Hannah never reveal 
Brudenell’s identity as Ishmael’s father.  Brudenell escapes to Europe, and Hannah struggles 
in poverty to raise Ishmael.  Although Hannah attempts to shield Ishmael from scandalous 
rumors, a schoolmate eventually calls him a bastard, and Ishmael, long uneasy about the true 
story of his parents, demands that his aunt tell him everything.  Hannah does so but without 
revealing his father’s identity.  Ishmael is haunted by the idea that he is the son of a 
bigamist—and that he is generally believed to be a bastard.  Like Zana, Ishmael vows to 
avenge his mother’s mistreatment.  He does so by becoming a lawyer and consistently 
defending women whose husbands have abandoned them and left them destitute. 
 Perhaps the most curious aspect of Southworth’s novel is that Herman Brudenell 
enters not one but two private marriages.  Southworth’s obsession with this practice seems to 
relate to her critique of the law: that just because something is sanctioned by legal authority 
does not mean that it is right and proper.  In order to soothe Hannah’s worries about her 
sister’s private marriage, Brudenell assures Hannah that it will be completely legal: “ ‘she 
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shall have the marriage certificate in her own keeping, and every legal protection and 
defense; so that even if I should die suddenly…she would be able to claim and establish her 
rights and position in the world’ ” (Ishmael 39).  After the ceremony is performed and the 
documentation signed, Brudenell whispers to Nora that she is in fact safe.  Yet Southworth’s 
narrative voice interrupts to ask:  “But--were either of them really safe or happy?” (Ishmael 
41).  These private marriages follow the letter of the law, but they violate the spirit of 
marriage.  While Brudenell assures Nora that she is protected because they are legally 
married, she is not really protected, as she soon discovers.  Brudenell has violated her trust 
and deceived her.  The apparent legality of their marriage disappears upon the arrival of 
Countess Hurstmonceux. 
 After Ishmael is born, Hannah is adamant about taking Brudenell to court, believing 
that in that forum her sister will be vindicated and Brudenell properly punished.  She vows: 
“‘if there is law in the land, you shall be dragged to jail like a thief and exposed in court to 
answer for your bigamy; and all the world shall hear that you are a felon and that she was an 
honest woman who thought herself your wife when she gave you her love!”  (Ishmael 103).  
However, Nora forces Hannah to promise not to reveal Brudenell’s identity as Ishmael’s 
father.  Though Hannah eventually acquiesces to Nora’s wishes, she is soon visited by the 
minister who performed the marriage ceremony for Brudenell and Nora.  He claims that once 
he heard of Brudenell’s first marriage to Countess Hurstmonceux, he “searched the laws of 
the land bearing upon the subject of marriage” (Ishmael 116).  He advises Hannah that she 
should “ ‘proceed against Herman Brudenell for bigamy, call me for a witness, establish the 
fact of Nora’s marriage, rescue her memory and…let the consequences fall where they 
should fall, upon the head of the man!’ ” (Ishmael 117).  Even if Hannah did not abide by her 
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promise to Nora and took Herman Brudenell to court, the law would not allow Ishmael to 
inherit from his father, according to the minister; rather, going to court would only allow 
Ishmael to inherit the one thing his mother has to deed him—an “unspotted” name (Ishmael 
117). 
 Recognizing the law’s failure to provide justice for Nora and her son, Hannah’s 
fiancé, Reuben, begs Hannah to tell him the name of Ishmael’s father so that he might kill the 
guilty man.  Reuben views himself as Nora’s “ ‘nearest male relation’ ” and as such, believes 
it is his duty to avenge her death (Ishmael 126).  He tells Hannah that “ ‘I feel it to be my 
solemn duty to Nora, to womankind, and to the world, to seek out the wretch as wronged her 
and kill him where I find him, just as I would a rattlesnake as had bit my child’ ” (Ishmael 
126).  Horrified at the prospect, Hannah insists that this would be considered murder and that 
the courts would have Reuben hanged.  Reuben, who believes the legal fictions of his time, 
counters: “ ‘But they’d not hang me, Hannah!….[I]f a man is right to kill another in defense 
of his own life, he is doubly right to do so in defense of a woman’s honor.  And judges and 
juries know it, too, and feel it, as has often been proved’ ” (Ishmael 126).  Reuben believes in 
a legal system informed by instinctual knowing and feeling—the kind of justice that 
Southworth demonstrates does not exist in The Lost Heiress.  In Ishmael as well, justice is 
incapable of incorporating “right feeling.”  After all, Nora does not want Brudenell’s name 
revealed because she believes in her heart that he would never have knowingly deceived her, 
even though she has no proof to support her feelings.  She also understands that the courts 
would not view the case with her eyes and that Brudenell would be punished, even if he were 
not truly at fault. 
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 However, by not revealing Nora’s story to the public, the specter of illegitimacy 
hangs over Ishmael’s life for the entire novel.  After a jealous schoolmate calls him a bastard 
at a school banquet, Ishmael demands that his Aunt Hannah finally tell him the story of his 
parents.  He tells her that he had always assumed that he shared his mother’s last name 
because his father was a cousin or some other distant relation of hers.  Ishmael responds to 
the story of his mother’s illegitimate marriage much the same way Zana reacted to her 
mother’s diary in The Heiress of Greenhurst: he swears to seek vengeance against his father.  
That night, he sits at Nora’s grave site and proclaims: “ ‘Oh, mother!  Oh, poor, young, 
wronged, and broken-hearted mother!  Sleep in peace; for your son lives to vindicate you.  
Yes, if he has been spared, it was for this purpose—to honor, to vindicate, to avenge you!’ ” 
(Ishmael 280). 
 Ishmael avenges his mother’s death not through violent action but by becoming a 
powerful and persuasive lawyer, who defends women who have been manipulated by their 
husbands.  He receives his first case from his mentor, Judge Merlin.  A friend of Merlin’s, 
Mr. Walsh, has recently returned to the city in order to reconcile with his wife and 
recommence his relationship with his children.  In response, Walsh’s wife has hidden their 
children, and now the man wants to file a writ of habeas corpus against his wife to force her 
to produce them.  As Merlin advises Ishmael: 
“[Walsh] will sue for the possession of the children, and his wife will 
contest the suit; she will contest in vain, of course, for the law always gives 
the father possession of the children, unless he is morally, mentally, or 
physically incapable of taking care of them—which is not the case with 
Walsh; he is sound in mind, body, and reputation; there is nothing to be 
said against him in either respect….You cannot do better than to take this 
brief.  It is the very neatest little case that ever a lawyer had; all the plain 
law on your side….” (Ishmael 440) 
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Ishmael, however, claims that he does not like “to appear against a woman” and claims that it 
is “cruel” to deprive a woman of her children (Ishmael 440).  Judge Merlin responds by 
claiming that it would be for the mother’s “good to be reunited to her husband” (Ishmael 
442).  From Ishmael’s perspective, Merlin’s view represents all that is wrong with the strict 
application of the mid-nineteenth century legal fiction that supported marital unity.  As 
Ishmael asserts, “ ‘Her own heart, taught by her own instincts and experiences, is the best 
judge of [whether or not it is best to reconcile]’ ” (Ishmael 443).  Through the character of 
Ishmael, Southworth faults the law for not being able to take into account the importance of 
feeling and intuition; he understands that when the status relationship of marriage is not 
practiced correctly, the wife should not always be punished.  Calling Ishmael “Quixotic,” the 
Judge warns: “ ‘In this case the law is on the father’s side, and you should be on the law’s’ ” 
(Ishmael 443). 
 Although Ishmael tells Merlin he will not take the case, Mr. Walsh nevertheless visits 
Ishmael, believing that if he only explain his side of the story that Ishmael will clearly 
understand his rights to his children.  After telling the story, though, Ishmael is more 
convinced than before that Walsh is a deceiver who abandoned his wife and left her to fend 
for herself and her three children.  When Ishmael again asserts that he will not take Walsh’s 
case, Walsh explodes: “ ‘The woman is my wife!  The children are my own children!  And I 
have a lawful right to the possession of them’ ” (Ishmael 447).  Here, Southworth clearly 
intends to criticize the view of marriage that would construe wives and children to be 
possessions that men own.  Her interest in women’s struggles against the legal system is clear 
in that she devotes several chapters to discussing the Walsh case; in fact, it is the only case 
she discusses in much detail throughout a text populated by lawyers and judges. 
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 After Walsh’s narration of the story, which is not reproduced in the text, Southworth 
retells it three times, each time emphasizing women’s vulnerability to men’s economic 
excesses.  Ishmael retells Walsh’s story in such a way that he transforms it into a tale of 
abandonment, indifference, and abuse.  After he finishes, he condemns Walsh for “ ‘call[ing] 
in the aid of the law to tear [your wife’s] children from her arms, and coerce her, through her 
love for them, to become your slave and victim again’ ” (Ishmael 448).  Ishmael’s rhetoric 
here echoes married women’s property advocates, who often equated marriage with 
slavery.16  After Ishmael explains to Walsh how he understands the case, the narrator 
reframes the story yet again:  
It was only the same old story—of the young girl of fortune marrying a 
spendthrift, who dissipated her property…and then left her penniless, to 
struggle alone with all the ills of poverty to bring up her three little girls.  
By her own unaided efforts she had fed, clothed, and educated her three 
children for the nine years.  And now he had come back and wanted her to 
live with him again.  But she had not only ceased to love him, but began to 
dread him, lest he should get into debt and make way with the little 
personal property she had gathered by years of labor, frugality, self-denial. 
(Ishmael 453) 
In this version of the tale, Southworth highlights its familiarity, making legal cases like 
Walsh’s seem commonplace.  Specifically, according to the narrator, the profligate husband’s 
wasting of his wife’s entire inheritance through speculation has become all too familiar.  This 
iteration of the story also effectively reconfigures the husband as predator, rather than 
protector.  Without the law, Mrs. Walsh is doomed to a life of fear and misery. 
Ishmael, then, becomes the embodiment of the legal protector.  After meeting Mr. 
Walsh, he decides to defend Mrs. Walsh against the writ of habeas corpus.  Despite the fact 
that Mrs. Walsh has no money to pay him, Ishmael readily offers to serve her for free.  Thus, 
perhaps the most effectual retelling of the Walsh story occurs during the court proceedings in 
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which Ishmael directly addresses the jury.  It is worth quoting Ishmael’s arguments at length 
because they indicate Southworth’s own points of concern about women’s legal standing: 
He told the court how, …when [Mrs. Walsh] had come into her property he 
had squandered it all by a method that he, the plaintiff, called speculation, 
but that others called gambling; how he had then left her in poverty and 
embarrassment and with one child to support; how he remained away two 
years, during which time her friends had set his wife up in business in a 
little fancy store. She was prospering when he came back, took up his 
abode with her, got into debt which he could not pay, and when all her 
stock and furniture was seized to satisfy his creditors, he took himself off 
once more, leaving her with two children.…when at the end of seven or 
eight months he came back again she received him again. He stayed with 
her thirteen months; and suddenly disappeared without bidding her good-
by, leaving her within a few weeks of becoming the mother of a third child. 
A few days after his disappearance another execution was put into the 
house to satisfy a debt contracted by him, and everything was sold under 
the hammer. She was reduced to the last degree of poverty…Nine years 
passed, during which she enjoyed a respite from the persecutions of the 
plaintiff. In these nine years, by strict attention to business, untiring 
industry, she not only paid off the debt owed… but she bought a little 
cottage….( Ishmael 467) 
Ishmael’s arguments effectively describe Mrs. Walsh’s natural antipathy toward the notion of 
defying her husband.  It is only after his repeated desertions that she finally is able to resist 
his advances.  Ishmael’s rhetoric resembles Carlisle’s arguments in Drury v. Foster and 
arguments found in legal treatises and legislative records across the country in the mid-
nineteenth century.  Women needed protection from abusive husbands because it was not in 
their natures to act against their spouses, and it was in their spouse’s nature to gamble away 
the family’s wealth on speculative business ventures.  Ishmael’s argument to the jury 
emphasizes how the husband has violated the marriage agreement and argues that it is the 
law’s responsibility to protect Mrs. Walsh, who is otherwise vulnerable to her husband’s 
tyranny: 
But now at the end of nine years comes back the plaintiff. Her husband? 
No, her enemy! for he comes, not as he pretends, to cherish and protect; but 
as he ever came before, to lay waste and destroy! How long could it be 
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supposed that the mother would be able to keep the roof over the heads of 
her children if the plaintiff were permitted to enter beneath it? If the court 
did not protect her home against his invasion, he would again bring ruin 
and desolation within its walls. (Ishmael 467) 
When male protection has failed her, Ishmael argues, a wife needs the protection of the law.   
 Throughout the courtroom scene, Southworth celebrates the married women’s 
property laws and imagines their history through the actions and the rhetorical prowess of her 
main character.  During his closing arguments, Southworth reports, Ishmael: 
…uttered thoughts and feelings upon this subject [of women’s right to 
separate property], original and startling at that time, but which have since 
been quoted, both in the Old and New World, and have had power to 
modify those cruel laws which at that period made woman, despite her 
understanding intellect, an idiot, and despite her loving heart a chattel--in 
the law. (Ishmael 468) 
As he is presented here, Ishmael is the representative crusader for married women’s property 
rights.  These principles are “original and startling” to his audience, but they are eventually 
applauded the world over.  Southworth even implies that Ishmael’s words contributed 
directly to the reform movement.  Here, Southworth romanticizes the move for property law 
reform and depicts it as eliminating women’s inequality under the law.17  
 Because of the dangers of speculation and market volatility, Southworth repeatedly 
supports the idea that marriage should be a status relationship that protects women from the 
volatility of fluctuation and speculation.  It is only when marriages fail to provide such 
security that Southworth believes that women need protection from the law.  All of the 
“good” marriages in the novel remove women from wage labor and any interactions with 
cash.  When Hannah finally marries Reuben, he brings her to his home proudly and 
proclaims: 
“Welcome home, Hannah! welcome home, dearest woman! No more hard 
work now, Hannah! and no more slaving at the everlasting wheel and 
loom! Nothing to do but your own pretty little house to keep, and your own 
 127 
tidy servant girl to look after! And no more anxiety about the future, 
Hannah; for you have me to love you and care for you!” (Ishmael 305) 
It is not that Southworth believes that marriage should no longer be considered a status 
relationship.  Throughout the novel, she emphasizes women’s need for protection.  Yet she 
also portrays the very real possibility that they will not receive that protection from the men 
who are supposed to provide it. 
 In Ishmael, Southworth depicts women’s position before married women’s property 
laws, and she recapitulates the rhetoric behind such reform.  Southworth rightly privileges 
the role of protection—rather than liberation or equality—as the impetus behind the laws.  
Therefore, she embodies the call for reform through the lawyer-as-crusader character of 
Ishmael.  Southworth portrays the decades preceding property rights reform as a time when 
women lacked proper legal protection.  Southworth, like many popular women writers of the 
mid-nineteenth century, did not challenge the status foundation of marriage.  When practiced 
rightly, marriage could shield women from the marketplace and wage labor.  When the status 
relationship was violated, it endangered women precisely by making them vulnerable to the 
ill effects of their husbands’ speculation.  As Carlisle argued in the Drury case, men were 
naturally attracted to speculation, and wives were naturally inclined to submit to their 
husbands’ will.  It was the law’s responsibility to protect these women when their husbands 
failed to. 
The Lost Heiress, Ernest Linwood, The Heiress of Greenhurst, and Ishmael all focus 
on a young character who must prove his or her legitimacy because of the law’s failure.  This 
quest for legitimacy is inextricably tied to a right to a certain kind of stable, unmarketable 
property—a mother’s diary or an ancestral homespace.18  These novels focus on the law’s 
failure to protect a woman when her stable value is threatened and she is forced unfairly to 
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fend for herself.  In this way, they plead the case that the law provides incomplete justice 
because it does not recognize women’s vulnerability in the status relationship.  They argue 
that instead it is the law’s obligation to invade the privacy of the homespace in order to 
protect women whose male relatives fail them.  In many ways, these novels expose the 
cracks in nineteenth-century legal fiction.  Although they accept the ideal that a husband and 
wife should be held together, unified by bonds of mutual affection, they continually revisit 
marriages in which this is not the case.  They demand that the law look beyond the legal 
fiction and address myriad, “real life” practices.   
From the legislatures to the courts, the legal realm grappled with how to respond to 
violations of marital unity.  The proliferation of domestic law cases demonstrates the law’s 
willingness to intrude upon the distinctly private space of marital unity.  In other words, the 
law was willing to recognize that the status ideal could fail white women.  For example, 
judges were willing to overturn legal precedents in order to award custody of a child to the 
mother, rather than the father.  On the other hand, the law was reluctant to interfere with or 
interrogate the status construction of slavery, and this reluctance perpetuated incalculable 
racial cruelty, violence, and injustice.  Thus, when Southworth bemoans women being 
viewed as mere “chattel” in the eyes of the law, she ignores the important fact that—
whatever the abstract theory undergirding marriage—the courts did not treat white women 
simply and exclusively as property.  In the next chapter, I will explore the connections 
between the status theories that supported both slavery and family life in the nineteenth 
century. 
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1
 This view probably originates with Nina Baym’s assessment of the respective authors in Women’s Fiction.  It 
has been repeated throughout the secondary critical work of domesticity and sentimentalism, perhaps because 
all three women considered themselves professional writers of one sort or another and wrote prodigious 
amounts explicitly to earn money for their families. 
 
2
 For more on Southworth’s relationship with her husband, see Melissa Homestead, American Women Authors 
and Literary Property, 44-49.  For information on Hentz’s financial condition, see Mary Kelley, Private 
Woman, Public Stage, 164-67. 
 
3
 In her recent book Family, Kinship, and Sympathy in Nineteenth-Century American Literature, Cindy 
Weinstein makes a powerful argument for further consideration of novels by Southern women writers, 
including Hentz and Southworth.  See 5-11. 
 
4
 Other critics, including Laura Korobkin and Dawn Keetley, have recently emphasized the connections 
between the sensationalist domestic novel and popular nineteenth-century trials, involving scandalous cases 
including adultery and murder. 
 
5
 Mrs. Foster’s first name was not recorded in court records (Braukman and Ross 57). 
 
6
 While such examinations had been required in medieval England, this practice was endorsed in an American 
context by Tapping Reeve in his treatise The Law of Baron and Femme (1816), the first extended discussion of 
marriage in American legal history.  Instead of seeing marriage as a contract, Reeve believed that it was an 
alliance between the stronger and weaker sex; therefore, the law should protect wives from the coercive powers 
of their husbands.  As Norma Basch claims, according to Reeve, “Marriage, therefore, was not a contract 
between equals, but a relationship between the stronger sex and the weaker sex, which the common law in its 
wisdom recognized” (Basch, “Invisible Women,” 138). 
 
7
 As Braukman and Ross argue in their extensive analysis of the Drury case, President Lincoln had recently 
added five new Republican justices to the court, who were all “committed to economic growth” and had 
recently ruled in favor of creditors in analogous cases involving “innocent investors” (66). 
 
8
 Fifteen states required privy examinations until near the turn into the twentieth century, and North Carolina, 
for example, abolished its requirements for separate examination in 1945 (Braukman and Ross 61). 
 
9
 Part of the uncertainty arose from the abolition of equity courts in most states during the early decades of the 
nineteenth century.  Prior to that time, equity courts adjudicated many marital concerns, particularly property 
concerns of the very wealthy.  Because the equity system, inherited from England, was widely viewed as 
undemocratic and unable to accommodate the changes of the market economy, most state legislators could 
easily see the need to end the equity system.  For more on the abolition of equity courts throughout the U.S. in 
the early nineteenth century, see Warbasse, Changing Legal Rights. 
 
10
 Interestingly, Ellen O’ Leary is given no credit for raising the magnanimous Maud; Southworth seems to 
write over Ellen’s character, transforming this woman who pleaded for her husband’s life, worked to support 
her family, and tended an estate, into a passive, weak, dreamy character who had little affect on her adopted 
daughter or her son, Falconer.   
 
11
 Despite these beliefs, though, Falconer relinquishes his career as a radical politician and reformer in order to 
marry Maud. 
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12
 Weinstein discusses the pervasiveness of the word “own” throughout Ernest Linwood in Family, Kinship, and 
Sympathy.  She concludes: “It seems clear that Hentz’s concern with what is one’s own has everything to do 
with losing one’s name, specifically the moment when a woman marries, loses her name, becomes a possession 
of her husband and metamorphoses, in the words of eighteenth-century legal writer William Blackstone, into a 
feme couverte” (22). 
 
13
 In order to marry Ernest’s sister, Edith, her primary suitor embarks on a multi-year journey to collect 
sufficient documentation of his lineage. 
 
14
 For a thorough analysis on the implications of Ernest’s inherited jealousy, see Keetley. 
 
15
 For more on the relationship between Hentz and her husband, as well as the autobiographical implications for 
Ernest Linwood, see Kelley 222-28. 
 
16
 This practice of women activists of the period elided the difference between one status relationship and 
another.  Though wives were in a status relationship with their husbands, it was not the same kind of legal 
dependence between masters and slaves.  I will explore this problematic appropriation of enslaved women’s 
experiences by white women activists in the next chapter. 
 
17
 For all of the troubled marriages in the novel and the many court cases focused on marital wrongs, it is 
notable that Southworth mentions the word “divorce” only once, when she mentions the kinds of scandalous 
cases that attract the most crowds to the courtroom.  Interestingly, divorce does play a more significant role in 
Ishmael’s sequel, Self-Raised; or, From the Depths (1876).  While Ishmael focuses on the married women’s 
property reforms, Self-Raised focuses on divorce litigation.   
 
18
 This is one crucial way that these novels differ from later nineteenth century novels that express anxiety about 
women’s relationship to inherited property.  In these novels, if a woman inherits any item of value, it is a family 
homespace and never cash or any other form of fluctuating wealth.  When Henry James turns to similar 
concerns, his female characters must also negotiate the difficulties and problems associated with cash wealth. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“NOT IN THE USUAL WAY”: SPECULATIVE VIOLENCE  
IN AFRICAN AMERICAN NARRATIVES 
 
In 1814, a freed black man named George Stephens appeared before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to seek a writ of habeas corpus to retrieve his wife.  Some years previously, 
she had escaped from her slave master in Maryland and then eventually married Stephens in 
Pennsylvania.  Her master, however, located her and demanded that she return to Maryland.  
She was able to negotiate a compromise with him in which she would work for a three-year 
indenture period in return for her freedom.  In Stephens’s writ, he challenged this bargain, 
asserting that her status as a married woman prevented her from entering into a contract 
without his consent.  The court denied his request, reasoning that her initial position as a 
slave superceded her position as a wife.  In arguing that the agreement was in the woman’s 
best interest, Chief Justice William Tilghman claimed that “her situation is totally different 
from that of a free woman” and that the common law’s rules of coverture did not apply to 
her.  Associate Justice Jasper Yates agreed, insisting that, “as a slave she could not enter into 
a [marriage] contract without her master’s consent” (qtd in Grossman 130).   
The question in the case of Commonwealth v Clements, then, was not whether or not 
Stephens’s wife could enter into a contract.  Instead, the issue at hand was which of her status 
positions—slave or wife—was the one that precluded her from contracting.  Stephens 
evidently believed that, because his wife married him in the North, that her status as property 
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in the South would be erased.  Clements, on the other hand, clearly believed that the woman 
carried her status as a slave with her into the North and that any relationships she entered into 
there were null and void.  In addition to these complications, the story is even more striking 
because the woman attempts to contract with her slave master for her freedom—a contract 
that, if tested in a court of law, would prove even less binding than her marriage. 
Cases like Commonwealth v Clements indicate just how deeply America’s 
fascination with status relationships affected the African American community.  Legal 
discourse erased the humanity of the slave and transformed him or her into a piece of chattel 
property.  In addition, as the Stephens case indicates, even if this status relationship could be 
escaped, the black wife still faced another: the legal fiction of marital unity, which denied her 
an identity separate from her husband.  From another perspective, though, the Stephens’s 
story demonstrates how slavery prevents a woman from assuming her role as a “proper wife” 
in the way the mid-nineteenth-century Americans would have understood it.  Although status 
robbed people of their subjecthood and self-possession, it could also enable them to inhabit 
the normative positions in society, such as husband, wife, father, and child. 
Despite the innumerable ways that the law affected their everyday lives, African 
Americans were systematically denied the opportunity to participate in the creation of 
America’s legal fictions.  Yet within mid-nineteenth century African American narratives, 
we can uncover an archive of alternative legal fictions, directly in dialogue with the dominant 
discourse.  This archive of narratives can provide insight into the African American legal 
imagination.  As Robert Cover claims in his essay “Nomos and Narrative”: “To live in a 
legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, but also their connections to 
possible and plausible states of affairs.  It requires that one integrate not only the ‘is’ and the 
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‘ought,’ but the ‘is,’ the ‘ought,’ and the ‘what might be.’  Narrative so integrates these 
domains” (102).  In this chapter, I argue that African American texts of the mid-nineteenth 
century engage with the period’s legal precepts in an attempt to offer a new hope for status 
relationships after white practice had threatened the ideal.  They do so by first disrupting the 
legal fiction of the white race at the top of the status hierarchy by offering a view of the real 
condition of the white home space.  Second, they envision a black domestic space that allows 
for the proper practice of status in a mutually beneficial and affective space. 
Before examining the texts in detail, we must first examine the legal fictions that they 
critique, beginning with the most central principle: self-possession.  In the early American 
republic, citizenship was tied directly to land ownership.1  To participate actively and without 
bias in the body politic, a man could not be under another man’s sway or duress.  Property in 
land represented a wealth that one could always depend on and that could not be taken away.  
As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon claims, “…historically, the notion of a political authority 
located in the independent agency of the citizen is closely linked to property ownership” 
(21).  With the turn into the nineteenth century, property became more fluid and wage labor 
became more common.2  Self-possession shifted, therefore, from being grounded in land 
ownership to being grounded in a core sense of the self.  In other words, there was a kernel of 
the self that could not be alienated away in labor.  It is derived primarily from Locke’s 
famous pronouncement in the Second Treatise that “every man has a Property in his own 
Person ” (305).3  As Peter Coviello describes it, “…all of the individual’s labor power is 
alienable in its transformation into a commodity, but the whole of the person is not—a 
wholly alienated person, a human commodity, is, properly speaking, not a laborer but a 
slave” (48).  
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Since only African Americans could be legally enslaved in the U.S., whiteness 
became that quality that protected the wage laborer from becoming a slave.  In other words, 
whiteness became that inalienable kernel of the self.  Consequently, in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, a body of legal discourse established whiteness as a form of property 
that enabled self-possession.  The courts articulated this conception of whiteness as a 
property and protected it like other rights.  As legal scholar Cheryl Harris argues, judges 
drew on racist theories to maintain that whiteness was a part of the physical self: “an 
unsullied fact of the blood rather than a volatile and violently imposed regime of racial 
hierarchy.”  She goes on to note that, “White identity conferred tangible and economically 
valuable benefits and was jealously guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those 
who met a strict standard of proof.” (Harris 1726).  As nineteenth-century legal history 
demonstrates, “whiteness realizes and concretizes the fiction of an inalienable property in the 
self” (Coviello 48).4 
In addition to whiteness, the legal construction of marriage during the mid-nineteenth 
century also sustained male self-possession.  Again, it is important to remember that 
marriage retained its status foundation for much of the century.  In the eyes of the law, 
husband and wife were one person, and that one person was the husband.  Purportedly, a wife 
did not need equal civil rights because she was protected by her husband’s affection.  This 
lack of a legal identity prevented a wife from entering into contracts and from keeping her 
own earnings, which regulated her interaction with credit markets and speculation.   
The legal fiction that supported the status structure of the marriage relationship was 
theoretically similar to the legal fiction that supported the other major status relationship that 
persisted in the nineteenth century: slavery.  As we have seen, both relationships were 
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grounded in the notion that the more powerful should protect and care for the weaker.  Yet I 
am not equating the position of wives with the position of slaves, even if women activists of 
the period made such problematic claims.5  Rather, this chapter investigates how nineteenth-
century authors, activists, and legal theorists reconciled the tensions of calling for the 
destruction of one status relationship—slavery—and idealizing another—marriage.6  As 
Stanley notes in her extensive study of contract law during the Civil War period, federal 
legislators refused to alter the theories of status that undergirded the marriage relationship.  
During the debates surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 1866, these legislators “foreclosed 
debate on whether liberties granted to former slaves would also afford wives individual rights 
and thereby transform marriage into an equal contract at law.  The legislators’ response to 
this was an unequivocal: ‘No’ ” (Stanley 199). 
Abolitionist discourse offers an invaluable resource for examining this attempt at 
reconciliation.  Abolitionists portrayed the status construction of marriage as fostering male 
self-possession, and they consistently presented it as a natural right.  Throughout their 
speeches and their essays, they configured the domestic space—and women’s place within 
it—as part of the reward that black males could expect from emancipation.  As Henry Ward 
Beecher said in a speech in November 1865: “ ‘The slave is a man and he will respond to 
human influence.  Although a black man may never be a Yankee, he will follow hard after.  
Why should he, an ill-compensated and bewhipt drudge, work willingly?…Give him the 
prospect of a home, a family that is not marketable, and he will work” (qtd in Stanley 138).  
Beecher’s argument that a family should not be put on the auction block corresponds with the 
belief that a wife should not go on the market to work.  Instead, her labor belongs to her 
husband; she does not work for herself.  She is, as Beecher claims, “unmarketable.”  To 
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counter the Southern criticism that slavery is more beneficial to the worker than the Northern 
industrial wage system, William Lloyd Garrison focused on the home space and a man’s 
right to own his wife and children—to have them belong to him and not to someone else: “ 
‘For even the most degraded and dependent free laborer, no power can take away from him 
his wife and children’ ” (qtd in Stanley 153).  This connection can be seen perhaps most 
clearly, however, in the arguments of former southern slaveholders during Reconstruction.  
One such planter argued: “Allow me to call your attention to the fact that most of the 
Freedwomen who have husbands are not at work—never having made any contract at all—
Their husbands are at work, while they are as nearly idle as it is possible for them to be…” 
This planter goes on to say that black freedwomen “play the lady and [demand to] be 
supported by their husbands like white folks” (Liberator).  The privilege to be protected at 
home is a function of whiteness; black married women do not have a right to exist outside of 
contract.  The continual connection between emancipation and the right to a home space 
prompted historian Amy Dru Stanley to note, that “no axiom had been more important to 
abolitionism” than the concept of the home space and a husband’s exclusive right to his 
wife’s labor.  Abolitionists, she argued, “constantly contrasted the morality of free market 
relations to the evil of the slave system on the grounds that all free, laboring men had a right 
to an inviolate household” (142).  
Abolitionists—men and women—configured the domestic space as a right of 
emancipation; they claimed, in other words, that part of being a self-possessed man was 
having a wife and family to protect and, yes, to own.  This notion was not simply borrowed 
from domestic literature.  It had been constructed and reified in the era’s legal discourse.  As 
historians have noted, Emancipation attempted to destroy one status relationship in America: 
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that between master and slave.  Yet even after Emancipation, the law continued to idealize 
another status relationship: that between husband and wife.   
Like abolitionist discourse, many antebellum African American texts celebrate the 
destruction of slavery without condemning the status-based model of marriage.  These 
narratives all provide a glimpse into to the white (usually slaveholding) home space, 
revealing it to be a troubled and violent perversion of the proper status relationship.  Yet, 
interestingly, the condition of white marriage does not necessarily cause the African 
American writers to conclude that the status relationship is altogether unrealistic or 
unattainable, even as they critique the status construction of the master-slave relationship.  
Instead, they hold out the possibility of the practice of a purer status relationship in the black 
home space.  Embracing the notion of the inviolate home space, they configure not just as a 
source of stability against market relations but also as a site of defense against white racial 
violence and intrusion.  In this chapter, I will place two African American texts—Frank J. 
Webb’s The Garies and Their Friends (1857) and Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a 
Slave Girl (1861)—within the context of nineteenth-century marriage law to illustrate the 
importance of the status ideal for the African American community. 
Webb’s and Jacobs’s texts engage deeply with the period’s legal discourse, but they 
provide unique perspectives on the question of status in the African American community.  
Most obviously, Jacobs presents the experience of a black woman—one who is “multiply 
disfranchised”—while Webb portrays what is possibly the first successful black businessman 
in American literature (Accomando 229).  Jacobs’s text famously ends without marriage; 
Webb’s text details a series of mutually enriching marriages among African Americans.  
While Webb’s text is self-consciously fictitious, while Jacobs’s narrative insists on its 
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truthfulness.  Jacobs details the difficulties of a fugitive slave, and Webb focuses exclusively 
on free blacks in the North.  These texts are not necessarily representative of two contrasting 
modes of African American life.  Rather, in spite of their differences, their similar focus on 
black women’s position in the home space registers the pervasiveness of the issue in the 
African American community.  Perhaps more interestingly, these texts also demonstrate the 
complex construction of “freedom” by complicating the notion that the opposite of an 
enslaved person is a self-possessed, contracting individual.  
 
 
Stable Property and Stable Women: The Inviolate Home Space  
in The Garies and Their Friends 
 
In 1857, five years after the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe wrote a laudatory preface for what is now believed to be the second African American 
novel, The Garies and Their Friends.  Stowe praised the author, Frank J. Webb, for 
portraying African Americans as “capable of freedom [and] self-government” (Webb xx).  
Webb, a free African American born in Philadelphia, was married to the African American 
actress, Mary Webb, whom Stowe had championed.  As Stowe’s preface to The Garies and 
Their Friends recognizes, Webb’s novel takes up the issue of the black capacity for self-
government; in other words, he explores the obstacles against—and the potentiality of—
black American citizenship.  While Stowe’s novel pushes black domesticity out of U.S. 
borders, Webb depicts a thriving black community, complete with “self-possessed” black 
men who provide for and protect exactly the kind of ideal domestic spaces that Stowe 
portrays in Rachel Halliday’s kitchen.  In The Garies and Their Friends, Webb provides a 
model for black male self-possession that is grounded in material wealth and is established 
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through a status-based marriage and a domestic space separate from market relations.  By 
critiquing white notions of property and value, Webb ultimately asserts that African 
Americans can gain not only citizenship but dominance through a proper understanding of 
self-possession.7   
Although many critics have claimed that Webb’s interest in the domestic space is a 
result of his interactions with women writers, this scholarship ignores Webb’s engagement 
with the legal discourse of his time.  The novel is filled with references to the law and 
American citizenship and is obsessed with the condition of property in America.  The novel 
begins at Clarence Garie’s plantation in Georgia.  The black woman who lives with him as 
his wife, even though she is in fact his slave, has recently discovered that she is pregnant.  
Unable to bear the thought of passing the matrilineal curse of slavery onto another child, 
“Mrs. Garie” pleads with Mr. Garie to move their family North.  She worries that if Mr. 
Garie dies, “Heirs would spring up from somewhere, and we might be sold and separated for 
ever” (Webb 54).  For these reasons, the Garie family soon moves to Philadelphia, where Mr. 
and Mrs. Garie are finally married.  They also join a tightly knit black community, becoming 
friends with the wealthy landowner, Mr. Walters, as well as the industrious black family, The 
Ellises.  The Garie’s neighbor is the racist white lawyer, Mr. George Stevens, who discovers 
that (unbeknownst to Mr. Garie) he is Garie’s long lost cousin and Mr. Garie’s only white 
next of kin—thereby qualifying him to inherit the Garie property.  Stevens devises a plan to 
start a race riot in Philadelphia to accomplish two selfish goals: (1) to devalue the area real 
estate so that he can buy it and sell it later at a profit and (2) to have Mr. Garie killed so that 
he can claim his stake in the Garie family property.  During the race riot, Mr. Ellis is 
gruesomely attacked, Mr. Garie is murdered, and Mrs. Garie dies during childbirth.   
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The riot brings violent devastation to the older generation, and after the destruction, 
Webb focuses on the younger generation: the Garie children (Emily and Clarence, named for 
their parents) and the Ellis children (Charlie, Esther, and Caddy).  With Mr. Garie dead, his 
lawyer decides that the young Clarence Garie should pass as a white person and attend a 
boarding school far away.  Because his sister, Emily, is too young to maintain such secrecy, 
she remains with the Ellis’s.  After many years of living as a white person, the white society 
with whom he has integrated discovers his secret and rejects him utterly.  This trauma makes 
him chronically ill, but before he dies, he returns to the black community and his sister 
Emily.  Despite such scenes of violence and death, The Garies and Their Friends is, finally, a 
tale of black uplift.  By its end, Mr. Walters is happily married to Esther Ellis, Charlie Ellis 
has married Emily Garie, and Caddy Ellis has also married a hard-working man from the 
black community.  The final sentence of the novel describes the senior Mr. and Mrs. Ellis, 
who “lived to a good old age, surrounded by their children and grandchildren” (Webb 392). 
 For Webb, women’s position within the home is an essential element of creating an 
inviolate domestic space, which alone can protect the black subject from white racial 
violence.  Webb portrays black men who succeed in the market while their wives are devoted 
to domestic pursuits and maternal duties: in other words, an ideal status relationship.  While 
in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the domestic space is never intruded upon by racial violence, in 
Webb’s novel, the terror of violence is brought, quite literally, to the doorsteps of the Gaires 
and their friends.  Immediately before the riot, The Ellises retreat to Mr. Walters formidable 
home, bringing with them a host of decidedly domestic skills.  For instance, Caddy Ellis—by 
far the most fastidious housekeeper in the novel and perhaps all of antebellum fiction—uses 
her kitchen tools to concoct a mixture of boiling water and pepper, which she then repeatedly 
 141 
pours on the approaching white mob.  She is able to transfer her domestic skills into a line of 
defense without herself become manly or engaging in combat.  During much of the novel, 
Webb actually critiques Caddy’s almost irrational devotion to domestic pursuits—at one 
point, her cleaning routine almost fatally injures her brother—but in the riot scene he 
celebrates her method of defense as one of the most effective against the attacking white 
mob. 
In the riot scene, Esther Ellis truly stands out for her ability to defend the home space 
while retaining her femininity.  When she enters Mr. Walters’s house, she responds that the 
sight of the guns collected in preparation for the riot “make me wish I were a man” (Webb 
205).  She then relates a story about watching a black woman being abused by the white mob 
and claims: “ ‘ I felt I could have strangled them: had I been a man, I would have attacked 
them on the spot’ ” (Webb 206).  Implicit in Esther’s desire to be a man, though, is a 
recognition that she is a woman and that she cannot strangle the white attackers.  Instead, she 
embraces her capabilities as a woman, and she pledges to load the guns for the men to make 
their work of defense more efficient.  Before the mob attacks the house, one of the men 
absent-mindedly lights a fire in the fireplace, and a spark jumps out from the grate toward the 
stockpile of gunpowder.  Esther alone has the presence of mind to stamp out the spark and 
clear the hearth.  As Robert Reid-Pharr points out, her heroic act mirrors the more mundane 
domestic chore of taking out the ashes.  After the dangerous episode, Esther faints almost 
immediately, further emphasizing her feminine nature.  Even though Esther may wish she 
were a man, she (and her sister) adeptly use womanly skills to help defeat the white attackers.  
Notably, Webb tells the reader that it is during these preparations for the riot—these 
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moments in which Esther realizes her potential to defend the home space—that Walters’s 
love for her develops. 
 Mr. Walters asks Esther to marry him after the riot, Esther realizes that her first duty 
is to help establish a new home for her immediate family.  Although she feels quite strongly 
for him, she informs her brother: “ ‘I told him yesterday that I could not think of marrying 
him now, whilst we are all so unsettled.  It grieved me to do it, Charlie, but I felt that it was 
my duty.  Cad and I are going to add our savings to mother’s; that, combined with what we 
shall receive for father’s tools…will be sufficient to furnish another house’ ” (Webb 286-87).  
As Esther’s quotation indicates, she cannot create a new house with her husband until she has 
re-established her family’s domestic space.  Similarly, her younger brother Charlie 
understands that with his father incapacitated, he must take on the role of provider and 
protector, a role that Webb discusses explicitly.  Immediately after learning about his father’s 
injuries, Charlie reassures the women in his family: “ ‘I’m almost a man now….don’t be 
afraid, I’ll take care of you all’ ” (Webb 268).  Mr. Ellis, Charlie’s father, echoes this need 
for male strength and protection, when he awakens briefly from his coma to tell his son: “ 
‘My boy, you are all your mother and sisters have to depend upon now; I’m—I’m—…I’m 
helpless; but you must take care of them’ ” (Webb 272).  Webb’s novel is deeply committed 
to depicting the practice of status relationships within the black community in Philadelphia.  
The women devote their earnings to the maintenance of the household, and the incapacitation 
of the father necessitates the brother assuming the role of protector. 
 After depicting proper enactments of the status, Webb then enshrines the ideals 
through a set of images that Walters displays in his home.  Early in the novel, Webb 
describes a painting that Walters owns, depicting Toussaint L’Overture, the black Haitian 
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revolutionary leader.  Walters admires the portrait because it shows the general in full 
military dress and resists turning the leader into a racist caricature.  “That,” he tells Mr. Garie 
when they discuss the image, “looks like a man of intelligence.  It is entirely different from 
any likeness I ever saw of him.  The portraits generally represent him as a monkey-faced 
person, with a handkerchief about his head” (Webb 123).  After Walters marries Esther, the 
narrator revisits the domestic space and relates some important changes. “Then opposite to 
the portrait of Toussaint is suspended another picture….It is a likeness of Mrs. Esther 
Walters, nee Ellis.  The brown baby in the picture is the little girl at her side,—the elder sister 
of the other brown baby who is doing its best to pull from its mother’s lap the doll’s dress 
upon which she is sewing” (Webb 333).  Webb’s imagery is significant, if not exactly subtle.  
Balanced by the intelligent, military hero is the black maternal presence, performing 
domestic duties and serving in the home.  Just as in the riot scene, Esther’s domesticity 
continues to support black male efforts at defending the home space.  Esther is enshrined as 
the ideal African American wife not only because she capably defends the home space, but 
also because she commits herself to the communitarian identity of the proper wife and 
mother.  Unlike Toussaint, who is depicted in his portrait as an intelligent, self-possessed 
military leader, Esther is depicted surrounded by her children and engaged in domestic 
pursuits.  Webb’s vision then embodies the complementary roles and responsibilities that 
legal discourse articulated in its descriptions of the status relationship. 
 Although women’s position in the status relationship purportedly bolsters male self-
possession in the market economy, Webb’s novel expresses considerable anxiety about the 
implications of wage labor.  In relation to the African American community, he criticizes the 
practice of sending young men into domestic service.  Significantly, this kind of service 
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separates young men from the black domestic space—a key source, as we have seen, for their 
self-possession.  In addition, Webb implies that to have a black boy working in the house is 
unnatural; it is a remnant of the condition of slavery rather than proper wage labor in which 
one can retain one’s self-possession.   For example, when Mrs. Ellis sends young Charlie to 
work in service for the white widow Mrs. Thomas, the boy balks at the prospect, swearing: “ 
‘I’m not going to be stuck up behind their carriage, dressed like a monkey in a tail coat—I’ll 
cut off my own head first’ ” (Webb 60).  Charlie recognizes that domestic service requires 
such a negation of the self that he would prefer to destroy himself.  In giving advice to the 
Ellises about the situation, Mr. Walters agrees with young Charlie:  
“If you can’t get on without the boy’s earning something, why don’t you 
do as white women and men do?…they would rather give [their sons] a 
stock of matches, newspapers, or apples, and start them out to sell 
them…Where would I or Mr. Ellis have been had we hired out all our lives 
at so much a month?  It begets a feeling of dependence to place a boy in 
such a situation.”  (Webb 64)   
The domestic service agreement is not really a contract at all, but a parceling out of one’s self 
for a wage until there is simply no self left.  It creates, as Webb makes clear, a dependent 
relation dangerously similar to slavery.  Robert Reid Pharr points out that Webb’s “critique 
stems…from the horror that the loosening of boundaries between the household and the 
market enacts in the psychologies on display in the text.  The servant is kept in a sort of 
limbo in which he sells not only his labor but also his person” (70).  Rather than domestic 
service, Mr. Walters endorses a return to classical liberal theory in which self-possession is 
maintained through selling concrete materials for an exact value.   
Just as Webb is critical of black domestic service for robbing men of their self-
possession, he emphasizes the ways that white’s speculative activities and contractual 
arrangements jeopardize their self-possession beyond recovery.  For example, one white 
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businessman, Mr. Blatchford, rescinds his offer to hire Charlie Ellis because his workmen 
threaten to quit if forced to work alongside a black man.  Blatchford recognizes his decision 
is unethical, but feels it is necessary: “To accede to his workmen’s demands he must do 
violence to his own conscience; but he dared not sacrifice his business and bring ruin on 
himself and his family, even though he was right” (Webb 298).  When his business associate, 
Burrell, subsequently relates this story to his wife, she criticizes Blatchford for not following 
his conscience.  Her husband responds to her critique: 
“Not so fast, my little woman….You are unjust to Blatchford; he could not 
help himself, he was completely in their power….he is under contract to 
finish a large amount of work within a specified time; and if he should fail 
to fulfill his agreement it would subject him to immense loss—in fact, it 
would entirely ruin him….he is greatly in debt from unfortunate 
speculations, and a false step just now would overset him completely; he 
could not have done otherwise than he has.” (Webb 301)   
Burrell’s statement registers the perils of the purely contractual marketplace.  Mr. Blatchford 
“can not help himself”; he is “completely” in the power of his business contracts.  Because 
he is under the sway of other men, he has no self-possession and is powerless to make ethical 
decisions for himself, and in turn perpetuates racial discrimination.  He is particularly in 
jeopardy because of his dalliance with speculation, which has left him in debt and therefore 
in danger of disappearing completely.   
Throughout the novel, white characters are associated with the volatile commercial 
economy of credit, speculation, and unstable value.  Mr. Stevens, the villain, plans the race 
riot as a way to temporarily devalue property in the neighborhood so that he can 
subsequently buy up the properties at a discount, “restore order,” and then resell the 
properties at a considerable profit.  Webb condemns such speculation, and he directly 
compares it to gambling.  As he describes Mr. Stevens’s business partner:  
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Mr. Morton speculated in stocks and town-lots in the same spirit that he 
had formerly betted at the racecourse and cockpit in his dear Palmetto 
State….To have frequented gaming halls and race courses in the North 
would have greatly impaired his social position; and as he set high value 
upon that he was compelled to forego his favourite pursuits, and associate 
himself with a set of men who conducted a system of gambling operations 
upon ‘Change, of a less questionable but equally exciting character. (Webb 
168)   
According to Webb, there is no significant difference between betting on horses and betting 
on the exchange; betting on stocks is simply “less questionable” than outright gambling. 
Because of such practices, Webb continually depicts the white home space as 
pervaded by market relations.  In the Stevens’s family home—the white domestic space that 
Webb describes most thoroughly— Mr. Stevens hatches his plan for the race riots, and as 
Webb points out, Stevens openly discusses his devious plans with his wife.  Thus, instead of 
the home providing a safe space from the dangers of contract and speculation, it is bound up 
with and poisoned by such arrangements.  In fact, Stevens’s home is even mortgaged to the 
wealthy Mr. Walters.  Therefore, his house is literally at risk, a disturbing prospect in a novel 
that so closely associates owning a home with owning oneself.  Stevens’s house is, quite 
literally, in constant jeopardy of being taken away from him.  In addition, the Stevens home 
is filled with violence and chaos.  Webb even presents a scene in which Mrs. Stevens whips 
her daughter, Lizzie.  In a complete rejection of the affective motherly discipline that Richard 
Brodhead finds in sentimental literature, Mrs. Stevens resorts to violence—and, quite 
interestingly, the same violence that the slave master uses to discipline his black slaves.8   
The Garies and Their Friends resembles other domestic novels in its deep anxieties 
about credit and speculation.  Because of the fluctuating value of these new forms of wealth, 
the fear was that the value of the self could also fluctuate and be destroyed.  (As Hawthorne 
warns in The House of the Seven Gables, the credit economy means “that someone is always 
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at the drowning point.”)  Thus, The Garies and Their Friends, like other novels of the period, 
emphasizes the stable value home space, secured by a wife who does not enter into market 
relations.  Yet, unlike other domestic novels, Webb’s fear of speculation is uniquely 
racialized.  While the white characters in Webb’s novel embrace the ephemeral forms of 
wealth that were beginning to dominate the antebellum economy, the black characters retain 
their faith in stable value and material goods.  Thus George Stevens is described as a real 
estate speculator, who buys and sells property using credit, while Mr. Walters uses 
prodigious reserves of cash to buy property and—critically—he never sells.  Walters 
therefore maintains his foothold in stable forms of wealth, and of course, his self-possession 
is further secured by his wife, Esther.  Throughout his novel, whiteness is inextricably linked 
to the volatile commercial market, and he implies that there is no going back.  White 
America has abandoned stable forms of wealth in favor of limitless speculation, and 
consequently whiteness is perpetually associated with the danger of disembodiment and 
disappearance.  In Webb’s novel—in an amazing reversal of legal theory—it is blackness 
that represents an inalienable and stable property, and whiteness becomes a lack of property.   
As a result, The Garies and Their Friends warns against the enervating consequences 
of interracial mingling, as seen most clearly in the story of Clarence Garie.  After his parents’ 
death, it is decided that Clarence will go to a boarding school and pass as a white person.  
Clarence enjoys his white privilege and soon shuns the black community.  He falls in love 
with and plans to marry a rich and beautiful white woman.  Yet the cost of keeping such a 
secret is literally destroying him.  As he tells his only white confidant:  “ ‘I must shut this 
secret in my bosom, where it gnaws, gnaws, gnaws, until it has almost eaten my heart 
away….It has kept me awake night after night, it haunts me at all hours; it is breaking down 
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my health and strength—wearing my very life out of me’ ” (Webb 325).  His white blood 
forces him to repress his true self, and the process slowly destroys him.  When Clarence’s 
secret is exposed, he is ruined.  Rejected by his betrothed and disgraced in white society, he 
discovers that he cannot reconnect with the black community because he remains hyper-
aware of the presence of his white blood.  In contrast, his sister Emily has happily rejected 
any claim to whiteness and, as Charlie Ellis’s wife, embodies the ideal of the domestic 
woman.  At the close of the novel, when Clarence’s death is inevitable, he finally returns to 
Philadelphia to be with his sister.  When Charlie picks up Clarence from the steamer, he 
immediately recognizes how the illness has transformed Clarence, but reassures: “Ah, wait 
until we get you home, we shall soon have you better.”  After the remark, Clarence responds, 
in the spirit of George Harris: “ ‘Home!…home!  How delightful that word sounds!  I feel it 
is going home to go to you and Em’ ” (Webb 382-83).  Unlike George Harris, though, 
Clarence’s home is viable, sustainable, and located within a vibrant black community, 
located firmly in the domestic. 
 By presenting a thorough critique of white misunderstandings of property, The Garies 
and Their Friends recuperates classical self-possession as a possibility only for the black 
community because it alone can maintain a domestic space separate from contract relations.  
The black enclave will be able to defend itself against white racial violence, while in the 
interim, white America risks its self-hood on forms of wealth that do not, in fact, exist.  By 
exposing white America’s fascination with contract and speculation, Webb countered the 
prevailing legal fiction of whiteness as property with his own legal fiction: The Garies and 
Their Friends. 
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The Status of Protection:  
Harriet Jacobs’s Search for a Sustainable Domestic Space 
As in The Garies and Their Friends, Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl (1861) reveals white marriage to be a corruption of the status ideal, and it too suggests 
that an inviolate household can protect African Americans against white racial violence.  
Jacobs’s narrative argues that black families can embody the principles of the status 
relationship.  First, she demonstrates white Southern culture’s failure to uphold the ideals of 
status and then emphasizes the importance of the status model for black families.  Jacobs is 
aware that the inviolate home space is composed of a husband who works for wages and a 
wife who remains at home and labors solely out of love for the family.  As the planter’s 
comments suggests earlier in this chapter, white women’s privilege of being removed from 
the marketplace and commodification was persistently denied to black women.  As Claudia 
Tate notes, “Black women were public commodities of exchange whose market value was 
exclusively indexed as the production of material wealth, whereas white women were private 
individuals” (25).  By placing Jacobs’s narrative within the context of legal depictions of 
marriage, we can understand that it is not simply a narrative following the transformation of 
an enslaved woman into a liberated, contracting agent.  Jacobs is also arguing for African 
Americans’ right to enact and inhabit a status-based construction of familial relations.  
Throughout Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs repeatedly states that her goal is to 
provide a safe domestic space for her children, and Jacobs is deeply critical of slavery and 
the legal fictions that support it, which systematically deny any privileged status to black 
Americans. 
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Like Webb, Jacobs contrasts the depravity of the white family with the strength of the 
African American family.  Through her comparison, Jacobs undercuts the legal fiction that 
structured Southern antebellum society.  Through her portrayal of the corrupt Southern white 
family, Jacobs attacks a primary legal fiction of the culture: that black families—and black 
marriage, in particular—are not real.  In 1858, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled on 
the case of Howard v. Howard, the South’s last decision on slave marriages.  In the 
judgment, the justices distinguished slave relationships from white marriages by invoking the 
differences between contractual and status understandings of marriage.  To distinguish slave 
couplings from white marriage, judges configured black couplings as purely contractual and 
negotiable, whereas, as we have seen, marriage retained its status element for much of the 
nineteenth century.  As North Carolina Chief Justice Pearson argued: 
[T]he relation between slaves is essentially different from that of man and 
wife joined in wedlock.  The latter is indissoluble during the life of the 
parties, and its violation is a high crime; but with slaves it may be 
dissolved at the pleasure of either party, or by a master of one or both, 
depending on the caprice or necessity of the owners.  So the union is 
formed, and no ground can be conceived of, upon which the fact of 
emancipating can, not only drawn of it the unqualified relations, but by a 
sort of magic, convert it into a relation of so different a nature. (qtd in 
Grossberg 131) 
As Pearson indicates, a white marriage is entered into for life and cannot be dissolved, while 
a slave marriage is easily terminated for “pleasure,” “caprice,” or “necessity.”  Despite the 
fact that slaves could not enter into contracts, this description of slave relationships resembles 
nineteenth-century jurists’ warnings about the dangers of a contractual model of marriage.  
For example, a Maryland Court of Appeals decried the immoral nature of such so-called 
marriages: “These loose and irregular contracts, as a general thing, derive no support from 
morals or religion, but are most generally founded in a wanton and licentious cohabitation” 
(Denison v Denison, 35 Md 361).  Rather than critiquing the status-based understanding of 
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marriage, Jacobs, like Webb, asserted that blacks had the ability—and should have the 
rights—to occupy this construction of marriage.   
Scenes throughout her narrative indicate that Jacobs was aware of legal discourse’s 
depiction of slave marriage.  When referring to the precarious nature of her Aunt Nancy’s 
marriage to a free black man, Jacobs carefully points out that their marriage was “a mere 
form, without any legal value” because Nancy’s “master or mistress could annul it any day 
they pleased” (Jacobs 143).  Dr. Flint also articulates the contractual view of slave 
relationships when he discusses Linda’s marriage prospects with her young lover: “ ‘If you 
must have a husband, you may take up with one of my slaves,” to which Jacobs responds: “ 
‘Don’t you suppose, sir, that a slave can have some preference about marrying?  Do you 
suppose that all men are alike to her?’ ” (Jacobs 39).  The definition of slaves as property, not 
people, was clearly a central legal fiction to the slaveholding states, but Jacobs also 
highlights the legal fiction that structured slave relationships. 9  Just as the law recognized 
that slaves were in fact human beings, but rejected their personhood in legal proceedings, 
judges recognized that slaves formed relationships, but rejected that those relationships could 
be marriages.   The law insisted that slaves could not inhabit the status model of the family; 
instead slaves could only ever understand and act within a temporary, contractual model of 
relationships. 
In the nineteenth century, status relationships were based on the notion of protection.  
As opposed to contractual relationships, status relationships were understood as a group of 
interconnected people in which the stronger members would care for the weaker, while the 
weaker would labor for the stronger.  Jacobs insists, though, that this ideal of a caring and 
protective space did not exist and that her portrayal is more accurate than the legal fictions: “I 
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draw no imaginary pictures of Southern homes” (Jacobs 35).  As Jacobs argues repeatedly in 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, the Southern household represents the degradation of the 
status model.  Jacobs uses the principles of status to critique Southern slaveholding society.  
Her portrayals of domestic life in South depict a fallen ideal in which husband and wife are 
divided from one another and unable to fulfill their familial responsibilities.  Hazel Carby 
notes that Jacobs’s descriptions of Mrs. Flint “utilize the conventions of an antebellum ideal 
of womanhood while exposing them as contradictory….The qualities of delicacy of 
constitution and heightened sensitivity…appear as a corrupt and superficial veneer that 
covers an underlying strength and power in cruelty and brutality” (53-54).  In one of several 
passages, Jacobs portrays the unhappy condition of the Southern husband and wife: “Angry 
words frequently passed between her and her husband…in her angry moods, no terms were 
too vile for her to bestow upon me.  Yet I, whom she detested so bitterly, had far more pity 
for her than he had, whose duty it was to make her life happy” (Jacobs 32).  Here, Jacobs 
emphasizes the absence of sympathy and affection in the Southern home.  Rather than a 
proper practice of status, the way that she depicts relationships in the Southern home status is 
confused and inverted: the husband does not care for his wife, and the slave bestows pity on 
the mistress.   
The legal concept of “status” structured both the family and the plantation in the 
South, so Jacobs’s depiction of failed status in the household also implicated the master-slave 
relationship.  She shows that just as the white husband does not protect his wife from 
disgrace, the slave master does not protect or care for slaves and that, just as the white wife is 
too lazy to work for her family, she does not care for her slaves.  For example, when she is 
first confronted with Dr. Flint’s sexual aggression, she asks her reader: 
 153 
But where could I turn for protection?  No matter whether the slave girl be 
as black as ebony or as fair as her mistress.  In either case, there is no 
shadow of law to protect her from insult, from violence, or even from 
death; all these are inflicted by fiends who bear the shape of men.  The 
mistress, who ought to protect the helpless victim, has no other feelings 
towards here but those of jealousy and rage. (Jacobs 27-28) 
Rather than rejecting the premise that the black woman requires protection, she repeatedly 
insists that neither the law nor the master provide such protection.10  In fact, she argues that it 
is precisely the law and the slave master who endanger black women.    
The absence of protection within the slave system causes Jacobs to turn to other white 
men in order to fend off Flint’s sexual advances.  As Jacobs is all too aware, slavery has 
deprived her of the opportunity for and privilege of a truly protective marriage.  Early in 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, she is romantically involved with a free black carpenter.  
As Jacobs describes the situation, “We became mutually attached, and he proposed to marry 
me.  I loved him with all the ardor of a young girl’s first love.  But when I reflected that I was 
a slave, and that the laws gave no sanction to the marriage of such, my heart sank within me” 
(Jacobs 37).  The injustice of Southern law as well as the continued advances of Dr. Flint 
forced Jacobs to renounce her first love.  As she realizes,  
Even if [her lover] could have obtained permission to marry me while I 
was a slave, the marriage would give him no power to protect me from my 
master….And then, if we had children, I knew they must, “follow the 
condition of the mother.”  What a terrible blight that would be on the heart 
of a free, intelligent father!  For his sake, I felt that I ought not to link his 
fate with my own unhappy destiny. (Jacobs 42) 
Jacobs brilliantly appeals to her readers’ assumptions about what marriage should be in order 
to critique the slaveholding society.  A free black husband would be unable to protect her 
from her master’s advances.  In addition, her children would inherit the condition of slavery 
from her, and her husband would then be unable to protect them as well.  Because of the 
accumulation of legal fictions that would deny her family’s existence, Jacobs gives up her 
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lover for his benefit.  She implies that he would be unable to consider himself a real husband 
because he would be robbed of the ability to protect his wife and family.   
Because the law denies Jacobs a marriage that can provide protection, she chooses to 
become involved with a powerful white man, Mr. Sands.  When Jacobs admits to her readers 
that she entered into an extramarital relationship with Sands, she justifies her decision for 
those who would judge her according to white standards of behavior.  As she famously tells 
her readers: 
With all these thoughts revolving in my mind, and seeing no other way of 
escaping the doom I so much dreaded, I made a headlong plunge.  Pity me, 
and pardon me, O virtuous reader!  You never knew what it is to be a slave; 
to be entirely unprotected by law or custom; to have the laws reduce you to 
the condition of a chattel, entirely subject to the will of another….I know I 
did wrong.  No one can feel it more sensibly than I do.  The painful and 
humiliating memory will haunt me to my dying day.  Still, in looking back, 
calmly, on the events of my life, I feel that the slave woman ought not to be 
judged by the same standard as others. (Jacobs 55-6, my emphasis) 
Here again, Jacobs distinguishes her position from that of white women based on her lack of 
protection.  As Christina Accomando indicates, “According to Jacobs, the ‘virtue’ of slave 
women is different from that of free Northern women not because of nature or essence but 
because of legal status.  White women have the protection of the law, while laws—and the 
men who make them—conspire against slave women” (238).  Without proper protection 
under the law, in other words, Jacobs is forced to create her own, which causes her to violate 
conventional codes of conduct.  Yet, as Jacobs points out, her relationship with Sands 
represents an exercise of consent—the kind of consent white women practice when they 
make their marriage decisions.  As she writes, “It seems less degrading to give one’s self, 
than to submit to compulsion” (Jacobs 55).  Here, Jacobs exercises self-possession over her 
sexual identity—a powerful and empowering experience considering the predominance of 
rape between master and female slave.  This exercise of agency, therefore, occurs within the 
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context of the need for protection.  Jacobs seeks protection in her narrative, and because she 
cannot attain it in the way that white women can, she is left “struggling alone in the powerful 
grasp of the demon Slavery” (Jacobs 54).  Jacobs asks her readers to admire her agency while 
simultaneously condemning the slave system that forced her to resort to such tactics.   
Throughout Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs continues these appeals to 
her imagined audience, Northern white women, and she persistently focuses these rhetorical 
moments around the concept of protection.  In what is perhaps the most famous appeal, in the 
chapter “A Perilous Passage in the Slave Girl’s Life,” Jacobs asks her readers not to condemn 
her for her sexual actions:  
But O, ye happy women, whose purity has been sheltered from childhood, 
who have been free to choose the objects of your affection, whose homes 
are protected by law, do not judge the poor desolate slave girl too severely!  
If slavery had been abolished, I, also, could have married the man of my 
choice; I could have had a home shielded by the laws; and I should have 
been spared the painful task of confessing what I am now about to relate; 
but all my prospects had been blighted by slavery. (Jacobs 54, my 
emphasis)   
Within this passage, Jacobs twice reminds her readers that their homes are protected by law, 
which, drawing on legal discourse, she understands as emanating from the husband.11  White 
women’s homes are protected under the full privileges and rights given to white men.  While 
white women are shielded through their connection to their husbands, Jacobs must work for 
herself to create a safe space.  Throughout the narrative, she remains acutely aware of white 
women’s position—protected and secured from the dangers of commodification and 
American greed.   
Like Webb, then, Jacobs locates protection within the inviolate home space and 
women’s secure place within it.  For her, as for many abolitionists, the difference between 
being a slave and being free rests in the ability to create just such a domestic space.  Jacobs 
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most forcefully articulates this in describing her trip to England when she compares the 
condition of poor laborers there with slaves in the Southern United States—a comparison 
often used by slavery apologists to highlight the purportedly beneficent aspects of the slave 
system.  Jacobs vehemently disagrees with the apologists’ position.  While she acknowledges 
the English workers’ difficult labor, she also notes that their physical work is preferable to 
that of Southern slaves.  However, her most sustained comparison between British laborers 
and American slaves emerges in her discussion of their homes.   
But when I visited them in their little thatched cottages, I felt that the 
condition of even the meanest and most ignorant among them was vastly 
superior to the conditions of the most favored slaves in America….Their 
homes were very humble; but they were protected by law.  No insolent 
patrols could come, in the dead of night, and flog them at their pleasure.  
The father, when he closed his cottage door, felt safe with his family 
around him.  No master or overseer could come and take from him his 
wife, or his daughter….The relations of husband and wife, parent and 
child, were too sacred for the richest noble in the land to violate with 
impunity. (Jacobs 184) 
Jacobs makes clear that the English poor are in a better position than American slaves 
because the English homes are protected by law.  Echoing the rhetoric of abolitionists like 
Garrison and Beecher, she focuses on the father who can be certain that his home and family 
belong to him.  In Jacobs’s view, the English laborer’s home is an inviolate domestic space, 
populated by family members who love and care for each other.  This is protection as it 
should be, as opposed to the supposed “protection” provided by the paternalistic slave 
system.   
After the publication of Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs continues to 
focus on the domestic space—and women’s place within it—as a key distinction between 
free and enslaved peoples.  In her work with the Freedmen’s Bureau in Virginia, she visited 
freed blacks’ homes and noted their condition: 
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When we went round visiting the homes of these people, we found much to 
commend them for.  Many of them showed marks of industry, neatness, 
and natural refinement.  In others, chaos reigned supreme.  There was 
nothing about them to indicate the presence of a wifely wife, or a motherly 
mother.  They bore abundant marks of the half-barbarous, miserable 
condition of slavery, from which the inmates had lately come. (National 
Anti-Slavery Standard) 
Just as Stowe contrasted Rachel Halliday’s orderly abolitionist kitchen with Dinah’s chaotic 
slave kitchen, Jacobs asserts that one can tell a truly free black family by the “presence of a 
wifely wife, or a motherly mother.”  If the problem with Dinah’s kitchen in Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin is that the market is omnipresent and all-powerful, it follows that black women, like 
Jacobs, might want a home space free of the stain of the market.  Women’s removal from the 
marketplace is seen as a key reward of emancipation.  As Amy Dru Stanley claims: 
“Northerners pledged that in exchange for hard work freedpeople would earn the right to 
maintain the traditional dependency relations of the household.  They affirmed that wage 
labor would support wives’ unpaid domestic work—unlike in slave families, but like in 
idealized white families” (Stanley 140).  Jacobs, like other activists, argued for African 
Americans’ right to a status-based model of the family—one in which women could work 
only in their own home space. 
Slavery’s legacy was in many ways a lingering concern about should be sold on the 
market for a price.  As wage labor became more prominent, a corresponding fear of alienated 
labor developed.  A persistent concern became the question of how much labor could one sell 
without selling away oneself.  This conundrum was particularly troubling when related to 
women, whose primary responsibilities were as wives and mothers who cared for the 
domestic space.  The ideal woman’s removal from the marketplace—in other words, the wife 
created by the legal discourse of the period—provided a comforting sense that everything 
was not ultimately for sale.  In Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs is forced to work 
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for a wage, and she takes the issue of alienated labor quite seriously.  Like Webb, she 
presents domestic service as an extreme form of alienated labor, which is dangerously akin to 
slavery.  While Webb focuses on men’s experience in domestic service, Jacobs emphasizes 
its damaging affects on women.  Throughout Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs 
details the slave woman’s pain of working to nurture someone else’s children while hers are 
left to fend for themselves.  In addition, she points out that domestic service has afforded her 
little opportunity to hone her writing skills or record her life story: “Since I have been at the 
North, it has been necessary for me to work diligently for my own support, and the education 
of my children.  This has not left me much leisure to make up for the loss of early 
opportunities to improve myself; and it has compelled me to write these pages at irregular 
intervals, whenever I could snatch an hour from household duties” (Jacobs 1).  Notably—and 
as Jacobs makes clear—these “household duties” are not dedicated to her own home, but 
rather the white home in which she works.  Jacobs’s narrative ends much the way it begins: 
with her persistent attempts to secure a home for her children.  In the concluding chapter, 
Jacobs claims that being a domestic servant is a “vast improvement” over slavery, but she 
confides to her readers: “The dream of my life is not yet realized.  I do not sit with my 
children in a home of my own.  I still long for a hearthstone of my own, however 
humble….But God so orders circumstances as to keep me with my friend Mrs. Bruce.  Love, 
duty, gratitude, also bind me to her side” (Jacobs 201).  Part of what “binds” Linda Brent to 
Mrs. Bruce is that Mrs. Bruce has paid for Jacobs’s freedom.  As Jacobs makes clear, Mrs. 
Bruce’s payment represents a debt that “such a great obligation could not be easily 
cancelled” (199).12  Even in her freedom, then, Jacobs is indebted and bound to a white 
household.  Though she prefers domestic service to slavery (and crucially recognizes the 
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difference between the two conditions), she is disappointed at the elusiveness of the ideal of 
the inviolate home space. 
The significance that Jacobs attaches to the domestic space may well come from her 
grandmother—Aunt Marthy in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (also known as Molly 
Horniblow).  Aunt Marthy struggles to create her own inviolate domestic space, which serves 
as a kind of fortress of familial love against the commodifying evils of slavery.  In particular, 
Jacobs focuses on Aunt Marthy’s power as a home owner.  As Jacobs explains, from 
childhood, she and her brother had admired their grandmother’s house: “We reasoned that it 
was much more the will of God that we should be situated as she was.  We longed for a home 
like hers” (Jacobs 17).  Throughout her narrative, Jacobs strives to create just such a home 
and finds it even more difficult than she might have imagined.   
Molly Horniblow’s house itself eventually became a symbol of the difficulties facing 
African American property ownership.  When Horniblow prepared her will in 1842, her 
granddaughter Harriet had just escaped North, and her son Mark Ramsey was still enslaved.  
Because slaves could not inherit, Horniblow had no family members to whom she could deed 
her house, and so she appealed to the North Carolina state legislature to free her son so that 
he could legally inherit her property.  Her case was denied, and she appointed two prominent 
Edenton businessmen—Josiah Collins III and Dr. William Warren—to act as the legal 
executors and legatees of her estate.  While Collins and Warren both apparently refused any 
proceeds from Horniblow’s estate, their heirs went to court in order to control the estate 
following the economic devastation of the Civil War.  As Yellin reports in her biography of 
Jacobs, “…[I]n February 1867 the heirs were awarded Grandmother’s property, and Warren 
successfully sued to eject Uncle Mark’s widow Ann Ramsey from [Horniblow’s] home” 
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(255).  Although Jacobs repeatedly depicts the importance for freed slaves to own their own 
domestic space, her own family’s property is not secured, even after slavery has ended. 
Like the women writers discussed in the previous chapter, Jacobs depicts an 
alternative, extra-legal mode of inheritance that creates a sense of family affiliation and 
belonging outside of the traditional systems of male property transmission.  Thus, Jacobs 
dismantles the legal fiction that slaves cannot own property by repeatedly presenting the fact 
that they do indeed control property, which they too pass across generations.  The value of 
inherited objects is echoed when Jacobs confesses her sexual sin to proud Aunt Marthy, who 
is initially so shocked and offended that she disowns Linda, and in a symbolic act, she strips 
Linda of her material connections the family: “She tore from my fingers my mother’s 
wedding ring and her silver thimble.  ‘Go away!’ she exclaimed, ‘and never come to my 
house, again’ ” (Jacobs 56-57).  Like antebellum women writers, Jacobs emphasizes the 
passing down of family heirlooms as a way to subvert or deny the period’s legal fictions.   
In addition, Jacobs’s portrayal of this alternative inheritance economy demonstrates 
the multiple ways that whites take property directly from black slaves.  For example, before 
she was freed, Aunt Marthy had been dutifully saving money from her sales of baked goods 
in order to eventually purchase her children’s and grandchildren’s freedom.  As Jacobs 
explains, “She had laid up three hundred dollars, which her mistress one day begged as a 
loan, promising to pay her soon.  The reader probably knows that no promise or writing 
given to a slave is legally binding; for, according to Southern laws, a slave, being property, 
can hold no property” (Jacobs 3).  Here, Jacobs shows how whites manipulated legal fictions.  
Aunt Marthy’s mistress argues for a contractual arrangement in which a certain amount of 
money is borrowed and then repaid.  Yet under the law, Aunt Marthy cannot enter into 
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contracts; she provides the money not because she expects it will be repaid, but because 
under the status arrangement of master and slave, she must.  Aunt Marthy’s loan ultimately 
pays for an expensive silver candelabra that is handed down through the Flint family for 
generations, and Aunt Marthy never receives any of her money: “When her mistress died, her 
son-in-law, Dr. Flint, was appointed executor.  When grandmother applied to him for 
payment, he said the estate was insolvent, and the law prohibited payment.  It did not, 
however, prohibit him from retaining the silver candelabra, which had been purchased with 
that money.  I presume they will be handed down in the family, from generation to 
generation” (Jacobs 11). 
Jacobs, like Webb, provides a thorough examination of the dangerous foundation of 
white property and the corrupt legal fictions that support white America.  Her narrative is a 
realization of agency, but it is also a quest for protection—a search for a stable, inviolate 
home space where she is safe with her children.  Unlike Webb’s fictional account, Jacobs’s 
narrative reveals the difficulty of attaining such an elusive ideal, particularly due to the 
legacy of antebellum legal fictions that had prevented the formation of sustainable black 
families.  Throughout Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, Jacobs reminds the reader of how 
difficult it is to do this by herself.  Even at the close of the narrative, she underscores the 
absence of a husband and reiterates a desire to form a home space without a man’s 
assistance. 
 
Through The Garies and Their Friends, Webb creates an alternative black legal 
fiction in the only realm he can: the literary marketplace.  In so doing, he capably dismantles 
the legal fictions undergirding white identity, and he locates the only true source for stable 
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identity within the black family.  In The Garies and Their Friends, Webb privileges African 
American men’s limited engagement in the market: black male labor can maintain a safe 
distance from speculative activity, and black wealth remains grounded in material goods that 
cannot be lost through speculation.  The stability of black identity is ultimately ensured, 
though, by the black wife.  Her complete removal from market activity enables the creation 
of the inviolate home space, which alone can resist white racial violence.  In contrast to the 
secure black home space, the white domestic space is filled with unrest, which Webb 
attributes to the contractual, rather than affective, ties that tenuously and self-interestedly 
hold the white family together.  In this way, Webb exposes white identity as having no real 
foundation.  It is ephemeral and fluctuating, like the market it has immersed itself in.   
Just as Webb embraces the status ideal as a way to bolster and stabilize male self-
possession, Harriet Jacobs idealizes status because it provides shelter from the vagaries of the 
market economy and allows women to inhabit the maternal role completely—a possibility 
that was foreclosed by Jacobs’s enslavement.  At the close of her narrative, Jacobs connects 
her status as a “free” single woman with the difficulty of securing a homespace for herself.  
She implicitly recognizes that the status construction of marriage would improve the 
likelihood of her inhabiting an inviolate homespace, surrounded by her children and safe 
from wage labor, even if entering into such a relationship would mean that she would not be 
self-possessed.  Jacobs’s narrative, thus, highlights that the condition of women is a more 
complex matter than being completely owned by another or of absolutely owning oneself.   
Webb and Jacobs both privilege the original function of status: to consolidate 
property and ensure its ordered transmission across generations.  As both their narratives 
make clear, black families have been systematically denied this ability to transmit property, 
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and they are also acutely aware of the ways that white society steals or even destroys black 
family property.  In particular, they depict white inheritance as a dangerous force that can 
rob, displace, or re-enslave the members of the black family.  As Mrs. Garie warns Mr. Garie 
at the beginning of Webb’s novel: “ ‘Heirs always spring up from somewhere.’ ”  Implicitly, 
she is referring to white heirs and how the power of their greed can turn a person into a 
commodity.  In their depictions of the potential benefits of status, both Webb and Jacobs also 
envision a black lineage that can lay claim to and share family possessions. 
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1
 As Peter Coviello claims, “The free and enfranchised black citizen…was an entity vastly more conceivable in 
the 1780s than in the 1830s.  Similarly white maleness, though it did indeed offer many privileges, such as 
naturalization and the freedom from enslavement, did not itself guarantee an individual’s civic status….[T]he 
essential principles around which the nation sought to organize its civic life were simply not identical to the 
discriminatory powers of race or gender.  They had to do more directly, instead, with the qualification of 
property” (30).  For details on the individual state constitutions and how they connected voting rights with 
property ownership in the early republic, see Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, pp. 27-29. 
 
2
 Jeffrey Sklansky emphasizes the ascendancy of the labor theory of property: “As labor became the main 
measure of value, it was also deemed the basis of property.  Ownership of one’s labor and its products became 
widely regarded as the most basic human right, the material manifestation of ‘self-command’ (19).  For more on 
the transformation of theories of property in the eighteenth century, see Alan Ryan, Property and Political 
Theory.   
 
3
 This interpretation of Locke’s Second Treatise was asserted by C.B. Macpherson’s influential The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism.  For more on Macpherson’s notion of possessive individualism, see 263-64 
and 269-70.  
 
4
 For more on the importance of white masculinity in forming the concept of the American citizen, see Dana 
Nelson, National Manhood, pp. 26-33. 
 
5
 For example, Antoinette Brown Blackwell commented, “The wife owes service and labor to her husband as 
much and as absolutely as the slave does to his master.  This grates harshly upon the ears of Christendom; but it 
is made palpably and practically true all through our statute books, despite the poetic fancy which views woman 
as elevated in the social estate; but a little lower than angels” (qtd in Siegel, “Home as Work,” 1101). 
 
6
 Karen Sanchez-Eppler’s Touching Liberty provides important insight into the dangers and violations inherent 
in white women’s equating their position with that of black female slaves.   
 
7
 For more information on Webb’s biography, see Eric Gardner, “ ‘A Gentleman of Superior Cultivation and 
Refinement’: Recovering the Biography of Frank J. Webb,” African American Review 35.2 (Summer 2001): 
297-308.  See also Werner Sollors’s introduction to Frank J. Webb: Fiction, Essays, and Poetry.  New York: 
Toby Press, 2005. 
 
8
 See Richard Brodhead, “Sparing the Rod: Discipline and Fiction in Antebellum America” in Cultures of 
Letters. 
 
9
 In North Carolina, the most infamous articulation of this concept emerged in the case State v. Mann (1829), in 
which the court ruled that the slave is “doomed in his own person, and his posterity, to live without knowledge, 
and without the capacity to make anything his own” (State v. Mann, 13 N.C. Reports 263; 1829). 
 
10
 Jacobs’s use of “protection” foreshadows the equal protection clause established by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1868.  It is important to underscore here that equal protection was 
determined not to mean equal access.  In Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
enforced separation of the races did not violate the equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment, 
establishing the viability of supposedly “separate but equal” public accommodations.  This decision underscores 
the vexed and complicated understanding of “protection” within a racist legal system. 
 
11
 For example, even as late as 1870, a wife was understood as receiving “protection” from her husband and his 
home.  As the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled in Magrath v. Magrath, “There is no more important right of 
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the wife, than that which secures to her in the marriage relation the companionship of her husband and the 
protection of his home” (103 Mass 577, 4 Am Rep 579). 
 
12
 Linda’s daughter, Ellen, herself experienced unkind treatment as a domestic servant in the Hobb household.  
While in her own life, Jacobs continued to find employment as a domestic servant, she recognized that her 
daughter Louisa would seek a different way to earn wages.  In an 1852 letter to her friend Amy Post, Jacobs 
dismissed the possibility of Louisa joining Jacobs in working in the home of Cornelia Willis (known as the 
second Mrs. Bruce in Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl): “Louisa would not be happy to live in that way.  She 
wants to seek her own livelihood where thinks she can be most useful” (qtd in Yellin 253).  Rather than serving 
in another’s home, Louisa procured employment in a series of government offices, including the Census Bureau 
and Treasury Department.  Yet as Louisa and other of Jacobs’s female friends experienced, women were greatly 
underpaid compared to their male counterparts.  Women’s economic disadvantage, even in the wage labor 
system, was another reason to value the luxury of being removed from the market.  Jacobs would not have been 
so easily convinced that a contracting, wage-earning female laborer would automatically receive the same 
privileges and opportunities as a contracting man would have. 
166 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
“A CRUSADE AGAINST DUTY”: PROPERTY, SELF-POSSESSION,  
AND THE LAW IN THE NOVELS OF ELIZABETH STODDARD 
 
“I know little of the domestic drama; but I conclude that the most isolated, equable, in-door 
life contains much worth one’s study….” Elizabeth Stoddard, Temple House.   
 
In her first column as a professional writer—in an October 1854 edition of the Daily 
Alta California—Elizabeth Stoddard bemoaned the quality of antebellum women’s writing.  
She disparaged the “pugilism of Fanny Fern, the pathetics of Minnie Myrtle, [and] the 
abandon of Cassie Cauliflower” (qtd in Morgesons 313).  Stoddard would return to the 
subject of women writers repeatedly, often focusing on how these writers celebrated 
women’s duty and self-sacrifice. As she wrote in August 1856:  
Why will writers, especially female writers, make their heroines so 
indifferent to good eating, so careless about taking cold, and so impervious 
to all the creature comforts?  The absence of these treats compose their 
women, with an eternal preachment about self denial….In reading such 
books I am reminded of what I have thought my mission was: a crusade 
against Duty—not the duty that is revealed to every man and woman of us 
by the circumstances of daily life, but that which is cut and fashioned for us 
by minds totally ignorant of our idiosyncrasies and necessities.  (qtd in 
Morgesons 315) 
In Stoddard’s view, women in such novels never desire what they should not. Their self-
denial is depicted as somehow easy, almost accidental; they are “indifferent,” “careless,” and 
“impervious” to comforts.  In this column, we see the beginning of the crusade Stoddard will 
undertake later in her fiction: to attack women’s duty, specifically duty that is constructed 
and enforced by others.  
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In Stoddard’s view, the nineteenth-century construction of women’s duty foreclosed 
their capacity for self-possession.  Stoddard, like many of her contemporaries, valorized self-
possession; yet perhaps no writer claimed more insistently that women were prevented from 
achieving it.  Throughout her body of work, Stoddard persistently rejected the cultural belief 
that women were motivated primarily by emotion, and she insisted instead that every person 
was driven to achieve a sense of self-ownership.  Her “crusade against duty,” therefore, did 
not focus exclusively on women writers; she also openly critiqued legal discourse, which 
effectively naturalized women’s duty during the period.1  In particular, Stoddard vehemently 
denied that women’s sense of duty was somehow instinctual—that maternal affection, for 
example, was an inevitable outcome of childbirth.   
Stoddard explicitly connected women’s lack of self-possession and their subjection to 
duty with their inability to control property.  Like many women’s rights advocates of the 
period, she believed that “a woman should have an entire right to her earnings and her 
property” (Daily Alta California, Feb 3, 1856).2  In her newspaper columns and in her 
personal correspondence, Stoddard argued that owning property and retaining one’s earnings 
were critical to a woman’s sense of self-ownership  In a Daily Alta California column, she 
forcefully commented on the keynote address delivered at a woman’s rights convention that 
she attended in 1856:3 
[The speaker took] for a text an opinion of Judge Reeve, “That a woman 
should have no individual rights, because her husband has the right of 
possession of the person of his wife”—she came down on the audience 
with Thor’s hammer.  She talked with daring tact.  Women, she said, were 
the victims of legalized prostitution.  Forced by the lust of men into false 
and inharmonious relations with themselves, compelled to wear the painful 
honors of maternity…sapped in health and strength, their lives loathingly 
bitter and burdensome.  Therefore she argued the right of self-possession 
on the part of wives. (Daily Alta California, 11 January 1857; my 
emphasis) 
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In this quotation, Stoddard is clearly impressed with the speaker’s connection between 
women’s unhappiness and contemporary marriage law, and she joins in the condemnation of 
one of the most influential domestic law treatises of the antebellum period, Tapping Reeve’s 
The Law of Baron and Femme (1816).4  As Stoddard’s column indicates, married women’s 
ability to control property and retain earnings had become topics of much concern by the 
mid-nineteenth century.  While many agreed that wives should be able to hold property in 
their own names, the consequences of this property-holding—in other words, the extent to 
which wives could and should be self-possessed—generated frequent discussion. 
Given the prominent legal debates about women’s relationship to property, the 
recurrence of inheritance plots in Stoddard’s novels cannot be accidental.  Rather, her 
continual return to the same plot dynamics, particularly women’s relationship to family 
property, registers her concern with the obstacles to women’s self-possession.  In this 
chapter, I will examine Stoddard’s novels to elucidate her analysis of women’s position as 
well as to highlight her attempts to envision a domestic space that does not rely on an 
externally prescribed set of duties and responsibilities.  Because each of Stoddard’s novels 
ends conventionally with marriage and even domestic seclusion for the female character, 
critics have focused on her critique of domesticity and have largely ignored her attempts to 
imagine alternative domestic arrangements.  I argue, however, that we should take more 
seriously Stoddard’s attempt to reconcile family life with self-possession.  Rather than 
advocating specific legal reform as the solution, Stoddard removes from the domestic space 
the social elements—such as property accumulation and inheritance—that bring the law into 
private life.  Therefore, she envisions marriage as an asocial alliance that can accept 
individuals’ drive for self-possession.  In her three novels, Stoddard wrestles with and 
 169 
eventually challenges the Lockean connection between property and self-possession.  In her 
last novel, she revises Locke, separating self-possession from material goods, and 
demonstrates that the connection between property ownership and self-possession actually 
encourages self-denial and division.   
 
 
“An Absolute Self-Possession”: Property and Personhood in The Morgesons 
Stoddard’s first novel, The Morgesons, exposes how the pressures of inheritance—
property in men’s sphere and duty in women’s sphere—divide families and thwart affection.  
In other words, external expectations distort family members’ sense of selfhood and purpose.  
Over the course of the novel, Stoddard seeks a way for people to achieve self-possession 
through property ownership without succumbing to constraining social expectations.   
The effect of much of the novel is to expose the dangers inherent within the family’s 
dependence on women’s labor and sense of duty.  Through Mary Morgeson, the maternal 
figure in the novel, Stoddard reveals that status relationships are gratifying for women only 
in the ideal realms of legal decisions and domestic advice literature, which repeatedly 
envisioned women as fulfilled by such arrangements.  As legal historian Norma Basch 
emphasizes, the fiction of marital unity “meshed neatly with the antebellum stereotype of the 
self-sacrificing helpmeet as well as her alternate, the lady who stood as a glittering ornament 
to her husband’s success.  In either case the wife’s place in the economy was mediated by the 
husband” (Eyes of the Law 69).  Mary Morgeson strives to embody this stereotype; indeed, 
she does contribute to the family’s wealth, particularly through her labor to entertain visitors 
who are often her husband’s business associates.  Cassandra Morgeson, Mary’s daughter and 
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the first-person narrator of the novel, describes the prosperous Morgeson home as literally 
filled with visitors.  She tells the reader that all she can recall from her childhood is the 
repetitive and dull activities focused on these guests: “arrivals and departures, an eternal 
smell of cookery, a perpetual changing of beds, and the small talk of vacant minds” 
(Morgesons 23).  Whereas earlier domestic novels depicted women’s labor as edifying for 
the family, Mary’s labor is directed outward toward visitors, who in turn leave the family 
“but small opportunity to cultivate family affinities” (Morgesons 22).   
Stoddard portrays household labor as alienating and unfulfilling in order to 
underscore that idealized conceptions of duty deceive women.  Although Mary tries to be a 
good household administrator, Cassandra reveals that: 
…there was little systematic housekeeping.  Mother had severe turns of 
planning, and making rules, falling upon us in whirlwinds of reform, 
shortly allowing the band of habit to snap back, and we resumed our 
former condition.  She had no assistance from father in her ideas of change.  
It was enough for him to know that he had built a good house to shelter us. 
(Morgesons 23)  
Despite the culture’s persistent claim that women’s labor could engender reform, Mary finds 
that her efforts produce little change in the family’s habits.5  Additionally, as the above 
quotation indicates, the father, Locke, is unmoved by and indifferent to his wife’s efforts.  He 
is rarely present at family lunches, and Cassandra makes it clear that his absence alleviates 
her mother’s sense of obligation: “As [father] was away…we were the least disturbed then, 
and it was a lawless, irregular, and unceremonious affair” (Morgesons 24).  Here, Stoddard 
presents lunch as a rare moment during which the restraining rules of propriety and 
convention temporarily lift.  Away from prying eyes, it seems, Mary can relax her sense of 
duty in order to allow her children to exist more naturally, without laws and ceremonies.  
Such behavior indicates that Mary’s sense of duty is not natural or born of her affections, but 
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rather is created by obligations primarily enforced by “outsiders,” including her husband.  
Mary Morgeson does not have a “high” or “holy” calling to the work, as the judge in Cropsey 
v. Sweeney would have it; instead, external pressures and expectations dictate her labor.   
 In addition to her commitment to household labor, Mary Morgeson hopes to live up 
to a domestic ideal by serving as a model of chastity for her daughters, Cassandra and 
Veronica.  Throughout the novel, Mary is pious and submissive, and she resists discussions 
of women’s sensuality or desire. 6  As Cassandra matures, her impending sexual awakening 
concerns Mary, who warns her somewhat obliquely: “ ‘I foresee the day when the pitcher 
will come back from the well broken’ ” (Morgesons 63).  When Cassandra then asks for her 
mother’s advice about how to handle her desires, Mary retreats to convention and replies, “ 
‘Read the Bible and sew more’ ” (Morgesons 64).  In order to model proper behavior for her 
daughters, Mary hides the sensuality about which they are so curious.  For example, when 
Cassandra learns that Mary had been in love with another man before Locke Morgeson, her 
mother’s desire fascinates her, but Cassandra realizes that she cannot ask Mary about the 
story.  As Cassandra explains, “…she wished me to believe that she could have no infirmity 
in common with me…that she must repress all the doubts and longings of her heart for 
example’s sake” (Morgesons 64).  Mary’s unwillingness to discuss sexuality openly means 
that Cassandra has no guide to help her navigate her desires, and she enters an intense 
relationship with her older married cousin, which is cut short only by his death.  When 
Cassandra returns from her prolonged visit with him, Mary senses that Cassandra has 
experienced significant change, but when she invites Cassandra to confide in her, Cassandra 
matter-of-factly refuses because Mary is too “pure” and “single-hearted” to bear it 
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(Morgesons 133).  Through Mary’s repression, Stoddard underscores that women’s sense of 
duty alienates them from their own desires and from one another.   
Although Mary attempts to embody the ideal mother through her devotion to 
domestic tasks, piety, and purity, she never experiences the maternal bonding that domestic 
literature repeatedly depicted as the rewards of such self-sacrifice.  Instead, her daughters 
find her inscrutable and aloof.  Veronica even admits after her mother’s death “ ‘I did not 
love her’ ” (Morgesons 13).  Yet Mary never appears to interpret the family’s emotional 
distance as evidence of the baselessness of the domestic ideal; instead, she believes that she 
is simply too faulty to enact such an ideal effectively.  As she remorsefully tells Cassandra: “ 
‘I have no influence with you, nor with Veronica.’ ” (Morgesons 63).  As Stoddard makes 
clear, Mary and Cassandra are alike enough to feel sympathy for each other; however, Mary 
cannot stop performing as she thinks a mother should.  Her failure of “influence” is a result 
of the inherent flaws in the domestic system—a system created, idealized, and enforced by 
external discourses like the law.  Cassandra is able to recognize and even articulate the 
limited efficacy of rigid familial roles: “ ‘If you hadn’t been my mother,’ ” she tells her 
mother at one moment, “ ‘I dare say we might have helped each other, my friendship and 
sympathy have sustained you’ ” (Morgesons 133).  Mary’s adherence to duty and her 
aversion to women’s sexuality erect an insurmountable barrier between them.  Stoddard’s 
portrayal of Mary demonstrates that when one takes on the role of a “mother,” one takes on 
the responsibility of trying to transmit duty, which thwarts—rather than nurtures—the bonds 
of affection. 
While women in the novel pass notions of feminine duty from one generation to the 
next, men transmit property.  Stoddard repeatedly identifies property as a source of 
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considerable family strife, and, as we have seen, legal discourse delineates domestic duties 
and obligations in order to regulate and stabilize the distribution of family wealth.  
Throughout The Morgesons, male property inheritance is an underlying obsession of every 
family, even extending out to the broader community.  For example, the day after Arthur 
Morgeson is born, a family friend remarks, “ ‘Locke Morgeson ought to have a son…to leave 
his money to,’ ” to which their servant replies, “ ‘…girls…may go to the poor house, as long 
as the sons have plenty’ ” (Morgesons 25).  This attitude dominates the novel.  In another 
example, Locke Morgeson and his father are estranged because Locke’s grandfather passed 
his inheritance (and his name) on to his grandson, rather than to his own son.7  Thus, blocked 
from his inheritance, Locke’s father is often portrayed as frustrated and almost impotent.  
The danger of men’s dependence on inherited property, however, is most evident in Ben and 
Desmond Somers, the two brothers whom Veronica and Cassandra marry.  A peculiar twist 
in their parents’ will withholds the inheritance from all of the sons until the youngest boy 
turns eighteen.8  This stipulation disrupts family affection to such an extent that Desmond 
Somers even wishes his youngest brother were dead.  Stoddard’s portrayal of these damaged 
and alienated families shows the devastating possibilities within the status relationship; 
elusive affection, family members clamoring for property, and the instability of wealth lurk 
throughout the novel. 
In spite of external pressures and internal divisions, the Morgeson family is able to 
stay connected, albeit tentatively, because of Mary’s household labor.  Although Cassandra 
resents her mother’s notion of duty, Mary’s sudden death forces Cassandra to realize that her 
mother’s labor was essential to the family.  After the funeral, Cassandra describes the state of 
the family:   
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The un-thought-of result of mother’s death—disorganization, began to 
show itself.  The individuality which had kept the weakness and faults of 
our family life in abeyance must have been powerful.  I attempted to 
analyze this influence, so strong, yet so invisibly produced. (Morgesons 
216) 
Mary’s labor had provided the house with order, even though the family, including 
Cassandra, never recognized its power.  Because families need women’s labor, Cassandra 
decides that she must follow her mother’s domestic example of duty and self-sacrifice.  As 
she tells Veronica, “ ‘An idea of responsibility has come to me—what plain people call Duty’ 
” (Morgesons 219).  The characters explicitly discuss Cassandra’s decision as a loss of her 
self-possession.  When Cassandra assures her aunt that she will take over her mother’s role, 
her aunt wonders, “ ‘Oh, Cassandra, can you give up yourself?’ ” Cassandra responds, “ ‘I 
must, I suppose….I never…mean to have anything to myself—entirely, you know’ ” 
(Morgesons 219).  In this exchange, Stoddard clearly presents feminine duty as a 
dispossession of the self.  For a woman to be dutiful, she must give up herself and renounce 
sole proprietorship, in the service of the family.  Cassandra’s decision also removes her from 
sexual circulation, enclosing her in her father’s house to work and to help prepare for 
Veronica’s wedding.  Cassandra’s willingness to take on this duty demonstrates Stoddard’s 
belief that the myths surrounding women’s self-sacrifice and duty are powerful, even though 
this self-sacrifice is painful and its rewards are uncertain.  Cassandra claims, “It was taken 
for granted that my own spirit should not rule me.  And with what reward?  Any, but that of 
sympathy” (Morgesons 219).  Here again, Stoddard emphasizes the failure of domestic 
ideals; “sympathy” is exactly the kind of compensation women were supposed to receive for 
their labor.  Yet Cassandra, like her mother, finds the domestic ideal elusive.   
Locke Morgeson’s economic failure intensifies Cassandra’s duty compulsion, and, 
more generally, it underscores women’s economic vulnerability to masculine business 
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practices during the mid-nineteenth century.  As legislators who advanced women’s property 
rights recognized, women’s comfort and security depended on their male relatives’ economic 
well being.9  Cassandra reacts to her father’s economic failure by negotiating the male 
systems of inheritance, which in turn re-ignites her desire for self-determination.  She 
convinces Locke not to sell the family’s house but instead to let his son-in-law (Veronica’s 
husband, Ben) buy it.  Although she in part wants to provide for her sister Veronica, 
Cassandra’s actions also show her growing desire for independence and agency.  She finds 
that she can no longer “repress her desire and longings” as her mother did, and she believes 
that Ben should be responsible for caring for Veronica.  After their wedding ceremony, 
Cassandra thus rages: “No change, no growth or development!  The fulfillment of duty avails 
me nothing; and self-discipline has passed the necessary point….I would now give my life a 
new direction….[H]ad I not endured a mute case long enough?” (Morgesons 243).  
Cassandra’s words echo Stoddard’s Daily Alta California columns in which she condemns 
both duty and those female characters who exhibited “an eternal preachment about self-
denial.”  Cassandra’s outburst serves to distinguish her from earlier heroines in the 
sentimental tradition, like Gertie Flynt in Maria Cummins’s The Lamplighter (1854) or Ellen 
Montgomery in Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World (1850) who, over the course of their 
narratives, learn to silence their desires in favor of the greater good.  Cassandra instead learns 
to reject self-sacrifice and duty as unfulfilling and pointlessly restraining, thereby reversing 
the trajectory of the typical sentimental novel.  
The clearest example of Stoddard’s reversal of the sentimental plot occurs after Locke 
remarries, and Cassandra once again negotiates the male systems of inheritance and property 
distribution.  At that time, she convinces her father to buy back the family home from her 
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brother-in-law, Ben, and she simultaneously advises Ben to build his own home with his 
newly inherited fortune.  She then demands that her father give the family home to her to live 
in alone.  In these exchanges, Cassandra manipulates and even inverts the normal domestic 
arrangement by sending her father to live in his wife’s home.  This inversion allows 
Cassandra to remain in her family’s house as its sole proprietor, which Cassandra realizes on 
her first day alone in the house:   
I was at last left alone in my own house, and I regained an absolute self-
possession, and a sense of occupation I had long been a stranger to.  My 
ownership oppressed me, almost, there was so much liberty to realize. 
(Morgesons 248)   
Even after she marries Desmond, Cassandra does not leave the family home, as most 
domestic heroines do, but instead her husband leaves his home in order to live with her.  
Clearly, Cassandra’s position at the close of the novel is unusual; Stoddard does not seem to 
be envisioning a practical or realistic solution for women’s dilemma.  However, this should 
not discount Stoddard’s attempts to imagine a woman who embodies the Lockean connection 
between property and identity.  While Locke claimed in the Second Treatise that a person’s 
labor is “unquestionably” his or her own property, women’s labor in the nineteenth century 
was devoted to the maintenance and preservation of the family, without contract or promise 
of monetary compensation.  Their labor was not owned but alienated into bonds of affection.  
At the end of Stoddard’s novel, her heroine is finally able to labor for a home space that she 
controls.   
The centrality of women property owners in the novel is emphasized in several of the 
minor characters, particularly Alice Morgeson.  Alice is the only female character in 
Stoddard’s novels to engage directly in the business world.  Early in The Morgesons, Alice is 
interested only in fashion, society, and matchmaking.  However, after her husband’s death, 
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she manages his mills and rejects the female conventions she had hitherto embraced.  When 
Alice subsequently encounters Cassandra’s family in Surrey, Cassandra takes note of her 
newly found liberation:  “[I]t was no longer society, dress, housekeeping, which absorbed 
her, but a larger interest in the world….None of her children were with her; had it been three 
years earlier, she would not have left home without them” (Morgesons 153).  Although critic 
Louise Penner believes that Alice is “portrayed as threatening” for abandoning the domestic 
sphere, here Cassandra obviously admires the transformed Alice (141).  Similarly, Alice tells 
Cassandra that she can now understand Cassandra “to the bone and marrow” (Morgesons 
125).  Alice and Cassandra are connected by their desire for self-possession through 
economic agency and their rejection of conventional duty.  Through her strong female 
characters, Stoddard asserts that the liberal connection between property ownership and self-
possession should be applied consistently to both men and women--which is precisely what 
married women’s property reform had been unable to accomplish.   
Cassandra’s relatively quick attainment of self-possession, which occurs within the 
last few pages of the novel, may explain why critics have found the novel’s conclusion so 
frustrating and unfulfilling.10  Despite Stoddard’s powerful articulation of women’s 
repression, she struggles to imagine a sustainable model for women’s self-possession.  While 
Stoddard indicates that women can only realize their selfhood away from societal constraints, 
she also ties women’s sense of self to their sexual fulfillment.  Like more conventional 
novelists, however, Stoddard can only envision sexual consummation within marriage, so for 
her female characters to be truly self-possessed, they paradoxically must be joined to another.  
Although she strives to portray a marriage that is fulfilling for both men and women, she 
provides scant details on Cassandra’s and Desmond’s marital relations.  For example, given 
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such intense focus on family property throughout the novel, it is striking that Stoddard does 
not explain who actually owns the Morgeson house after Cassandra and Desmond marry.  
The conclusion should not be completely dismissed, though, because it demonstrates 
Stoddard’s attempt to find meaningful self-ownership through property ownership.  In The 
Morgesons, Stoddard places an unusual amount of emphasis on the connection between 
women’s ability to control property—formerly a completely masculine capability—and their 
self-possession.   
Although Cassandra’s story might seem to end conventionally because of her 
marriage and domestic setting, it is also important to recall the way the novel’s conclusion 
defies generic conventions.  At the end of the novel, Cassandra and Desmond do not have a 
child, and there is no suggestion that they will.  In their relationship, Stoddard eliminates 
successive generations in order to remove what she sees as the tremendously negative 
pressures of inheritance: property accumulation for men and duty for women.  However, the 
only way she can imagine for safeguarding this self-possession from such damaging external 
influences is to separate the house entirely from society and its practices, including child 
rearing and economic exchange.11  The Morgeson house, at the conclusion of the novel, is 
enclosed and isolated, even if it can also be construed as liberating.   
 
Destroying the “Sentiment of the Soil”: The Collapse of Property in Two Men 
 The Morgesons demonstrates Stoddard’s belief that the twin forces of duty 
transmission—male property accumulation and feminine labor and repression—divide family 
members against each other and, ultimately, against themselves.  Whereas in The Morgesons, 
Stoddard primarily focuses on how women were affected by an enforced sense of duty, in her 
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second novel, Two Men, Stoddard becomes interested in how status expectations affected 
both men and women.  In the novel, she presents yet another deeply divided domestic space, 
but the family home has moved from repressive and isolating to openly divisive and 
embattled.  The family in Two Men has no pretense of affection, and its members are held 
together, almost against their will, by the dictates of duty.  Throughout the novel, Stoddard 
gives no indication that the family members ever believed in domestic ideals.  Rather, duty is 
explicitly considered a way to control family members and to expand family capital.  In Two 
Men Stoddard attempts to destroy the home space as a destructive repository of empty 
duty—without, at last, being able to envision a new alternative.   
The novel begins when Jason Auster, an earnest carpenter with socialist beliefs, 
enters a New England coastal town and soon marries the wealthy Sarah Parke.  The two have 
a son, Parke, named for Sarah’s powerful family.  Soon after Parke’s birth, Sarah’s prodigal 
cousin, Osmond Luce, returns with his ten-year old daughter (and co-heir of the Parke family 
fortune), Philippa.12  Once Osmond leaves again, Jason becomes the guardian of the Parke 
family wealth for his son, Parke, and his niece Philippa, and he renounces his personal stake 
in the inheritance.  After Philippa’s arrival, the Auster family becomes more intensely 
passionate and more intensely antagonistic, arguably the most fractured family in all of 
Stoddard’s disturbed domestic fiction.  As one of Philippa’s suitors notes, the Auster family 
is in need of a “nucleus…something to knit them together and bring out their good qualities” 
(Two Men 140).  Jason and Sarah are distant, alienated, and resentful toward one another, 
realizing ultimately that they never loved each other.  Sarah is jealous of and acts vindictively 
toward Philippa, whom she considers merely a threat to her son’s share in the family fortune.  
Philippa in turn develops close relationships with Jason and Parke.  Philippa’s attachment to 
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Parke becomes romantically inclined, though unreciprocated, while Jason silently falls in 
love with Philippa.  Meanwhile, Parke, gregarious and independent, becomes attracted to 
Charlotte Lang, the beautiful daughter of a former slave.  Parke seduces Charlotte, they carry 
on an illicit relationship, and she becomes pregnant.  Parke’s “sin” results in Charlotte’s 
death, his child’s death, and Sarah’s death.  Soon after, Osmond Luce returns, and Parke 
leaves with him for South America.  Philippa finally returns Jason’s affection, and the novel 
ends with the presumption of their marriage.13   
In Two Men, Stoddard exposes the dangerous consequences of women’s separation 
from property, particularly through her portrayal of Sarah Parke Auster.  Sarah begins the 
novel as a haughty heiress, deeply attached to her patriarchal grandfather and the family 
property.  Shortly after Jason and Sarah’s marriage, her grandfather, the Squire, dies, as if her 
marriage destroys her association with the Parke legacy.  On his deathbed, Sarah realizes 
“that there were no more Parkes, and she felt a pang because she was a woman, and had been 
obliged to change her name” (Two Men 20).  Stoddard explicitly reveals the pain that Sarah 
feels when she realizes that, as a woman, her connection to the Parke family will be written 
over.14  As a sort of recompense for this, she names her son Parke, and throughout the novel 
she displaces her ambitions onto him.  She also becomes fiercely protective of his share in 
the family’s wealth.  When Philippa arrives at the Auster house, Sarah’s first thought is that 
her family is suddenly “half as rich”; Philippa is a competitor to the fortune, not a family 
member.15  While Sarah is not a sympathetic character, Stoddard’s portrayal makes it clear 
that Sarah’s difficulties lie in her attachment to a family legacy that she must relinquish in 
marriage. 
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Whereas Mary Morgeson was introverted and almost made mute in her status 
position, Sarah is vocal and ferocious about her desire to control her family.  Unlike Mary, 
who attempted to teach her daughters duty because she believed it was her responsibility to 
serve as a feminine example, Sarah inflicts duty as a punishment onto her niece Philippa, 
whom she openly despises.  The dull regimen that Sarah concocts for Philippa serves as 
Stoddard’s most vivid condemnation of the repetitive and mindless quality of women’s 
household labor.   Each day, Philippa practices “…dish towel hemming, patchwork, fine 
stitching, knitting, muslin work, counting spoons and linen, setting the table and clearing it, 
keeping chairs at the right angles, airing rooms, closets, clothes, and furniture, and taking 
care of her own room….”(Two Men 44).  As in The Morgesons, women’s labor is not 
edifying, inspirational, or transforming.  However, the Morgeson family had believed in the 
ideals of women’s duty.  Mary Morgeson and her sister try to instill in the younger girls that 
women’s duty is important; alternatively Sarah simply wants to punish Philippa.  And 
indeed, Philippa finds her work “intensely disagreeable” and her existence “as rigid as that of 
the penitentiary” (Two Men 44). Sarah also believes that her “daughter” must experience the 
same upbringing—and the same restraints—that she had.  Everything that she lacked, Sarah 
asserts, Philippa will also lack. As the servant, Elsa, points out, however, Philippa’s 
inheritance should exempt her from needing the same domestic skills that Sarah learned: “ 
‘…you must call to mind that she has got an independent fortune; you hadn’t, you know’ ”  
(Two Men 44).  In other words, Philippa’s property should grant her a certain kind of self-
possession; she should not need to learn duty because she will always be wealthy.  Yet Sarah 
insists that “money or no money,” Philippa must be “taught the sense of duty, and the 
practice of it,” that she “should be taught to be useful, not to enjoy herself after any fashion 
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of her own.  What had been right for herself, Sarah said, must be right for Philippa, whether 
it suited or not” (Two Men 44). Here, Sarah’s emphasizes that duty is not intended to elevate 
or benefit a young woman in any way, but instead it robs her of individuality, of “any fashion 
of her own.” Duty, in other words, actively works against women’s sense of self-possession, 
regardless of her financial situation. 
Sarah acutely senses her lack of self-possession because she relinquished the family 
property and family name upon marriage.  Therefore, she creates a situation in which it does 
not matter what one owns buts instead what one controls.  As a result, the Auster family 
home becomes a battlefield, rather than a site of unity or family connection.  This situation is 
most evident during the two contentious renovations that the family home undergoes.  In the 
first project, Jason transforms the house structurally by removing and reshaping the barriers; 
“old ceilings, the old partitions, and the old windows” were eliminated (Two Men 40). When 
he finishes, “nothing reminded the family of [the house’s] previous shape, except the 
wainscoting in the west parlor, and the broad brick hearth in the kitchen” (Two Men 41).  A 
socialist, Jason wants to join spaces, and his renovation can be interpreted as an attempt to 
connect the members of the family.  Yet Sarah refuses to participate in the renovation and 
insists on keeping the Squire’s old furniture, preserving a sense of the family’s past.  The first 
renovation destroys the barriers that divide the family in an effort to create communal spaces, 
so that the family will be rejuvenated rather than ossified in the past.16  In many ways, it 
seems to resemble the kind of redecorating that Holgrave endorses at the conclusion of The 
House of the Seven Gables.   
Almost a decade later, “some caprice” causes Sarah to start her own renovation (Two 
Men 110).  She removes all vestiges of her grandfather’s furniture and relegates the “old 
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regime” to the basement, replacing it with “gay French furniture” (Two Men 117). Stoddard 
presents Sarah’s renovation as merely a garish interior decorating project, rather than the 
structural transformation of Jason’s efforts.  Sarah’s decisions do not take the family’s 
identity into account, but seem a misguided effort to keep up with trends.  Sarah’s changes 
might seem contrary to her desire to preserve and sustain her family’s history.  Yet, it is 
actually an attempt to mark the family house as her own, in spite of Jason’s legal possession.  
The narrator’s claim that “the house was more changed in Sarah’s hands than it had been in 
Jason’s” seems to indicate that Sarah was successful in her intentions (Two Men 120).  As 
Sarah triumphantly proclaims when the project is finished, “ ‘I do not wish to have the house 
renovated for fifty years.  Whoever will disturb it, disturbs me, dead, or alive’ ” (Two Men 
114). Sarah clearly sees her efforts as a way to control the domestic space and wrest it from 
Jason’s influence, regardless of how it disrupts her family’s legacy. 
Throughout Sarah’s renovation, Philippa resists the changes and refuses to allow 
anyone into her room.  In a blatant act of defiance, Philippa keeps the couch, which had 
belonged to the Squire, in her room and then sews a new cover onto it.  When, after the 
renovation, Sarah finally enters Philippa’s room, she immediately asks Philippa about the 
couch, to which Philippa proudly responds, “ ‘It is mine now, and I am glad my great-
grandfather is dead’ ” (Two Men 119).  Philippa “writes” herself into her lineage through 
property, transforming an inherited piece of property into her own.  Although Philippa and 
Sarah antagonize one another, it is clear in this scene that Philippa has learned from Sarah the 
importance of controlling family property in order to claim one’s place.  For the two women, 
the only way to have their family identity secure is through an intensive control of domestic 
space.  Stoddard’s emphasis on the domestic space as a battlefield for competing wills 
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underscores her persistent claim that women’s duty does not serve an ameliorative function, 
but instead poisons the domestic atmosphere.  
Sarah and Philippa’s antagonism thus repeatedly returns to a debate over who has 
property claims to the family property.  One of Philippa’s suitors, Mr. Ritchings, notes 
Philippa’s intense engagement with the Auster property when he remarks to Sarah, “ ‘…if 
ever a girl understood what the ‘sentiment of the soil’ is, it is Philippa’ ” (Two Men 126).  
Sarah responds to Mr. Ritching’s comment in such a way that,  “without actually lying” is 
designed “to give him an impression that it was by no means certain that Philippa would 
inherit much of the ‘soil’ ”  (Two Men 126). In other words, Sarah tries to undermine 
Philippa’s marriage prospects by convincing others that Philippa has no legal right to the 
family property.  This exchange emphasizes the classic plot of the domestic novel: women 
are viewed as vessels for family wealth, and their value on the marriage market is directly 
related to their family’s property value.  Sarah lies to Mr. Ritchings because she hopes to 
destroys Philippa’s chance at happiness but also to prevent Philippa from alienating the 
family property to a new family.  However, Philippa has once again learned deeply 
embedded lessons about the importance of family property from Sarah; Philippa also does 
not want to see her stake in the family property alienated away from the Parke clan.  Instead, 
she hopes to marry her cousin, Parke, in order to keep the family property intact.  As she 
describes it to her friend Theresa Bond, her plan for marriage is “consolidation”: an 
interestingly business-like phrase to describe romantic hopes (Two Men 77).  Philippa’s 
desire to control family property essentially shape her sexual desires.  For most of the novel, 
therefore, she acts with a single purpose: to marry her cousin Parke.  Philippa is the only of 
Stoddard’s women characters to try to enact the role of the domestic heroine who reunites the 
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competing claims to family land, just as Elizabeth Temple does in The Pioneers and Phoebe 
Pyncheon does in The House of the Seven Gables.17.   
Thus, Philippa, often configured as an exotic outsider to the family, perceives family 
property as a way to legitimize her identity as a part of the Parke legacy.18  As she tells Jason, 
“ ‘I don’t know…how much my soul could gather around anything foreign to Crest.  When I 
say Crest, I mean our own surroundings, you know; lately my vision narrows to these walls, 
our acres, each rock and tree, the sea before the house, the sky over it’ ”  (Two Men 195-6).  
In this passage, all of Philippa’s markers are relative to the family’s domestic space; typical 
for women, Philippa’s sense of place has narrowed entirely to family property.  In her 
description of her surroundings, Philippa also conflates the two meanings of domestic: family 
home space and the home country (in contradistinction to “foreign” lands).19  Duty and her 
almost unceasing desire to integrate herself into the Auster family has transformed the home 
space into Philippa’s entire world.   
Stoddard’s portrayal of Philippa underscores the notion that domesticity could serve 
an assimilative function, but Stoddard, interestingly, represents the cost of such assimilation: 
division, repression, and unhappiness.  Despite Philippa’s “sentiment of the soil,” when 
Osmond asks Philippa to leave with him for South America, she feels a strong desire to 
escape and go with him.  Stoddard uses striking language to describe the scene in which 
Philippa must make a critical choice between her communal identity and her internal desires: 
A spark of nature was elicited in both [Philippa and Osmond] at last; their 
faces wore the same eager, passionate, overcoming expression.  For an 
instant she was seized with his nomadic spirit, and set her foot forward as if 
to enter upon his free, salient, purposeless life.  With outstretched hands, he 
urged her in a voice so altered by tenderness and entreaty that she 
wondered at the feeling of resistance which compelled her to struggle with 
the phantoms of Liberty and Pleasure which his words had evoked.  (Two 
Men 213). 
 186 
Here “at last,” Philippa feels a “natural spark” that is her connection to her father’s nomadic 
life, and she feels tempted by the possibility of transgressing the female duties enforced upon 
her.  After this momentary temptation, though, Philippa’s face changes, and the physical 
resemblance between her and Osmond fades.  She refuses to leave the home space and her 
duties there because she believes they protect her from her desires: “ ‘I succumb to tradition 
and custom because I love them.  But if these barriers should be removed, I feel I have within 
that could rise, and overtop excess’ ” (Two Men 231).  
Men, unlike the women in Stoddard’s novels, have the ability—the access to self-
possession—to leave the family home.20  The most obvious example of this is Osmond Luce, 
the prodigal male family member, who seems incapable of staying with the family for even 
as long as a few weeks.  Parke, too, eventually leaves Crest and the family property, 
forsaking his stake in growing the family property.  Throughout the novel, other characters 
indicate that it is Parke’s inheritance that encourages him to enjoy an indolent and spoiled 
life, largely encouraged by his mother.21  As opposed to women’s almost paranoid level of 
awareness of their social investments, Parke is allowed to act only on his desire, as when he 
pursues Charlotte Lang, the daughter of a former slave.  Initially, Sarah is not worried about 
Parke’s kindness to Charlotte because, she believes, the “spirit of society [is] too strong” to 
allow him to commit the sin of miscegenation. (Two Men 147).  Sarah has a woman’s 
understanding of societal pull: that Parke’s sense of social responsibility will constrain his 
desires just like Philippa’s love of custom has constrained her exotic, nomadic nature.  Parke, 
however, continues to seduce Charlotte, regardless of what the town thinks, and it is only her 
pregnancy—his need to think about the duty toward his progeny—that forces Parke to 
consider the repercussions of his actions.  Sarah claims that she forgives Parke, but the 
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incident kills her and destroys Parke’s reputation.  Parke insists on burying her at the Parke 
family burial site, thereby severing ties with her family but also forcing his mother, who’s 
buried next to her, to share property and status with Charlotte.22   
Throughout the novel, Stoddard asserts that men can and should acquire self-
possesesion through property ownershi  Because they control property and, therefore, gain 
self-possession, men alone can recognize how their family identity should not dictate their 
fate.  Parke, therefore, sees the family wealth as constraining, as forcing social obligations 
upon him.  After Charlotte, the baby, and Sarah die, Parke decides to flee Crest with Osmond 
so that he may live completely free from social pressures.  He wants, like his uncle Osmond, 
to leave Crest and realize his self-possession.  Yet Osmond urges Parke to reconsider this 
decision: “ ‘You have something…to keep you here; you are your own master.  I was not 
when I left Crest; not until I put this ancient town far behind me did I know what it was to 
belong to myself.  You have almost too much money to commence my career picturesquely.’ 
” (Two Men 226 - emphasis).  Osmond left Crest when he had no inheritance to claim, and 
by relinquishing his eventual hold on the property, he seems to have completely separated 
himself from the Parke family legacy.   
Stoddard’s second novel is permeated with discussions of the relationship between 
property ownership, self-possession, and civil identity.  Two Men opens with Jason entering 
the town of Crest with “simple confidence that he should find the place where he could earn 
a living by his trade, and put in practice certain theories concerning the rights of men and 
property….” (Two Men 1—my emphasis).  Jason, then, implicitly rejects the increasingly 
powerful market economy that alienates laborer from product.  However, once Jason 
becomes attracted to and then marries Sarah, he struggles to maintain his beliefs.  Her 
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“executive ability as the mistress and manager” causes him to feel “the impotence of his 
crude ideas and his individual isolation” (Two Men 112). The duty-bound dimensions of the 
domestic system ultimately overcome his sense of individuality and his theories of property.  
So, Jason, “suddenly ushered from one sphere to another,” does “what most men would do”: 
he alters his ideals to fit his new circumstances(Two Men 12). He enters the contract 
economy and works diligently to increase the wealth of the estate.  Yet when Philippa 
arrives, Sarah’s disdain for her and sense of her as a competitor reawakens him to the evils of 
private property.  Jason decides that he will do no more to increase the value of the family 
property, vowing that  
…there never should be an issue regarding the Squire’s property, as far as 
he was concerned; if it depreciated naturally, the heirs must bear the loss 
equally….[He] tied up the property beyond his control, that, morally 
speaking, he was able to consider himself as outside the family. (Two Men 
46-7). 
From this point on in the novel, Jason removes himself from the market economy entirely, 
“enter[ing] into no speculations, and ma[king] no contracts” (Two Men 47). Therefore, Jason 
surrenders the typical male duty of growing family property for the next generation.  Jason 
recognizes what so many of Stoddard’s characters do not: the family is not held together by 
the deep affection bonds espoused in the idealized portrayals of status relationships.  Rather, 
the family is held together by duty and the desire to earn more capital.  By exempting himself 
from the contract economy, the sphere in which he would be able to increase family wealth, 
Jason self-consciously removes himself from bonds of the family.  When Parke decides to 
leave for South America, Jason sees the departure as an opportunity to make the situation 
between them clear, and he insists that he will no longer manage the family property for 
Parke.  Jason tells Parke: “ ‘I must be as free of you as you are of me’ ” (Two Men 234).  By 
breaking that relationship, he severs the last ties he has to his son. 
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With his son gone and his wife dead, Jason feels that he can tell Philippa of his love 
for her.  In confessing his feelings, he claims that he was “nothing to himself” while he was 
married to Sarah and that all of his relations “implied little with [him] beyond duty” (Two 
Men 269). The pressures to fill a status role of protector and provider destroyed his chance 
for self-possession.  Philippa believes that he is complaining about a burden that she has 
known too well—duty: “You found no satisfaction in duty!  Who does?  Something that we 
esteem, however, pushes us on towards its aim, as strenuously as if were our most beautiful 
ideal” (Two Men 269).  Philippa, still bound by her devotion to family property and family 
relations, retains hope that duty has its own aim—even when it does not provide satisfaction.  
For Philippa, duty is performed without the hope for the exchange that would come as a part 
of a contract relationshi  Although Philippa seems embedded in relational ways of thinking, 
she finds that she “for the life of her she could not name the character of the relation” 
between her and Jason (Two Men 274). Just as she is perplexed by her relationship with 
Jason, she simultaneously acknowledges the baselessness of her feelings for Parke.  Once he 
is “away from Crest, he could not be to her what she had believed he would be”; he could no 
longer give her the access to family property that he would make her identity as a Parke 
completely legitimized (Two Men 254).  With the possibility for “consolidation” finally 
foreclosed, with the twin systems of duty and property accumulation ended, her connection 
to Parke has faded as well. 
The Auster family, thus, “disintegrates” toward the close of the novel.  Philippa 
begins to extricate herself from her previously held notions about duty and the importance of 
family property.  The complete destruction of these beliefs, however, comes when Jason 
decides to leave Crest.  At this point, Philippa comes to understand that Jason is poor—that 
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he has given all to which he was entitled to her and Parke.  In response to Philippa’s 
comment, Jason rages:  “ ‘A poor man!  Have I been a rich one ever?  Ungenerous girl, think 
a moment of the nonentity, me—who, for twenty years, have managed the Parke property—
which, like a beast, has walked and waved its horns before all the family, including 
yourself—and held you in thrall’ ” (Two Men 294). Jason’s outburst vividly portrays the 
family’s perpetual delusion in property.  By the end of the novel, he has rejected their way of 
life completely.  He has surrendered his role as the executor of the trust, and he slowly 
transitions to hunting and carpentry instead.  He comes, in the end, to live an idyllic, 
anachronistic life in which he engages directly with the product of his labor, rather than 
subsuming his identity into the ephemeral wealth of the economies of credit and contract.  
Ultimately, however, he cannot relinquish the one true affectionate bond that remains in his 
life—his attachment to Philippa. 
Typical of Stoddard’s novels, her characters do not pronounce intentions to marry or 
make formal engagements.  Rather, Jason and Philippa undergo a gradual transformation, 
which culminates in a conversation in which each simply calls the other husband and wife.  
Again, Stoddard is clear that their marriage will be removed from the social elements and 
prescriptions of the status-based view of marriage.  Even more so than the characters at the 
conclusion of The Morgesons, Jason and Philippa will be left alone in the house, with no 
children, and they seem to have no intention of growing Philippa’s inherited wealth.  Their 
isolation within the house is made clear when their neighbor Mrs. Rogers suggests another 
renovation because, as she claims, “ ‘the beams are rotting’ ” (Two Men 262). Her assertion 
that fundamental aspects of the house—arguably, its age and deep connections to the past—
endanger Philippa and Jason are quickly dismissed.  Both Jason and Philippa deny renewal 
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through renovation; they ultimately reject Holgrave’s solution for long-term domestic 
happiness, espoused at the end of the House of the Seven Gables.  Instead, Philippa matter-
of-factly concedes to Mrs. Rogers, “ ‘[The house] may fall on us someday,’ ” to which Jason 
retorts, “ ‘I hope nobody will take the trouble to unroof us if it happens’ ”  (Two Men 269).  
As in The Morgesons, the married couple who survives the family—and Stoddard does 
present it as mere survival—encloses itself inside the house with no intention or mention of 
starting a family of their own.  In the conclusion of Two Men Stoddard implies that the 
purging of familial and generational bonds are required for the couple to continue.  Yet this 
new couple—of which neither party is a “true” Parke—is left in an isolated, rotting house 
with no sense for possible renewal.  It is as if at the end of Two Men, Stoddard is prepared to 
acknowledge the dangerous trap of property, but she still seems unsure about romantic love’s 
ability to combat powerful theories of property and self-possession.  It is in her last novel, 
Temple House, in which she will move closer toward developing her own theory of self-
possession outside of property ownership. 
 
 
The Ties that Bind: Looking Beyond the Family in Temple House 
Stoddard continues to explore family alienation as a result of property accumulation 
and duty in Two Men and Temple House.23  In Temple House, her final novel, she 
vehemently rejects the belief that the family is a naturally affective collection of individuals 
that, as such, is responsible for establishing social bonds and for rearing good citizens.  Such 
claims were popular among legal theorists who asserted that the marriage contract, unlike a 
business contract, had important social obligations.  They considered marriage—and, by 
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extension, the family—a microcosm of republican government.24  In Temple House, as in 
The Morgesons, Stoddard continues to demonstrate how the pressure of family duty actually 
restrains and impedes affection.  In Temple House, however, Stoddard makes a more 
sophisticated case that marriage is an extremely private and even asocial alliance between 
individuals, and she begins to envision a new kind of community that can reject property 
accumulation and duty altogether. 
Temple House is a family estate in Kent, a small New England whaling town.  Argus 
Gates, a sea captain, has inherited the house from a distant relative and, soon after he moves 
in, his wife dies.  Argus’s brother, George, is an irresponsible libertine, and after meeting 
George’s wife, Roxalana, Argus invites George and Roxalana to live with him in Temple 
House, anticipating that George will eventually abandon Roxalana.  George and Roxalana 
soon have a daughter, whom they name Temple (“Tempe”), in honor of the family who 
passed down the estate to Argus.  Eventually, George does leave the family.  At that point, 
Argus retires from the sea, and he and Roxalana continue to live together, although not 
romantically.  The novel’s action begins with the three Gateses—Argus, Roxalana, and 
Tempe—living a quiet life at Temple House, interacting almost exclusively with Mat 
Sutcliffe, Argus’s first mate, and Virginia Brande, their wealthy and beautiful young 
neighbor.   
The inhabitants of Temple House are contrasted with the Brande family, one of the 
most prosperous in Kent.  Cyrus Brande is a prominent, pious businessman, who runs a 
forge, Stoddard’s symbol of the “emergent northern-industrial order and…an emblem of the 
future” (Weinauer 242).25  In the Brande home, communal living consists of empty ritual, 
enforced by duty rather than affection, and identity is subsumed into property.  The family 
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members are divided and unhappy, and they constantly fight each other and their own 
desires.  Although the Brande house appears luxurious and peaceful to outsiders, Stoddard 
reveals it to be a nightmarish, oppressive space, centered on prescribed roles and enforced 
obligations.  Rhoda Brande, the family’s matriarch, serves as Stoddard’s most trenchant 
critique of women’s duty in any of her novels.  Stoddard describes Rhoda as: 
…indolent, whining, uneasy, and endeavored by drugs and stimulants to 
deaden herself against the torments of her position.  Cyrus was patient with 
her, but excused her from none of the religious and secular duties which he 
had imposed upon himself, as a portion of the life he thought necessary to 
lead. (Temple House 34) 
As the novel continues, Rhoda becomes increasingly violent, ripping out Virginia’s hair and 
stabbing her husband in the cheek with scissors.  All of her outbursts pervert any positive 
associations with domestic tools: “fixing” hair by ripping it out, for example, or using 
scissors as a weapon.  Her actions embody the horrific consequences of forcing women to 
live exclusively in accord with their domestic duties.   
 Through her portrayal of Rhoda Brande, Stoddard draws attention to the fictitiousness 
of such legal concepts as marital unity; although status roles provide clear responsibilities 
and expectations, they are enforced upon individuals who do not and sometimes cannot live 
up to them.  “It was one of Mr. Brande’s requirements,” Stoddard relates, “that his wife, in 
whatever condition of nervousness, lethargy, or feebleness, should appear at breakfast” 
(100).  Brande’s demands and rituals do not, however, make such rituals effectively bind the 
family.  Even Brande must eventually face Rhoda’s inability to fulfill her duty: “He could 
compel her to sit at the table,—but he could not force her to eat, nor prevent the occasional 
fall of a cup or the spilling of coffee by her trembling hand” (Temple House 100-01).  With 
her “puffy eyes and lax mouth, her hoarse sighs, the handsome lace cap awry on her head, the 
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mixed finery of her dress,” Mrs. Brande is a mockery of the pleasant wife (Temple House 
100).  She is the grotesque version of the silent and repressed Mary Morgeson.   
Like the female characters who struggle with their responsibilities, Cyrus Brande also 
believes that he must quell his desires in order to live a socially acceptable life.  As Stoddard 
reveals, he is plagued by “…a hundred dreams [of escaping his family that] swarmed in his 
mind, like stinging bees, laden with honey” (Temple House 104).  Cyrus cannot follow these 
“dreams” because he is afraid of what he might do without the imposing constraints of duty:  
“…away from the restraints of family, society, and the church—something in himself would 
hold him back from the indulgence, the desire for which gnawed into his life like a worm!” 
(Temple House 104).  Simply put, Cyrus cannot imagine a life outside of the dictates of 
externally imposed duty.  He is plagued by desires that he believes are immoral, and despite 
his hopes that societal constraints will contain them, they continually “gnaw” at and “sting” 
him.  With Cyrus, Stoddard portrays a man who, based on classical liberal notions of 
ownership, should have self-possession.  Yet, while Cyrus might own property, he has no 
ownership over his self because he has no control over his desires.   
Although men and women both experience inner turmoil because of duty, Stoddard 
continues to condemn most pointedly women’s inability to control wealth, particularly since 
women’s duty often enables men to acquire more and more property.  In Temple House, 
Virginia Brande, Cyrus’s daughter, is expected to marry the wealthy Mr. Carfield, who will 
consequently save the Brande family from financial ruin.  Cyrus Brande commands Virginia:  
“ ‘I desire you to accept Mr. Carfield.  The voice of nature demands it—the ties of property, 
our business, my welfare” (Temple House 268).  Brande claims that his reasons for the match 
are natural; yet the ties he mentions—property, business, and economic welfare—are clearly 
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social.  Aware of her father’s distortions, Virginia realizes that she has no stake in the family 
property and is instead simply a vessel for male property accumulation:  “To her, Mr. 
Carfield…was merely the representative of money….How she despised the signs of wealth 
about her,—and none of it hers!” (Temple House 197-98).  Although Virginia believes her 
father’s demands are unreasonable, she insists that she must still fulfill her duties to him: “ ‘I 
must still be a dutiful daughter.  I rebel against the service, though; it hurts, and strains, and 
tears…the family tie so binds my feet that I can not advance one step in any path where my 
soul should take its pride and pleasure’ ” (Temple House 150).  Domestic duty, in Stoddard’s 
view, operates the same way that foot-binding does: externally enforced restraints limit one’s 
ability to pursue one’s desires.  Thus, Virginia believes that to act against her father’s 
wishes—and in favor of her own self-possession—would destroy her family.  She cannot see 
that her father’s relentless pursuit of property and respectability has eroded her family; rather, 
she blames her own desires: “To the end would she live with her father; their house should 
not be divided because of her conduct” (Temple House 272).  Duty haunts the women of 
Stoddard’s novels, causing them to believe that only through their self-sacrifice will their 
families survive.   
Stoddard contrasts the lack of self-possession at the Brande house with the 
independent space of Temple House.  The inhabitants of Temple House are neither socially 
admired nor rich; as the narrator comments, the Brande house and Temple house are “as 
different as pound cake was to molasses gingerbread” (Temple House 40).  In fact, Tempe 
Gates often complains about their lack of luxury and determines to marry John Drake, heir of 
the wealthiest family in Kent.  However, he dies on their honeymoon, and the aristocratic 
Drake family rejects Tempe.  Upon returning to Temple House, she sees anew “the 
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wonderful talent of self-ownership which belonged to Argus and Roxalana….[T]hey seemed 
superior to the persons she had lately been intimate with; their outside possessions weighed 
nothing to that instinct of self-possession so well developed!” (Temple House 73).  Unlike 
Cyrus Brande, whose character reveals the dangers of anchoring one’s identity in property, 
Roxalana and Argus provide a model for self-possession that depends entirely on the self, 
rather than material goods. 
In particular, Roxalana and Argus have no desire to expand their ancestral property or 
enter the market.  Neither works outside the home, and Stoddard repeatedly refers to the lack 
of consumption and spending at Temple House.  Argus even puts forth his own theory about 
property ownership, which he discusses with Sebastian, a wealthy man whom Argus saved 
from a shipwreck and then befriended. While boasting that he has “no ties” to property, 
Argus explains: 
“I own nothing.  What is the ownership of a shell,—named when men and 
women built it together, and made themselves its kernel—Temple House?  
The ties of property,—mutual interests,—those relations which slip into 
each other like the scales in a coat of mail, and which compose the armor 
worn to keep us erect before God, and crooked with the devil,—are not for 
me.” (Temple House 183)  
Through the positive models of Argus and Roxalana and the negative example of Cyrus 
Brande, Stoddard shifts the basis of self-ownership that she envisioned in The Morgesons.  In 
Temple House, she asserts that the ties of property are seductive, but dangerously unstable, 
and thus are a precarious basis for identity.   
Rather than the typical domestic space in which wealth multiplies and is then 
transmitted across generations, Temple House is a space in which all forms of wealth are 
annihilated.26  Various characters who long for freedom become attracted to the uninhibited 
space of Temple House, but before coming to live there, these new residents all must 
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surrender their property and especially their money before joining the community.  First, 
Sebastian essentially donates his wealth to Argus.  When Virginia is contemplating her 
escape from her father’s house to Temple House, Roxalana discourages her from bringing 
cash: “ ‘I think I would not like to have you come with money; it might unsettle us terribly.  I 
am sure Argus dislikes the cares of property’ ” (Temple House 224).  The plot of Temple 
House, therefore, works to sever the ties of property and duty that repress people’s desires 
and divide them against themselves.   
 Through the removal of duty and property accumulation from the domestic space, 
Temple House resembles Stoddard’s other novels, which end with similar rejections of such 
obstacles to self-possession.  If Stoddard has a model for female self-possession, it seems to 
arise from her obvious admiration for her strong male characters like Argus Gates who are so 
self-possessed that they are indifferent to the outside world.27  However, in Temple House, 
Stoddard begins to question the potentially negative consequences of such extreme self-
possession.  At the start of the novel, Argus is isolated and asocial; he lives, he claims, only 
for himself.  The novel details a series of rather fantastical events that cause Argus to 
question his condition.  Much of Stoddard’s portrait of Argus revolves around his struggle 
between a desire for individuality and his desire for Virginia Brande, as in the following 
passage: 
He set aside [Virginia’s] beauty, sweetness, and power… and shut his eyes 
upon that selfishness which might calculate her as the companion and 
friend of his lonely age, and pondered over one characteristic,—that which 
made him remarkable—his secretive, impassive individuality,—whether he 
had better live on it, as his substance, or share it with Virginia, to her 
advantage and his happiness. (Temple House 261) 
In order to act on his desire for Virginia Brande, Argus realizes that he must relinquish this 
extreme form of individuality, which he ultimately decides to do.28 
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While Argus must overcome his desire for independence, Virginia, as a woman, must 
struggle against her almost crippling sense of duty.  Virginia worries that her love for Argus 
is too selfish and could lead her into a dangerously asocial partnership: “ ‘To live with him 
would…prove so seductive and binding an alliance, which though conscience might vaguely 
accuse me of falling into the depths of a great temptation, I should never beseech God to 
deliver me from it’ ” (Temple House 222).  For duty-bound Virginia, a completely fulfilling 
love threatens to remove her from the dictates of conscience or of God.  Once again in 
Stoddard’s work, women’s sense of duty prevents them from expressing their natural sexual 
desires; her resistance to a fulfilling romantic relationship is a sign of her lack of self-
possession.  Responding to Virginia’s concerns, Roxalana argues that love must be 
considered separately from social concerns, like conscience, religion, and, presumably, duty: 
“ ‘I do not see what a profound love has to do with principle, or reason.  If love was not a 
separate power, impregnable to conscience, human nature would be a feebly sustained thing.  
[Love] should exist for itself, and by itself’ ” (Temple House 222).  Roxalana’s statement 
encapsulates Stoddard’s persistent, although diffuse, claims that romantic love does not 
support or model the larger society, which is exactly what legal discourse asserted when it 
justified hierarchical, status-based marital relations.   
Stoddard repeatedly makes clear in the novel that love must be understood as 
intensely private; while it connects two people to one another, it does not serve as the bridge 
between those two people and their community.  She continually implies that love cannot and 
should not be held answerable to the demands of society or morality, as legal discourse and 
domestic novels typically asserted.  In multiple discussions, Roxalana condemns parents who 
attempt to arrange their children’s marriages, as Cyrus Brande does.  When Sebastian asks 
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Roxalana to approve of his marriage to Tempe, Roxalana responds, “ ‘Why in the 
world…have you not conversed with Tempe on this subject? It is not the fashion here, for 
parents to marry their children. We marry ourselves in this country, and so the idea of family 
is disintegrated, like all our institutions’ ” (Temple House 314-15).  Stoddard’s proclamation 
of the dissolution of blood relations is not unique in the period.  As Cindy Weinstein has 
astutely noted about other women’s novels: “…novel after novel is engaged in ridding itself 
of the paternalism of consanguinity by replacing it with a family that is based on affection 
and organized according to a paradigm of contract….” (9).  Stoddard, however, refuses to 
reconstruct a new form of nuclear family—contractual or otherwise—out of the remains.  As 
we have seen, she is deeply suspicious of the family structure, believing even that kinship 
signifiers inevitably call status relationships into being.  Thus, the inhabitants of Temple 
House, who seem to live without duty and prescribed roles, refuse to recognize kinship.  
Argus forbids Tempe from calling him “uncle,” even though that is his relationship to her.  
And, when Virginia asks Sebastian if he will act as her brother, he refuses, asserting, “I will 
be no woman’s brother….” (Temple House 300).  Stoddard makes evident that the 
inhabitants of Temple House should not understand their relationships as a reconfiguration of 
the consanguineous family, renewed by the terms of voluntary contract.29  She seems to view 
this as a false construct, another mask that obscures relationships of duty as relationships of 
love.  Thus, at the end of her last novel, Stoddard removes all markers of status, including the 
signifiers of familial relation.   
The proposal of a love “alliance,” as Virginia calls it, indicates Stoddard’s 
disapproval of contemporary conceptions of the marriage contract.  Her intensely private 
view of marriage could explain why Stoddard depicts few courtships and no formal marriage 
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ceremonies in her novels.  Instead, her couples become engaged to be married in private 
conversations; there is no asking for a hand, no agreement to set a date.  The arrangements 
that Stoddard portrays went against prevailing legal opinion, which claimed that, because 
marriage was more than a mere contract, it required a formal ceremony to be legally 
recognized.  In an 1872 Maryland case, for example, the court denied the legality of a 
marriage because the couple had entered into the union privately and without ceremony.  As 
the presiding judge wrote, “To constitute lawful marriage here there must be superadded to 
the civil contract some religious ceremony….These loose and irregular contracts, as a general 
thing, derive no support from morals or religion, but are most generally founded in a wanton 
and licentious cohabitation” (McCurdy 86).30  With Temple House, especially, Stoddard 
places her faith in the “loose and irregular,” while denying the social elements of marriage, 
including religious ceremonies and public witnesses. 
The conclusions of Stoddard’s novels understandably can create a kind of 
disappointment in modern readers.  Because her novels provide such powerful critiques of 
domesticity, her heroines’ sudden marriages can seem like a capitulation to the prevailing 
culture, as if Stoddard could not sustain her criticisms past a certain point or as if she simply 
surrendered to generic conventions.  While Stoddard may not deliver the final blow to 
domesticity for which today’s readers hope, it is important to emphasize how and why 
Stoddard re-imagines the marriage relationship.  Indeed, other novels of the period that 
condemned women’s repression often abandoned marriage altogether, in essence equating 
marriage with status.31  After all, married women’s duties, as well as the codes of 
domesticity, were inextricably tied to the legal construction of marriage in the mid-nineteenth 
century.  Viewing Stoddard’s novels through this historical context reminds us that women’s 
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legal position did not move linearly and inevitably from “status to contract” over the course 
of the nineteenth century.  By providing an alternative model of marriage, which excludes 
children and property transmission, Stoddard attempts to remove the law’s power over 
individual relationships and thereby disassociate marriage from externally imposed 
expectations.  While many writers portrayed married women’s struggles for self-possession, 
the solution for women’s difficulties was not evident, even if it might appear more obvious to 
today’s readers.  Rather than be disappointed in Stoddard’s inability to see her way out of 
such large cultural problems, we should see her solutions as a reflection of the dimensions, 
complexities, and contours of the many debates surrounding women’s role in marriage—
debates that would not be settled for decades after her death.   
 
 
                                                 
1
 As Elizabeth Maddock Dillon claims, the mid-nineteenth century marks a time “when privacy is most clearly 
related to gender and political subjectivity, and at which a binary model of gender is most strongly naturalized.” 
(7). 
 
2
 A longer selection from this column further highlights the complexity of Stoddard’s views about gender 
relations: “In other respects [aside from property rights] women have the best of it.  I maintain that most women 
live with the view of being provided for in some way; they unhesitatingly adopt the idea of their female 
helplessness.”  Though this statement does reveal a certain antipathy toward women reformers, it also 
demonstrates Stoddard’s distaste for the prescribed roles for women within the contemporary construction of 
the marriage contract.  Just as she warns against men insisting on dominance, she is disturbed by wives who 
take on the role of vulnerable helpmate. 
 
3
 Stoddard probably attended the Seventh National Women’s Rights Convention, which was held in New York 
City in November 1856.  Lucy Stone delivered the keynote address. 
 
4
 For more on Reeve, see Basch, In the Eyes of the Law 57-65. 
 
5
 It is appropriate to note here the class biases of Stoddard’s novels.  Like other writers of domestic fiction, 
Stoddard portrays the burdens of women’s labor, often depicting the difficulties of managing lower-class 
servants—a complaint Stoddard also articulated throughout her personal correspondence.  While it is important 
to recognize how Stoddard effectively erases servants’ more grueling labor, I seek to emphasize how Stoddard 
demystifies women’s labor more generally by removing any sense of psychological or emotional benefit from 
its practice.  
 
6
 Through much of the novel, Stoddard insinuates that New England Calvinism has contributed to Mary’s 
repression and unhappiness.  For example, Veronica directly blames Mary’s Puritan father for Mary’s 
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repression: “ ‘I believe…that Grand’ther Warren nearly crushed you….  Did you know that you had any wants 
then? Or dare to dream anything beside what he laid down for you?’ ” (64).  Alice Morgeson also confides to 
Cassandra after meeting Mary, “The Puritans have much to answer for in your mother.” (153).  
 
7
 The unusualness of Locke as a Christian name—particularly since it is a family name, passed down through 
generations—is another signal of Stoddard’s intense concern with questions of property and self-possession 
throughout the novel.   
 
8
 In the Somers family, it is the mother, Bellevue Peckersgill Somers, who brought the money into the Somers 
family, which turns Mr. Somers into a man who is “…faded and bedridden, an inverted parody of the hapless 
female hanger-on….” (52).  With the Somers family, then, Stoddard makes clear the centrality of property for 
men’s sense of power and identity.  Here, Stoddard also presents an inversion of status roles, but it is important 
to note that there remain only two possibilities: the powerful property owner or the weakened hanger on. 
 
9
 This statement is not intended to simplify judges’ positions.  While it is true that many were more conservative 
than state legislators, their view of women’s economic agency was often a result of the kinds of cases over 
which they presided.  Most court cases involving marital property involved a creditor trying to receive payment 
from a husband who astutely took advantage of married women’s property rights to shield his assets.  Faced 
with so many cases dealing with credit fraud, judges encountered married women who were often complicit in 
their husband’s schemes, which might account for their negative view of the reform legislation.  For more, see 
Lawrence M. Friedman 147-149. 
 
10
 For example, Alaimo claims that the conclusion of the novel marks the final stage of Cassandra’s “descent 
into ladyhood.”  In her opinion, by staying in the family’s Surrey home, Cassy’s chooses domestic restraint over 
sexual liberation: “Though Cassandra’s inheritance of the house should empower her, the close identification 
between Cass[andra] and her house suggests she has internalized her external entrapment within the domestic 
realm” (35). 
 
11
 For more on the removal of the market in The Morgesons, see Julia Stern, who notes, “…the Morgeson 
house…has become a reconstructed dwelling, with capitalist patriarchs and their acquisitive wives forever 
expelled” (122). 
 
12
 Stoddard does not explain exactly how Philippa is considered a co-heir of the land.  It is important to note that 
Two Men is set in the past, though Stoddard does not establish exactly when.  It is likely that it would have been 
after the Massachusetts state legislature passed its first significant married women’s property rights in 1845, 
though before it passed one of the first married women’s earnings laws in 1855.  Since both Sarah’s parents and 
Osmond’s parents died young, the Squire’s (Sarah’s and Osmond’s grandfather) wealth would have gone 
directly to Sarah and Osmond.  Unless the Squire willed it directly to Sarah (which it seems from Sarah’s 
resentful response to his death that he did not), her share of the Squire’s property would have come under her 
husband’s control.  Osmond, of course, would have been able to control his portion of the wealth for himself.  
Rather than the adult generation spend the money, it seems that Jason and Osmond agree to aggregate all of the 
Squire’s wealth into a trust for Philippa and for Parke.  Jason then manages the trust.  It should be noted that the 
most common way that married women’s separate estate was protected before the passage of married women 
property rights was with the creation of trusts.  Thus, even if no married property reform acts had been passed, 
Philippa could still have had sole control over her portion of the trust once she reached legal age.  For more 
information on trust formation and the married women’s property acts in Massachusetts, see Chused. 
 
13
 For an in-depth discussion of the plot, see Matlack, "The Literary Career of Elizabeth Barstow Stoddard," 
339-61. 
 
14
 It is unclear whether or not women’s property law had been reformed at the time of the novel’s events.  An 
essential component of my argument, though, is that even if Sarah could hold the property in her name, her 
access to self-possession would be troubled; property did not give women a right to a civic identity.  The 
property would always belong to a “new family,” as would her son.  The naming convention would still have 
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erased Sarah’s connection to her family, and so she attempts to reinscribe that connection through her son’s 
name. 
 
15
 The novel does not make clear how Philippa’s inheritance is established, but both Parke’s and Philippa’s 
share of Sarah’s grandfather’s estate is held in a trust overseen by Jason Auster.   
 
16
 Interestingly, Jason’s destruction of barriers and attempt to join spaces rejects early nineteenth century 
architectural trends.  The architecture reform movement of the period, most famously Andrew Jackson 
Downing and Orson Fowler, advocated a further demarcation of space so that different labors would be 
segregated from public view.  Jason refuses to efface the signs of labor in the domestic space.  For more on 
domestic architecture reform in the early nineteenth century, see Gwendolyn Wright, Building the Dream,78-
93; Clifford Clark, Jr.; and Adam Sweeting, Reading Houses and Building Books. 
 
17
 Philippa’s desire to restore ancestral property complicates the novel’s incestuous overtones and its 
valorization of “transgressive desire” that critics like Radinovsky explore (203).  When considering these issues, 
it may be useful to follow critics who have connected incest and ancestral property in Wuthering Heights, a 
novel that Stoddard greatly admired.  
 
18
 Philippa is described as a Catholic from the South.  As recent scholarship has suggested, Philippa may be of 
mixed race lineage from South America.  See Jennifer Putzi, “The ‘American Sphinx’” 
 
19
 The persistent nineteenth-century conflations of these meanings are investigated at length in Amy Kaplan, 
“Manifest Domesticity.”  
 
20
 The Auster family servant, Elsa, is a notable exception in that she leaves their home space to inhabit a space 
of property that she owns. 
 
21
 From his youth, Parke is treated differently from Philippa: allowed to stay at home and read while Philippa 
must go to church, made exempt from household duties, and encouraged to live leisurely.  When comparing the 
costs of Philippa’s inexpensive education and Parke’s exorbitant one, Sarah defends her choices by claiming 
that “a man’s bills are different,” echoing the attitude in The Morgesons that “girls can go to the poorhouse” as 
long as the brother is kept wealthy (Two Men 49).  Parke does not learn a trade and does not work, which Elsa 
reasons is the cause of his ruin:  “ ‘It all comes from him having nothing to do.  How could he help having 
riches left to him, though?  How could he help taking after one or two of his relations?’” (Two Men 177).   
 
22
 Charlotte’s relationship with inheritance is also interesting.  Although she has blue eyes and silky hair—no 
marks of blackness on her body—her blood remains tainted.  As Parke himself claims, Charlotte is “ignorant, 
confiding, weak, poisoned with ancestral blood…” (Two Men 163).  Charlotte’s white body and black blood 
embody the injustice of racial inheritance—no matter how “white” she may seem, one drop of “black” blood 
condemns her.  Rather than adding to or stabilizing family value, Charlotte would deplete and taint it.   The 
inheritance of poisoned blood is worse than a mere lack of property.   
 
23
 In Two Men, Stoddard focuses even more intently on the psychological damage caused by the relationship 
between women’s duty and family property.  The maternal figure in the novel, Sarah Auster, is obsessed with 
family property, and she enforces the notion of women’s duty more cruelly and resentfully than Mary 
Morgeson.  At the end of the novel, the daughter figure, Philippa, and her husband (and one-time father figure) 
seem even more inextricably bound to and contained within the family home than Cassandra and Desmond at 
the end of The Morgesons.  Despite these similarities, Two Men contains other interesting—and problematic—
plot dynamics, most notably issues of race and miscegenation, which cannot be adequately investigated in the 
confines of this article.  Rather than a cursory treatment of this rich novel, I focus on Stoddard’s first and final 
novels to demonstrate her shifting interests in property, duty, and self-possession over the course of her novel-
writing career. 
 
24
 For more on how the family served as a model for republican society, see Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and 
Pilgrims and Elizabeth Barnes, States of Sympathy 
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25
 Weinauer’s essay interprets Temple House as an American gothic novel that uses the home space to engage 
in contemporary political issues to “express deep skepticism about the promises of industrial development in the 
postwar period.”  I agree that Stoddard’s novels are more politically engaged than have hitherto been explored.  
Yet I believe it is important to highlight how the novel is consistent with Stoddard’s attempts to grapple with 
the theoretical underpinnings of liberalism.  I trace her anxiety to a cynicism about the roles built into 
contemporary constructions of marriage, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) a cynicism specific to the 
nation’s project of Reconstruction. 
 
26
 Temple House is also a space in which future generations are in peril.  Tempe’s son, George, dies from a 
mysterious illness.  Even though he is technically a Drake, he is called Georgie Gates and is treated by many in 
the family as the heir of Temple House.  His death reveals Temple House to be a dangerous environment for 
children, just as the Morgeson home is, when one considers that Cassandra apparently will not have children 
and Veronica’s baby suffers from unspecified mental and physical difficulties.  At the conclusion of all of her 
novels, Stoddard is wary about the presence of future generations and presents a world devoid of the fertility 
present in most domestic novels’ finales. 
 
27
 Stoddard openly admires male independence in much of her personal correspondence.  One can also find such 
characters in Stoddard’s short fiction as well as in the figures of Jason Auster and Osmond Luce in Two Men.  
 
28
 It is worthwhile to note that Stoddard portrays Argus’s transformation from individual to husband by 
depicting an intermediate relationship with Sebastian, a shipwrecked man of Spanish origin who eventually 
joins the community of Temple House and marries Tempe.  There are quite evident elements of homosocial and 
even homoerotic desire in Sebastian and Argus’s relationship, which cannot be explored at length in this essay.  
Stoddard makes clear that it is Argus’s acceptance of Sebastian’s friendship that enables his later union with 
Virginia. 
 
29
 It is worth noting, however, the unusual relationship between the inhabitants of Temple House.  Their 
rejection of kinship signifiers creates a domestic space in which desire seems to extend out in all directions.  For 
example, Sebastian and Virginia, who have an intense romantic attraction to one another, will live in Temple 
House together while married to other people.  In addition, Argus and Sebastian’s friendship has a distinct 
homoerotic quality, which is never resolved.  In many ways, Stoddard’s novels with their unusual domestic 
arrangements would make for interesting comparisons with utopian, free-love communities of the nineteenth 
century.  
 
30The case in question was Denison v. Denison (Md. 1872). 
 
31
 Examples of such women’s rights novels, which have often been critically ignored, include Mary Gove 
Nichols’s Mary Lyndon; or, Revelations of a Life.  An Autobiography and Caroline Chesebro’s Isa, a 
Pilgrimage. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
“THE QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION”: WAGE LABOR, SELF-POSSESSION, 
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DOMESTIC NOVEL 
 
“Let the State be logical; if marriage is a civil contract, it should be subject to the laws of all other 
contracts….We need a national law or no law on this question.”  
-Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “Marriage and Divorce,” The Revolution, October 29, 1868 
 
Over the course of this project, I have tied the rise of the domestic novel to the status 
construction of marriage, which became idealized during the early decades of the nineteenth 
century as a way to provide stability amidst market fluctuation.  Like the period’s legal 
discourse, the domestic novel associated women with the home and uncompensated labor in 
order to secure a portion of the economy from the commercial markets and speculation.  As 
market speculation became a more integral part of the American economy and as women’s 
rights activists focused on changing the legal definition of marriage, the possibilities that the 
domestic novel envisioned were foreclosed.  It is important to note that the culture continued 
to believe in natural gender differences and that the husband and wife could not negotiate the 
marriage contract on their own terms.  However, it is undeniable that after the Civil War the 
definition of marriage expanded.  This change occurred gradually from state to state, from 
region to region, but domestic law increasingly recognized married women’s right to contract 
their own labor and to retain their earnings.  Once women had the ability to contract, it 
became less feasible to imagine them secure in a home that is safe from the market.   
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In this conclusion, I will trace the decline of the domestic novel by providing an 
overview of the legal changes of the postbellum period.  I will then turn to Lillie Devereux 
Blake’s Fettered for Life (1874), which provides a positive portrayal of women’s interaction 
with the commercial economy, as well as champions a contractual model of marriage.  
Through its depiction of married women’s rights and capabilities, it represents a significant 
departure from the domestic novels on which this project has focused. 
In 1855, radical women’s rights activist Francis Gage openly condemned the status 
construction of marriage because of its denial of women’s self-possession: “We must own 
ourselves under the law first….Let us get out of our prison-house of law.  Let us own 
ourselves, our earnings, our genius; let us have the power to control as well as to earn and to 
own” (qtd in Stanley 203).  Despite Gage’s powerful assertion that the right to contract 
would produce self-possession, many antebellum women rights activists disapproved of the 
push to restructure the marriage relationship.1  In the early nineteenth century, to be married 
meant being involved in a status relationship; therefore, imagining an alternative to status 
meant imagining a relationship that could not be marriage.  Many activists believed that the 
law should provide wives with better protection, but this did not entail equal civil rights, a 
concept which was often associated with an attempt to deny natural sexual differences.  For 
many women’s rights activists, discussing marriage as a contract threatened the sanctity of 
the family, particularly because such a discussion usually insinuated that divorce should be 
more broadly accessible.  According to historian Elizabeth B. Clark, these activists often 
believed that the contract theory of marriage “neither worked realistically to redress 
inequality, nor acknowledged the durability and permanence of parental or marital ties” (41).  
Instead, the majority of antebellum women’s rights activists “invoked duties rather than 
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rights” when discussing marriage.  They were willing to acknowledge the violation of the 
status ideal when a man did not fulfill his obligations, but this was not the same as asserting 
women’s right to contract. 2  Frustrated at the response of the larger movement, Elizabeth 
Cady Stanton continued to believe that transforming marriage into a legal contract was 
essential to true reform.  She wrote to Susan B. Anthony in 1853: “I do not know that the 
world is quite willing or ready to discuss the question of marriage….[But] the right idea of 
marriage is at the foundation of all reforms….I feel this whole question of woman’s rights 
turns on the point of the marriage relation, and sooner or later it will be the question for 
discussion” (qtd in Stanley 177).   
As lawmakers began to consider expanding civil rights to freed black men, women’s 
rights activists, who had often been deeply involved in abolitionism, began to resent the 
hypocrisy evident in legislators’ willingness to grant contracting rights—and, thereby, self-
possession—to one group of people while denying them to another.  During the debates 
surrounding slave emancipation, the federal government effectively condemned one status 
relationship—slavery—while it upheld another—marriage.  This contradiction became most 
evident when federal legislators decided to exclude gender from the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.  Senator Edgar Cowan opposed the initial draft of the bill because, as he informed his 
fellow legislators, it “confers upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon 
lunatics…the right to make and enforce contracts” (qtd in Stanley 57).  The possibility that 
married women would be granted contract rights was enough to threaten the bill, and 
Republican lawmakers decided to limit the scope of the legislation to address race only.  This 
move ensured that marriage remained governed at the state level, all but guaranteeing that its 
legal definition would not change.  As one lawmaker assured his fellow legislators: “Your 
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State may deprive women of the right to…contract….But if you do so…it must not be on 
account of race, color, or former condition of slavery” (qtd in Stanley 58).  Throughout these 
legislative debates, lawmakers glorified contract rights as the key to male sovereignty, while 
simultaneously denying such abilities to married women.   
The women’s rights movement began to shift toward Gage’s and Stanton’s more 
radical views after the Civil War when the connection between contracting ability and 
freedom became a central tenet of American political rhetoric.  Following this trend, the 
women’s rights movement began to move away from its focus on duties and toward the new 
rhetoric of rights.  As Amy Dru Stanley notes: “…feminists claimed that marriage belonged 
at the very center of public debate over the outcome of slave emancipation.  To their way of 
thinking, this was the question of contract that logically followed abolition, for it distilled the 
inequality of the sexes and the continuing ownership of persons” (179-80).  In particular, 
they pushed for a wife’s right to her earnings and for women’s suffrage—both of which 
required a recognition of women’s self-possession, even in marriage.  These efforts, 
combined with changing economic conditions, helped usher in a second wave of married 
women’s reforms lasting from approximately 1860 through 1880.   
By entitling a wife to her earnings, these laws altered the marriage relationship 
because they overturned the notion that a husband had exclusive rights to his wife’s labor.  
As legal historian Reva Siegel argues, “The second wave of reform thus exceeded the logic 
of family protection.  In recognizing the wife as a legal and economic agent in her own right, 
the reform statutes implicated the structure of the marriage relation itself” (Siegel, 
“Modernization,” 2145).  The earnings statutes endorsed women’s right to enter the 
marketplace, and they also recognized women’s labor as an important commodity.  In other 
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words, the law no longer associated women with anti-market fears or the need for property 
stability.  Thus, the new laws fundamentally changed a wife’s position.  As Amy Dru Stanley 
notes, “In principle, [the laws] placed her contract rights on a new foundation—on her title to 
her own labor, rather than to property owned separately from her husband” (199-200).  The 
second wave of married women’s property rights revised the marriage contract to give wives 
contractual rights and ownership over their own labor; a husband’s legal identity was no 
longer believed to shelter his wife from market activity. 
Lillie Devereux Blake’s Fettered for Life: Lord and Master reflects the increasingly 
strident opposition to the status construction of marriage in the wake of slave emancipation, 
and therefore provides an interesting point of comparison with the domestic novels that this 
project examines.  A prominent women’s rights activist in her own right, as well as a 
frequent contributor to Anthony and Stanton’s The Revolution, Blake noted the inherent 
contradictions in the contemporary political climate: although the right to contract was 
essential for men, it was dangerous for married women.3  Because of the novel’s thorough 
critique of women’s legal disadvantages, David Reynolds claims that Fettered for Life is “the 
most comprehensive women’s rights novel written in nineteenth-century America” 
(Reynolds 401).  Indeed, Susan B. Anthony championed the novel; in her diary she noted that 
the novel would “stimulate every girl reader to have something beside marriage to depend on 
for support” (qtd in Farrell 131).  Anthony correctly divined Blake’s intention—to dispute 
the beliefs that women needed protection and that women found the greatest fulfillment in 
marriage and home life.  As Blake’s biographer, Grace Farrell, notes, even the novel’s title 
foregrounds Blake’s concern with the legal definition of marriage, particularly highlighting 
the persistence of status a decade after slavery had been abolished: “ ‘Fettered’ was a code 
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word for black slavery, a word that came to signify for antislavery feminists their own link 
with their sister slaves, and it also refers to marriage, with the novel’s subtitle ‘Lord and 
Master’ doubling both meanings and the theme of female constriction and imprisonment 
underscoring them” (132).  In her novel, Blake demonstrates the injustices of the current 
model of marriage, and she offers a new ideal of marriage as a union of two equal agents. 
In many ways, Fettered for Life’s plot resembles the trajectory of the domestic novel.  
It follows its central protagonist’s maturation process from her initial separation with her 
family until her marriage.  It also focuses on a community of women and frequently portrays 
the everyday life of the home.  Its investigation of depraved urban life and its sensationalistic 
tendencies also recall George Lippard’s The Quaker City (1845).  Both novels expose the 
powerful men of the city as lurid, deceitful, and perverse, and they imagine the perils that 
single women face in city life.  However, unlike urban sensational tales or domestic fiction, 
Blake’s novel supports women’s right to earn a living, and it asserts that their presence in the 
city and their participation in politics will bring much-needed change, particularly for the 
urban poor.  In fact, the novel’s complex and overlapping plot incorporates almost every 
major reform movement associated with women in the nineteenth century, advocating 
temperance, women’s suffrage, and women’s property reforms and decrying prostitution and 
domestic violence.   
Throughout the novel, Blake decries the law because it permits and even propagates 
so many of the evils done to women.  Through the characters’ frequent discussions of 
women’s political position, Blake presents every argument for legal reform.  When the 
prominent doctor Mrs. D’Arcy presents the protagonist, Laura Stanley, with a series of 
newspaper articles about domestic violence, she emphasizes that the status construction of 
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marriage informs a culture indifferent to the continued abuse of women: “ ‘but it is no 
wonder that such atrocities are lightly punished, when we realize what is the general tone of 
our laws with regard to women….Indeed the whole dicta of the law indicate that the wife is 
considered as the property of the husband, subject to him, and ever amenable to his 
correction’ ” (Blake 141-42).  Fettered for Life’s plot repeatedly identifies the legal definition 
of marriage as the central problem facing late nineteenth-century American women. 
Rather than depicting the law as an additional protection for women, as women 
novelists of the 1850s did, Blake portrays legal practitioners as cunning predators who use 
their power to abuse women.  When the novel opens, Laura Stanley is being held at a 
jailhouse against her will.  A policeman had brought her there after he found her walking the 
streets of New York at night alone.4  All of the policemen, as well as the judge who is 
assigned to her case, evidently suspect that Laura is a prostitute.  During her examination, 
Judge Swinton asks Laura how she has been employed, and she claims that she has been 
doing general housework in the country.  Openly doubtful of her story but clearly attracted to 
her beauty, the judge arranges for Laura to stay in the boarding house of one of his court 
assistants, Mr. Blodgett.  Soon after arriving at Blodgett’s, however, she begins to suspect 
that the house is not an ordinary boarding house.  As she tries to plan her escape, Frank 
Heywood, a court reporter who witnessed Laura’s rough treatment at the jailhouse 
examination, arrives to save her.  He explains that Blodgett’s is essentially a brothel, which 
Judge Swinton fills with the vulnerable women he examines in court.  In these short opening 
scenes, Blake establishes that the law is dominated by threatening and abusive men.   
The danger posed by the legal practitioners at the beginning of the novel extends 
throughout the narrative, particularly in Blake’s unflinching depiction of domestic violence.  
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Rhoda, Biddy, and Mrs. Blodgett are all victims of male brutality, including rape and spousal 
abuse.  Biddy almost dies as a result of her husband’s cruel assaults, and Mr. Blodgett 
mercilessly kicks his wife to death toward the end of the novel.  Blake makes it clear that 
these men are wicked, pitiless, and empowered by the legal system to unleash their 
aggression onto their wives.  By including so many instances of male violence, Blake asserts 
that such acts of depravity are no mere isolated incidents, and she prevents her readers from 
simply dismissing a character’s individual suffering.  The characters who suffer from the 
threat of domestic violence are all working-class women, and through her portrayal of their 
trials, Blake fictionalizes a prominent argument of the women’s rights movement: that even 
if upper-class husbands do not exploit their rights and strike their wives, the law does not 
adequately prohibit more brutish men from committing such assaults.   
If Blake reinscribes the class biases of the postbellum women’s rights movement, she 
also intimates that middle- and upper-class women who labor must brave charges of 
prostitution from unsympathetic men.  Not only do the officers of the court suspect Laura 
Stanley of prostitution at the beginning of the novel, but the men in the city repeatedly 
conflate women selling labor with women selling themselves.  As we have seen, male self-
possession steeled the man’s identity as he entered the wage market; he could always retain a 
core sense of self even as he sold his labor.  Because Blake’s male characters do not 
acknowledge women’s self-possession, they necessarily believe that any woman who works 
for a wage is placing her entire self onto the market for sale.  Laura encounters this view 
when she takes a job as a book agent in order to supplement her income.  The position 
requires that she sell books door-to-door in offices filled with leering, unwelcoming men.  On 
her sales trips, Laura must interact with sexually aggressive customers, who treat her 
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exclusively as a sexual commodity.  One customer buys a book after leering at her 
inappropriately and then assures her that “ ‘…whenever you have books to sell, be sure and 
come here…I’d pay a dollar any day to look at such a pretty face!’ ” (Blake 178).  His 
employees overhear the conversation and remark of Laura, upon her departure: “ ‘She’s one 
of ‘em!’ ” (Blake 179).  These men see nothing wrong with selling their own labor to the 
employer, but they condemn Laura as a prostitute for her own attempts to make money by 
engaging the man in business.   Blake continually emphasizes the hypocrisy of the theories 
supporting male self-possession and wage labor while denying the same rights to women; 
men believe that they alone can perform wage labor without selling themselves. 
Laura’s male customers also demonstrate the pervasiveness of belief in female 
dependency inherent to the status construction of marriage.  One of her first customers 
openly ridicules Laura’s decision to take a job: “ ‘it’s all nonsense for women to try to 
support themselves; even those who pretend to are all helped by some man; all of 
them…[A]nd you ought be getting married.  If you had a good husband to take care of you, 
you wouldn’t be doing this sort of thing’ ” (Blake 176).  Another customer, moved by 
Laura’s plight, reacts with what he intends to be sympathetic advice, but still dismisses 
Laura’s ambitions and ignores her grievances:  “ ‘…I see that you are honestly trying to 
support yourself; but take an old man’s advice: go home, have a little patience, and by and 
bye, you will get a good husband to take care of you!’ ” (Blake 181).  By portraying the 
customers’ ignorance of Laura’s s considerable intelligence and self-determination, Blake 
makes men who oppose women’s careers appear impractical, unfeeling, and reactionary.   
If Laura’s book agent job is degrading, Blake is quick to point out that it is not 
because traveling door-to-door is demeaning for a woman; rather, the position is degrading 
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because of the inappropriate way that men treat Laura.  When a customer suggests that Laura 
should find a more respectable way to earn a living, Laura powerfully describes the injustices 
facing women in every workplace: 
I am teaching drawing at half the salary paid to my predecessor, because I 
am a woman; and now you tell me I ought not to earn money in this way, 
because I am a woman!  What am I to do?  Even if I am a woman, I am 
hungry and thirsty, and cold, like a man; I have to pay the same board as a 
man; I must wear warm clothes as well as a man; in short, I need money to 
spend as much as if I were a man; and yet, because I am a woman, I am not 
allowed to earn it!” (Blake 181) 
Laura may not care for her book-selling job, but she is driven to that view only because she 
must endure either lewd behavior or unrealistic criticism from her male customers.  Even as 
Laura despises the treatment she receives as a book agent, she continues to demand her right 
to work such a job; therefore, her rhetoric in these scenes directly draws from the new 
emphasis on equal civil rights within the women’s movement that emerges during the post-
war period.  In this way, Blake portrays women’s rights advocates as sensible and ladylike 
women, like Laura, rather than the shrieking radicals who were often depicted in 
contemporary newspapers and magazines.   
 While Laura Stanley represents a woman determined to earn a living for herself, her 
friend Flora Livingstone embodies the privileged woman who is destroyed by a status-based 
marriage that robs her of self-possession.  Young and beautiful, Flora attracts the attention of 
the wealthy Mr. Le Roy.  From his entrance into the novel, Blake uses the language of 
subjugation and slavery, rather than courtship and companionate marriage, to describe his 
pursuit of Flora.  With Le Roy, Blake indicates, Flora “was no longer free, no longer 
belonged to herself, she had received a master, and been compelled to submit to the symbol 
of his power” (Blake 129).  Flora’s parents endorse the match, however, focusing only on Le 
Roy’s wealth, and Flora feels powerless to defy them.  After their marriage, Le Roy closely 
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monitors Flora’s spending, and when she objects to his control, he insists on his legal right as 
a husband to do so.   
Through Flora’s relationship with Le Roy, Blake emphasizes the emotional cruelty 
that husbands can inflict upon their wives, and she asserts the need for women’s self-
determination within marriage.  Unable to obtain money of her own, Flora secretly submits a 
poem to a popular magazine in order to earn a small cash prize.  When the poem is published, 
Le Roy is mortified and forbids her from writing again.  Flora becomes despondent; to take 
away her writing is to take away “all of her hope” (302).  To mollify her, he claims that he 
does not oppose her writing; he merely opposes her publishing her writing and earning wages 
from those publications.  This supposed compromise does not please Flora, though.  As she 
protests, “ ‘But it does not satisfy me to write them for my own eyes alone…I long to have 
others read my thoughts.  I was so happy the other day when my piece came out’ ” (Blake 
345).  Flora’s attitude is markedly different from the women writers who appear in Ann 
Stephens’s The Heiress of Greenhurst and Caroline Lee Hentz’s Ernest Linwood.  Flora does 
not claim that she is writing “only a record of my heart’s life” nor does she threaten to burn 
her pages, indifferent to whether anyone reads them.  Regardless of whether or not we can 
take comments from these earlier writers at face value, it is notable that Blake depicts a 
wealthy, privileged woman who wants her ideas to circulate publicly and be remunerated for 
them.  When Le Roy refuses to relinquish control over Flora, she becomes mysteriously ill 
and soon dies.  Depriving Flora of her writing opportunities literally robs Flora of herself. 
 The prominence of women’s artistic pursuits in Fettered for Life may appear as if 
Blake, like the domestic novelists before her, privileges the same limited range of career 
opportunities for women.  Yet in Fettered for Life, Blake does provide a portrait of a happy 
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professional, Mrs. D’Arcy, who is a successful doctor and “the model for what any woman 
might be” (Blake 384).  Mrs. D’Arcy is one of the most capable doctors in the city.  In fact, 
Blake even insinuates that Flora dies because Le Roy would not call on Mrs. D’Arcy to treat 
Flora.  
Blake’s most notable depiction of women’s possible professions emerges in her 
portrait of Frank Heywood, an activist city beat reporter, who also subverts nineteenth-
century notions of male protection.  Throughout the novel, Heywood appears at key 
moments, often when Laura is threatened by Judge Swinton and his henchmen.  Heywood’s 
character seems to provide the male protection that is so lacking in nineteenth-century urban 
life.  Yet Heywood never capitulates to the dominant cultural beliefs about women’s 
weakness and male protection because, as the reader finally learns, Heywood is actually a 
woman.  In Blake’s fictional landscape, therefore, men remain almost exclusively predators; 
it is women who can and must protect one another.   
Blake provides Frank Heywood’s story in a form of his/her long confession to Laura, 
and it contains echoes of the typical domestic novel plot.  Orphaned by the Civil War, Frank 
is left friendless on his/her family’s now worthless plantation.  As s/he tells Laura in 
language that could be taken directly from a domestic novel: “I found myself at twenty, alone 
in the world, with no protector and no home!” (Blake 365).  Frank, however, decides that 
s/he will not rely on any man for support.  “ ‘Full of a romantic belief in [the] possibilities of 
work,’ ” Frank explains to Laura, s/he sells all of the family’s remaining possessions and 
moves to New York City.  Frank faces the insulting and abusive treatment from the city’s 
men, including Judge Swinton, who attempts to sexually victimize Frank as he later will 
Laura.  At this point, Frank makes the decision to dress as a man in order to find his next job.  
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After pawning his/her father’s watch, Frank buys a suit of men’s clothes and is transformed.  
Frank assures Laura: “ ‘The change was delightful!  You can never imagine what it was!  My 
limbs were free; I could move untrammeled, and my actions were free; I could go about 
unquestioned.  No man insulted me, and when I asked for work, I was not offered outrage’ ” 
(Blake 366).  Through Frank, Blake presents women’s involvement in the cash and credit 
economy as thoroughly innocuous.  Rather than worrying about losing his/herself, as 
Melville’s Pierre does, Frank feels secure in working for wages.  Even though s/he must hide 
his/her gender, Frank’s freedom makes him/her the most self-realized character in the novel.  
Furthermore, after earning a fair wage for his/her work as a reporter, Frank is able to buy 
back his/her father’s pawned watch.  Unlike Pierre, who is tortured by liquidating family 
assets for cash, Frank’s involvement in credit is not only harmless, it is edifying.   
Frank’s fantastical story highlights Blake’s belief in the performative aspects of 
gender.  While cross-dressing certainly occurred in earlier texts, Frank’s decision is notable 
because s/he commits to cross-dressing until his death in order “to prove what a woman can 
do” (Blake 367).  In proving what a woman can do for the span of his/her life, though, Frank 
will actually prove what a woman can become—as fully capable and self-possessed as any 
man.  Frank’s narrative resembles a domestic novel’s plot only to disrupt the reader’s 
expectations of the genre.  Instead of learning from traumatic urban experiences that s/he 
needs the protection of friends and family, Frank rejects gender expectations and demands 
self-possession through wage labor. 
Despite Blake’s repeated depictions of the harrowing threats that women face in the 
city, Blake resists the temptation to turn away from the urban landscape and toward a 
nostalgic representation of lost rural life in the U.S.  Critics have too quickly categorized 
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Fettered for Life as an early urban reform novel, but it is instead a more thorough indictment 
of women’s legal position throughout the U.S.  Blake devotes several chapters in the middle 
of the novel to Laura’s return to her family’s farm, and in these scenes Blake reveals that 
women’s experience in rural life can be as unfulfilling and oppressive—albeit not as 
dangerous—as it is in the city.  When she arrives at the farm, her joy at seeing her sisters is 
quickly replaced by her remembrance of the difficulty of rural labor: “The old home life 
seemed to come back to her with all its drudgery, oppressing her, and wearying her.  No rest, 
no time for thought here; a daily struggle with endless work, a breathless race from morning 
till night; this was the lot to which those whom she so dearly loved were condemned!” (Blake 
314).  Blake’s inclusion of Laura’s return home in Fettered for Life prevents her readers from 
inaccurate comparisons between dehumanizing wage labor and the supposedly gratifying 
work of the productive homespace.  In Blake’s narrative, there is no nostalgic turn toward a 
more peaceful and stable economy situated in the home and removed from the pressures of 
the marketplace.   
In her descriptions of rural family life, Blake is careful to point out that husbands in 
the country also use their legal standing to abuse their wives.  Laura’s father is a domestic 
tyrant, unmercifully commanding a house filled with women.  Throughout Laura’s visit, 
Blake repeatedly mentions the laziness of the country men who congregate at the general 
store in town.  As one of Laura’s relatives claims, “ ‘Drive any evening through any of these 
villages hereabout, and you will find just such a lot of men lounging at the store; big hulking 
fellows who ought to be helping their tired wives at home’ ” (Blake 320).  If rural life is a 
paradise, Blake implies, it is because women must unceasingly labor to make it so.  Rural 
husbands, like their urban counterparts, subjugate their wives by ruthlessly controlling the 
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family’s money.  Laura’s cousin tells her a story of a woman who once entered the store with 
her young daughter and asked her husband for money to buy fabric for an apron that their 
daughter needed to work around the farm.  The man denies his wife’s request, and after she 
leaves, he buys all of the men in the store cigars.  Such a scene could easily be included in 
earlier domestic novels, but Blake follows the story with Laura’s cousin’s pledge that once 
she receives the right to vote, she will legally bar such cruelty on the part of husbands.  The 
possibility of translating critique into political action—and in particular the continual return 
to the rhetoric of rights—marks a shift from the hesitant probing of the possibilities afforded 
by status of earlier women novelists to Blake’s more confrontational womanist perspective. 
Despite Blake’s repeated portrayal of husbands’ abuses and despite Frank’s story of a 
fulfilling life without the possibility of marriage, Fettered for Life is not an anti-marriage 
novel.  For example, when introducing of Mrs. D’Arcy, Blake almost immediately informs 
the reader that the widowed doctor’s marriage “had been a profoundly happy one” (Blake 
29).  Like many women’s rights activists in postbellum America, Blake believed that 
marriage could be a beneficial relationship for men and women, provided it was an equal 
relationship.5  So, at the end of Fettered for Life, Blake offers her revised conception of the 
marriage contract.  When Guy Bradford asks Laura Stanley to marry him, Laura agrees but 
then justifies her decision in rather unsentimental terms: “ ‘For I believe that you will not ask 
me to surrender my liberty entirely, and will permit me to follow out my own career in life’ ” 
(Blake 379).  In agreeing to marry Guy, Laura makes clear that her career is essential to her 
selfhood and that she will not relinquish her self-possession to him.  Guy responds how a 
truly loving man should: “ ‘…your obligations to me shall be no greater than mine to you.  
We will make life’s journey hand in hand, equals in all things….’ ” (Blake 379).  This vision 
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of the ideal marriage differs significantly from the domestic novels on which this project has 
focused.  Certainly it rejects the conservative view of marriage as a status relationship, as 
well as the nostalgic reverie, in The Pioneers and The House of the Seven Gables, in which 
women provide stability and resolution amidst the tensions of the market.  Furthermore, it 
supersedes even the most progressive views of marriage in antebellum domestic novels.  For 
example, in Southworth’s The Lost Heiress, Falconer and Maude’s marriage is endorsed 
because Falconer refuses to accept control over Maude’s inherited property, yet he never 
suggests that the two will be equal “in all things.”  Although he repudiates his claim to her 
property, he does not dispute her emotional claim that a woman “does so delight to depend 
upon her husband.” 
Fettered for Life is a novel deeply committed to married women’s civil rights, and as 
such, it may not be representative of postbellum fiction.  However, it does provide an 
example of the new kind of legal fiction emerging during this time.  Fettered for Life is, after 
all, a fiction about the possibilities and consequences of contract.  Thus, it highlights the 
declining imaginative possibilities for status in the postbellum period.  Whereas antebellum 
literary fictions explored women’s possibilities within an idealized conception of marriage, 
the postbellum period—which was marked by civil rights debates during which status was 
expelled from the legal realm—explored women’s possibilities within the new paradigm of 
contract and rights. As wives earned the right to market their own labor and retain their own 
earnings, Henry Ward Beecher’s ideal of “a family that is not marketable” slowly became 
impossible.  A new kind of family must emerge to replace the status-based one, and as I 
demonstrate, Elizabeth Stoddard’s fiction centrally takes up this problem, a problem that will 
continue to engage writers of the late nineteenth century from Charlotte Perkins Gilman to 
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Henry James to Pauline Hopkins.  But the fantasy of the domestic novel—that the wife’s 
inferior legal status was a symbol and site of stability—was no longer a viable legal fiction, 
but simply nostalgia. 
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. 
                                                 
1
 Amy Dru Stanley dates the connection between the revision of the marriage contract and women’s 
emancipation to a private letter Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote in 1851.  See Stanley 177.  Elizabeth B. Clark 
claims that its origins lay in the communitarian visions of Robert Owen and Francis Wright.  See Clark 28. 
 
2
 Antoinette Brown Blackwell is probably the most widely known representative of the covenantal view of 
marriage.  She and Stanton debated the issue of contract and divorce at the 1860 national women’s rights 
meeting.  For more, see Stanton, Anthony, and Gage, The History of Woman’s Suffrage, I:716-735. 
 
3
 Blake began writing in 1857 shortly after her first husband’s death, and she became active in the women’s 
rights movement during the Civil War.  Resisting her family’s advice that she remarry, Blake began to write in 
order to support herself.  She wrote short stories, columns, and novels, and she also served as a Washington 
correspondent for the New York Evening Post and The World.  For more on Blake’s biography, see Farrell. 
 
4
 Blake’s biographer, Grace Farrell, attributes this portrayal of the dangers of the jailhouse to Blake’s work in 
the early 1870s with a committee that examined women’s treatment while in police custody.  For more, see 
Farrell 132-133. 
 
5
 Farrell attributes the novel’s support of marriage to Blake’s considerable antipathy toward Victoria Woodhull, 
who ardently supported free love.  Farrell implies that Blake wanted to demonstrate to the women’s rights 
movement that women could be self-possessed within marriage.  See Farrell 125-131. 
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